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TURKEY'S EXPERIENCE WITH CORPORATISM

By

Nilgün Önder

B.Sc., Middle East Technical University, 1987

THESIS

**Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Master of Arts
Wilfrid Laurier University**

1990

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explore Turkey's experience with corporatism from the founding of the Republic in 1923 onwards. In this study, corporatism is defined as a particular political structure within the capitalist system which acts as a linkage mechanism between the state and society. It is basically related to labour and capital organizations, and their relationship to the state.

The analysis of the Turkish case remains loyal to the traditional authoritarian / liberal corporatism classification. It is asked whether Turkey exhibits the characteristics of authoritarian corporatism or liberal corporatism, or both? Was there a transition from one type to the other? It is shown that the Turkish case came very close to the authoritarian type of corporatism during the latter half of the 1940s, and especially the 1950s. Centralized political control was established over labour, and the labour unions were coerced by the government to cooperate in the implementation of governmental policies.

After the 1960 military takeover, a democratic system was firmly established, and a wide set of democratic rights and freedoms were recognized. Freedom of unions and the right to strike and bargain collectively were put under constitutional guarantee. A new model of planned capitalist development was adopted. Within the new political and economic framework a transition from authoritarian corporatism to the liberal type corporatism occurred. Organized labour was induced to cooperate with the government and employers in restraining wage increases and preventing work stoppages in return for institutionalized participation in the making of economic policies. This took place within the framework of democratic rights and freedoms.

Towards the end of the 1960s these corporatist arrangements came under attack from the rank and file and the newly-established radical labour confederation, DISK. During the 1970s, in the face of increasing discontent of the workers with the corporatist arrangements, the major labour confederation, Turk-Is, avoided corporatist deals. In the latter half of the 1970s, the system of industrial relations became increasingly conflictual. Both the employers' associations and labour unions more often resorted to militant tactics. The economy also entered into a severe crisis. Under such conditions, the government sought the cooperation of organized labour in restraining wage increases and controlling strike activity. Consequently, a corporatist agreement was signed between the government and Turk-Is. But it did not last long. By the end of the 1970s labour militancy reached its peak.

This situation was brought to an abrupt end by the 1980 military takeover. An authoritarian corporatist structure was imposed on labour. This was very similar to the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America.

This study suggests that the main varieties of corporatism may emerge in a single country, and there may be shifts from one type to the other. It also shows that liberal corporatism is not confined to the advanced capitalist democratic societies of Europe. The political and organizational conditions for the emergence of liberal corporatism may also exist in a developing country like that of Turkey.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Purpose and Scope of the Study

Until the 1970s, the concept of corporatism was used mainly in the studies of history of ideology and of fascist or authoritarian regimes, mostly with prescriptive or pejorative intent. Since the mid-1970s there has been a revival of interest among scholars in the notion of corporatism. The literature in the field has grown to such an extent that some authors have come to speak of "neocorporatism as a major study itself". [Panitch, 1980:159].

The initial concern of the early neocorporatist writers was to divorce the concept of corporatism from its identification with fascist regimes. Corporatist practices were not confined to the fascist or authoritarian states only. Scholars pointed out that some corporatist tendencies emerged in liberal democratic societies as well, especially in the post-Second World War period. In contrast to corporatism in fascist or authoritarian states, corporatist arrangements in liberal democratic societies have developed within the context of democratic freedoms and rights. Therefore, there was an urgent need to distinguish between different types of corporatism. Authors used such terms as "authoritarian corporatism" or "state corporatism" to refer to corporatist arrangements in authoritarian states and "liberal", "societal", "bargained", "neo" or "plural" corporatism to refer to those in democratic states.⁽¹⁾ While some authors formulated generic definitions of corporatism which covered its sub-types, they immediately made a basic distinction

(1) We will use the terms "liberal" and "authoritarian" corporatism.

between its two major varieties: liberal and authoritarian. Students of corporatism point out that these types of corporatism show a basic structural similarity which enables one to characterize, at a very abstract level, different cases as generic instances of corporatism. They also emphasize that these two main varieties of corporatism are, however, the products of different political and socio-economic processes and based on different configurations of power relations that set them apart from each other. They agree that authoritarian corporatism is found in late dependent capitalist authoritarian societies, while liberal corporatism emerges in advanced capitalist liberal democratic societies.

The purpose of this study is to explore Turkey's experience with corporatism from the founding of the Republic in 1923 onwards. In studying the Turkish case we will remain loyal to the already established authoritarian/liberal corporatism classification. Within this framework we will investigate whether the Turkish case shows the characteristics of authoritarian corporatism or liberal corporatism, or both. If there occurred a transition from one type of corporatism to the other type, how did it take place and how can it be explained? Although the Turkish case may not necessarily produce all the dimensions of either authoritarian or liberal corporatism, it may come rather close to one or the other type during different periods. We will also examine the divergencies and similarities between Turkish corporatism and the general models.

We assume that Turkey came to show the characteristics of both liberal and authoritarian corporatism during different periods. As noted, advanced capitalist development is commonly regarded as providing the most favorable context, even the necessary condition, for liberal corporatism. During the period under investigation Turkey can not be characterized as an advanced capitalist society. In other words, it lacks the

theoretical conditions for the emergence of liberal corporatism as specified in neocorporatist literature. If it is shown that some kind of liberal corporatism emerged in Turkey, answers to some other questions can be searched out: In a developing country why and how do such liberal corporatist arrangements develop? Does liberal corporatism, which is believed to correspond to a certain level of economic and political development, form a deviant case in Turkey? In which form do such liberal corporatist arrangements occur in a country like Turkey, whose political regime underwent transformations from time to time? Do they appear in the same form as in the democratic societies of Europe, and how?

In the first chapter, we will discuss related topics in neocorporatist theory. We will first try to clarify the concept of corporatism. There is no agreement among students of corporatism on the conceptual usage. We will review major conceptualizations of corporatism identified in the literature. On the basis of our discussion, we will reach our own working definition. We argue that corporatism should be understood as a particular political structure which links the state and society. At a more specific level, we see corporatism as basically related to capital and labour organizations and their relationship to the state. In other words, the constituent units of corporatism are labour unions, capital organizations and the state.

If both liberal and authoritarian corporatism emerged in Turkey during different periods, as we expect, a better understanding of these arrangements and the conditions that led to their emergence would require a prior analysis of both liberal and authoritarian corporatism. After we discuss the distinction between liberal and authoritarian corporatism, we will examine both types in regard to major related questions. We will

review major approaches to the issue of the emergence and determinant conditions of liberal corporatism. In explaining the emergence of liberal corporatism some authors emphasize socio-economic conditions while others also attract attention to the importance of political and organizational factors. In view of the uneven development of liberal corporatism across advanced capitalist liberal democratic societies, we will argue that to be able to account for the emergence of liberal corporatism both socio-economic conditions and political factors should be taken into account.

In the field of liberal corporatism the recent debate is centered around the issue of who benefits under liberal corporatism, more specifically whether corporatist arrangements benefit the working class or not. This question has sparked a major debate between Marxist and non-Marxist authors. We will also discuss this topic in the first chapter. In the study of the Turkish case, by taking into account different arguments by students of corporatism, we will also try to find an answer to this question within the framework of the Turkish case.

Students of Latin American corporatism have recently come to emphasize the diversity of authoritarian corporatist arrangements in Latin America. There has now been a common effort to specify the socio-economic and political conditions that could account for the rise of different kinds of authoritarian corporatist practices in the region. This issue is a source of disagreement among authors on Latin American corporatism as well as among students of corporatist arrangements in Western democracies. They disagree as to whether socio-economic or political organizational factors are most important in explaining the diversity of corporatist arrangements. We argue that to be able to explain the rise of different types of corporatism one should take into account both socio-

economic conditions and political organizational factors. We will analyze corporatist arrangements in Turkey with a systematic reference to both socio-economic conditions and political factors.

We will study Turkey's experience with corporatism from a historical perspective, starting from the foundation of the Republic in 1923. The focus, however, will be on the post-Second World War period. In this way we can identify different kinds of corporatist practices and transitions from one type to the other.

The study of the Turkish case bears significance for several reasons: Given the fact that there is no agreement as to the conditions that lead to the rise of different varieties of corporatism, single case studies can still be employed. If liberal corporatism is observed in Turkey, a country which has a different level of economic development and democratization from those societies in which liberal corporatism developed, the reasons for its emergence in Turkey gain importance. Moreover, corporatist arrangements in the Middle Eastern countries did not attract much scholarly attention, while there is an impressive amount of literature on corporatism in Latin America and Western Europe. The present study of corporatist arrangements in Turkey is intended to be a start for filling this gap.

2. Methodology of the Study

This study aims to apply neocorporatist theory to the Turkish case. Mainly secondary sources will be used. As far as possible different sources of statistical information will be utilized to support the arguments developed.

Chapter 1

NEOCORPORATIST THEORY

Introduction

Although empirically corporatism is a 20th century phenomenon, its epistemological origin goes well back to the feudal socio-political organization of the medieval European society. As an ideology or prescriptive economic and social theory, corporatism emerged in 19th century Europe. Corporatist ideology borrowed heavily from Roman Catholic thought which encompassed both anti-individualist and anti-socialist elements. Although there are several varieties of corporatist ideology, the common emphasis was on "social harmony" and "organic unity" as the main societal values and goals. Corporatist ideology proposed a socio-political order based on functional organization and representation in order to achieve "organic unity" of society.

The best-known practical application of corporatist ideology was Italian fascism. In fascist Italy, the corporatist structures were introduced as an answer to the bitter class conflict and struggle within a situation of intensive socio-economic difficulties. Corporatism was also practised in some other authoritarian regimes of the 20th century, including Austria (1934-1938), Portugal (1933-1974), Vichy France and the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Peru. The establishment of corporatist arrangements in those societies took place concomitantly with the elimination of liberal democratic institutions, civil liberties, and the suppression of the working class movements and organizations. As a result of its incorporation into fascist practice and

ideology, corporatism came to be associated with fascism. However, corporatist practices were not confined to the fascist or authoritarian states only. In liberal democratic societies, some corporatist tendencies can be observed during the First World War and the inter-war period. These tendencies towards corporatism became more apparent during the Second World War, and especially in the postwar period. In contrast to the corporatist arrangements in the authoritarian regimes, corporatism in advanced capitalist democratic societies developed within the context of democratic institutions and liberal political rights and freedoms.

For a long time, corporatist practices in liberal democracies remained largely unnoticed. For the theorization of these new developments in the state-society relations in advanced capitalist democratic societies from a new perspective, we had to wait until the mid-1970s. By then the concept of corporatism began to be applied to liberal democratic societies, usually accompanied by such prefixes as "neo", "liberal", "societal", or "bargained". Neocorporatism takes a new network of relations among interest associations themselves and the relations between those associations and the state as its subject matter.

Until very recently, pluralism was the dominant model purporting to explain civil society-state relations. To summarize very briefly, pluralism is based on the assumption of the existence of a multitude of autonomous interest groups with more or less equal power, which compete on equal terms in the political arena, and are based on voluntary membership. Pluralist theory assumes that the raw materials of politics consist of the demands made by the interest groups on the state, and that political outcomes are actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment. The state is

considered as passive recipient of interest group demands.

However, the students of neocorporatism observe some new developments in the linkage mechanism between the state and society which are opposite to those suggested by pluralists. They argue that pluralist theory and its ahistorical methodology are inadequate to explain this new network of relations between the state and interest associations. They suggest a different configuration of interest politics, a different conceptualization of the state and its role in advanced capitalist democratic societies. Neocorporatist scholars point to the fact that some interest associations have monopolies of interest representation in their respective fields. Membership is not always voluntary. They do not just represent the interests of their members, but control and discipline them. These interest associations do not always act as autonomous entities but they can be granted privileges to participate in public policy-making and implementation in exchange for some controls over their activities. Moreover, the students of neocorporatism emphasize that the state is not simply a passive recipient of group pressures but itself a principal actor in the political process. These themes run through all the literature on neocorporatism. Philippe Schmitter, attracting attention to these elements common in neocorporatist literature, argues that "it is those elements common to the corporatist perspective on interest politics that constitute a paradigmatic revolution to the pluralist model". [Schmitter,1982:260].

Since the mid-1970s, the literature on neocorporatism has grown to such an extent that some scholars came to speak of "neocorporatism as a major field of study itself". [Panitch,1980:159]. While neocorporatism provides a valuable framework for the analysis of the relationship between the state and organized interests and the interactions

among those organizations themselves, there are some important ambiguities surrounding the literature in the field . Despite their agreement on the concrete existence of the phenomenon, the students of neocorporatism disagree among themselves on the conceptual usage, the determinant conditions and the consequences of the corporatist arrangements in democratic societies. In Panitch's words,

The first thing that strikes one as one reads through the literature on modern corporatism is the profound lack of agreement on what the concept actually refers to. [Panitch, 1980:159]

Similarly, Wilson notes:

Ten years of discussion of neocorporatism seems not to have clarified the definition of the term but to have muddled it up... As confusing as this lack of precise definition of corporatism may be, an even more serious problem is the uncertainty over what corporatism describes. [Wilson,1983:109]

The lack of agreement among the authors as to what the central concept actually describes causes a great deal of confusion in the field. It is variously used by different authors to connote quite different things such as "a system of interest representation", "a pattern of policy formation", "a distinct economic system", "a state form" or "a tool of social control to discipline the working class". These differences in the conceptual usage are important because they are the direct result of different theoretical perspectives adopted by the authors. To quote Panitch again, "the debate over the definitions is really the debate between different theoretical frameworks in which normative and ideological preferences play their parts". [Panitch,1980:184]. It is obvious that if authors have different conceptualizations in mind when they use the term, they will come to different conclusions regarding the determinants and consequences of corporatist arrangements.

In order to clarify the concept of corporatism and reach our own working definition which is to be applied to the Turkish case, it is necessary to discuss major conceptualizations of corporatism found in the literature.

I. Major Conceptualizations of Corporatism

1. Corporatism as a Form of Economic System

The broadest view of corporatism was proposed by Pahl and Winkler. For them, corporatism is a distinct economic system. They define corporatism as "a comprehensive economic system under which the state intensively channels predominantly privately owned business towards four goals: order, unity, nationalism and success." [Pahl and Winkler, 1974:72] The most important factor that marks the shift from capitalism towards corporatism is the change in the role of the state. Pahl and Winkler argue that under corporatism the state establishes far-reaching control over all the major areas of private economic activity. It is the state that directs and controls the economy by establishing national priorities. In other words, the state attempts to control private investment and profit. Thus, for Pahl and Winkler, "corporatism is more than an increased form of government intervention in economy". [Pahl and Winkler, 1974:72-73] They end up with a definition very close to the notion of state monopoly capitalism. As Cawson (1986:23) points out, "their corporatist model, however, reverses the model advanced by state monopoly theorists in which monopoly capital uses the state apparatus for their own purposes". According to Pahl and Winkler, although the state establishes a directive control over the national economy it does not attempt large scale nationalization. In other words, it does not eliminate private ownership: "The essence of corporatism is private

ownership and state control". [Pahl and Winkler,1974:73] Having defined corporatism as a new form of economic system, they counterpose it to capitalism, socialism and syndicalism, which are considered as alternative forms of economic system on the basis of public control and private ownership variables.

They explain the conditions that lead to a transition from capitalism to corporatism in terms of industrial concentration. They argue that industrial concentration reached such a level that the concept of open market competition became meaningless. Given that development, "the notion that profit is a sufficient justification for corporate activity is undermined. For a government to tolerate (and in some industries, to sponsor) industrial concentration to this level and still allow the giant corporations to maximize profits would be to institutionalize exploitation in the most blatant manner possible. This new structure requires not only some sort of mechanism to prevent the abuse of corporate power, but a new purpose and justification for business activity". [Pahl and Winkler, 1974:74] According to Pahl and Winkler, corporatism emerged as the most likely candidate to achieve these ends. [Pahl and Winkler,1974:74]

In short, Pahl and Winkler conceptualize corporatism as a total system which is distinct from capitalism. This is a very broad view of corporatism. They define corporatism and capitalism very loosely. They leave some crucial questions unanswered. They assume that the state is a neutral, autonomous subject which is able to impose its own will upon economic order. It is above the socio-economic forces in society. Although their arguments are based on the assumption of state's independence from economic interests, they do not explain where the autonomy of the state comes from. Moreover, as Panitch rightly points out, "Pahl and Winkler fail to establish that state

intervention that constitutes the core of their corporatist model takes place on the basis of economic criteria that are distinct from those of capitalism". [Panitch,1980:163] In the corporatist system as formulated by Pahl and Winkler, state control of the economy can well take place on the basis of profit-maximization, which is the essence of capitalism. By defining corporatism as a distinct form of economic system they miss the crucial point that corporatism, in fact, develops within capitalist system itself rather than being an alternative to it. As a result, it would not be unjust to say that Pahl and Winkler have not really helped us understand the corporatist phenomenon in capitalist societies.

2. Corporatism as a System of Interest Representation

The conceptualization of corporatism which has the greatest influence among scholars is that of Schmitter, often called the founding father of neocorporatism. His essay "Still the Century of Corporatism", which was published in 1974, inspired this new perspective.

For Schmitter, corporatism is a system of interest representation alongside pluralism, syndicalism and monism. The initial concern of Schmitter was to liberate the concept of corporatism from its identification with authoritarian regimes or fascism. Therefore, he confines corporatism to a particular form of interest representation.⁽¹⁾ He offers an ideal-typical definition compatible with different regime types:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation

(1) Although Schmitter uses the term interest representation in "Still the Century of Corporatism", he prefers to use the term "interest intermediation" in his later works on the grounds that interest associations are not just the passive recipients of already formed member interests. Instead they play an active role in forming these interests, hence representation may be only one of the activities of these associations. [see Schmitter,1977:9; 1982:263]

in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. [1974:93-94]

As Schmitter himself makes it explicit, his main purpose in constructing such a general model of corporatism was to offer "a paradigmatic alternative" to pluralism.[1974:95]

In contrast to corporatism,

Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered, and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories that are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and that do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories. [1974:96]

In Schmitter's definition corporatism and pluralism are considered as polar opposites. Yet he immediately acknowledges that these definitions are "ideal-typical description, a heuristic and logico-analytical construct". He says that "no concrete systems of interest representation may perfectly reproduce all these ideal forms but many come rather close". [1974:94, 1977:9]

Schmitter has been criticized by several authors for constructing his definition of corporatism as a polar opposite to pluralism. This point was first made by Nedelmann and Meier. In their view, Schmitter defines corporatism in terms of the same dimensions as pluralism, hence replicating the same theoretical problems embedded in pluralism. As they put it:

The very fixation of the concept of corporatism with the previously dominant model of pluralism contains a number of pitfalls. By taking over the dimensions of the latter -such as "numbers of organizations", "intra-sectional monopoly of interest representation, "degree of competition between the organizations" and so on- and just changing or inverting the empirical values of these dimensions or variables, one risks the same conceptual and theoretical difficulties already connected with the previous utilization. [Nedelmann and Meier,1977:40]

The same point has been also raised by Panitch [1980:167].

Schmitter's definition gives no indication about the socio-economic system in which corporatism is located. Defining corporatism along the same dimensions as pluralism, Schmitter puts all interest groups on the same plane and comes to ignore asymmetric power relations between them. He also assumes neutrality of the state vis-a-vis the groups. Thus he fails to challenge the basic pluralist assumptions of the equivalence of power and influence among the groups and state neutrality between the groups.

Schmitter's definition of corporatism contains essentially three dimensions: the structure of the interest representation system (limited number of constituent units, noncompetitive, functionally differentiated and singular), the internal structure of individual organizations (compulsory membership and hierarchically ordered) and their relation to the state (recognition by the state in exchange for some controls over leadership and interest articulation). Schmitter puts the emphasis on the structure of the interest representation system, but in doing so, says Lehmbruch, Schmitter neglects one rather important dimension: the interactional dimension, that is, the collaboration among the interest associations themselves.(2) As Lehmbruch put it:

(2) Like Schmitter, Streeck also focuses exclusively on the structural aspects of corporatism. [see Streeck, 1982].

Liberal corporatism should not be confused with simply more consultation and cooperation of government with organized interest groups which is, of course, common in all constitutional democracies with a highly developed capitalist economy. The distinguishing trait of liberal corporatism is a high degree of collaboration among these groups themselves in the shaping of economic policy. [1977:94].

Panitch also considers this omission of "the cooperative interaction dimension" a serious weakness of Schmitter's definitional approach which, Panitch argues, has not been overcome in his substantive analysis.[Panitch 1980:168-9]. Moreover, as Schmitter himself admits, the emphasis on the ideal-typical structural properties in his definition results in the static nature of his approach.

Schmitter acknowledges that his definitions of modes of interest intermediation are ideal-typical description, the concrete systems of interest intermediation being located somewhere between them. He maintains that "the interest intermediation systems of Western Europe are mixed. Although a given society comes much closer to one rather than the other... different interest sectors and issue areas may be operating in quite different ways". [Schmitter,1977:14]. As Lehbruch (1979:300) and Panitch (1980:179) point out, Schmitter, however, does not specify any particular interests as being more likely to be corporatized. In other words although Schmitter confines corporatism to a particular mode of interest representation or intermediation, thereby avoiding the problems associated with extending it to a total system, he nevertheless tends to include all sorts of interest group in his corporatist framework.

In Schmitter's definition the state recognizes, if it does not create, representational monopolies of interest groups in exchange for certain controls over the groups' leadership recruitment and interest articulation. But he does not deal directly with the issue and fails

to carry it far enough. He does not explain how the state grants monopolies of representation and what specific controls it exercises over these interest associations.

3. Corporatism as a Pattern of Policy Formation

The conceptualization of corporatism as a form of policy-making was formulated by Lehmbruch. He argues that corporatism is more than a form of interest intermediation. Lehmbruch criticizes Schmitter for neglecting the institutionalized organizational participation in government and the high degree of collaboration among the groups themselves. He offers his own definition of corporatism.

It is an institutionalized pattern of policy formation in which large organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in the articulation (or even intermediation) of interests, but -in its developed forms- authoritative allocation of values and in the implementation of such policies.
[Lehmbruch,1977:94]

Like Schmitter, Lehmbruch does not identify any particular interest associations as the constituent units of corporatism. He establishes the constituent units as simply "large interest organizations". But he immediately emphasizes that the most important interest associations included in the corporatist structures are organized labor and business associations, while other associations, even organized agriculture, are largely confined to classical pluralist pressure politics. He stresses that the central feature of corporatism is the collaboration of capital and labour. He also maintains that the corporatist pattern is essentially confined to economic policy, in particular incomes policies constitute the core domain.

To sum up, taking into account Schmitter's neglect of the collaborative interaction

among the groups themselves in a corporatist scheme, Lehmbruch states that this type of group collaboration in policy-making is the distinguishing characteristic of corporatism. Thus he comes to emphasize the institutionalized participation of interest associations in government and the collaborative interaction among them, whereas Schmitter puts the emphasis on the structure of the system of interest intermediation.

4. Corporatism as a State Form

Corporatism was defined by Jessop as "a state form within capitalist society". Jessop defines the state as "an institutional complex of forms of representation and intervention". [1979:193] Therefore, he comes to distinguish state forms on the basis of differential articulation between political representation and state intervention. He particularly focuses on the parliamentary and corporatist forms of the state. He says that parliamentarism is a form of state in which political representation takes place through elections and the exercise of other related political rights, while state intervention is realized through bureaucratic bodies in accordance with the principle of the rule of law. As he puts it:

Parliamentarism involves the fusion of political representation mediated through the participation of citizens in the policy making of an elected government through their exercise of voting and related political rights and state intervention in the form of legislation or general policies enforced by a permanent rational-legal administration in accordance with the rule of law. [Jessop,1979:194].

In contrast to parliamentarism, in the corporatist form of the state the formal institutions which mediate political interests are also responsible for the administration of state policies. In Jessop's words:

Corporatism involves the fusion of political representation mediated through a system of public corporations which are constituted on the basis of their members' functions within the division of labour, and state intervention through these same corporations and/or administrative agencies formally accountable to them. [Jessop,1979:195]

Thus for Jessop, in contrast to parliamentarism, which is characterized by the institutional separation of representation and intervention, corporatism involves their institutional fusion because those formal bodies which perform the function of representation of interests also take responsibility for intervention.

Jessop has a very broad phenomenon in mind when he talks about corporatism. He conceptualizes corporatism as a total system which stands in contrast with parliamentarism. He also talks about tripartism. He defines tripartism as "a hybrid form in which corporatist and parliamentary structures coexist". The relative weight of corporatist and parliamentary structures changes according to the extent to which the conditions for the existence of corporatism and parliamentarism are present and the balance of social forces constituting the support bases of each form.

Jessop claims that the coexistence of parliamentarism and corporatism is a contradictory unity. This is due to their different decisional rules (unanimity vs.majority), different principles of legitimacy (functional vs.electoral) and different political bases (corporations vs. parties), which at least suggest that the policies preferred in one system may be incompatible with those accepted in the other system. [Jessop, 1979:195-6, 201-3].

Panitch (1980:179) notes that although Jessop views corporatism as a state form, he never explains how corporatism as a total system emerges. He rather tends to emphasize

the contradictory unity of parliamentarism and corporatism in the tripartite structures in advanced capitalist democratic societies and the internal contradictions and limitations of corporatism which prevent it from emerging as a total system that stands in contrast to the parliamentary system. Jessop himself admits that just because corporatism is appropriate to economic intervention it tends to be inadequate for other issue areas. Corporatism, he says, would not be able to deal with popular democratic struggles; in such areas parliamentary government and pressure politics could continue to play a central political function. [Jessop,1979:204]. As Panitch rightly points out, in the end, Jessop comes to see corporatism simply as a part of tripartism.

5. Corporatism as a Mechanism of Social Control

Leo Panitch takes a very critical attitude towards the literature on corporatism. He argues that there is an unwarranted tendency on the part of neocorporatist authors to formulate definitions of corporatism which are too broad in scope. For Panitch corporatism is neither a distinct form of economic system nor a state form. He stresses that "corporatist arrangements do not extend to all interest group-state relations". It is the interest associations of business and labour alongside the state that are the core constituent units of corporatism. [Panitch,1980:173, 1977:65] He immediately places corporatism within the framework of the advanced capitalist economy. According to Panitch

Corporatism is a political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organized socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and of mobilization and social control at the mass level. [1977:66]

Panitch sees corporatism as a "specific" and "partial" political structure within advanced

capitalist society and not as a total political system or an alternative economic system to capitalism. It is specific, says Panitch, in the sense that it involves an institutionalized representation of the organized socio-economic producer groups in policy-making, collaborative interaction among the groups themselves and a degree of state control over the groups whereby they are used as agencies of control vis a vis their members. [1977:65-66; 1980:173]. Corporatism is also "partial" since it does not involve all interest groups but only large socio-economic producer groups, namely, labour unions and business associations. Thus for Panitch, corporatism is not simply a system of interest representation because it involves an element of state control over the groups and their consequent employment as agencies of social control at the mass level. He bitterly criticizes some corporatist theorists for assuming equivalence of power or influence between labour organizations and business associations in corporatist structures. He also rejects the assumption of neutrality of the state vis-a-vis capital and labour. He argues that there is a systematic bias on the part of the state towards the capitalist class. [1977:67; 1980:174]. Panitch sees the substantive character of corporatism as a mechanism of state control over organized labour in capitalist societies. [1980:181]. The emergence of corporatism in advanced capitalism is associated with the attempt to contain the political and economic strength of the working class. It is a mechanism of social control designed to incorporate the working class in the capitalist system. [Panitch, 1980:174].

Similarly, Claus Offe also discusses the differential impact of corporatization on labour and capital organizations after studying the German case. Yet he looks at the corporatist arrangements in advanced capitalist democratic societies from a broader perspective than Panitch. Offe says that "the distinction between class organizations on

the one side and other organized interest groups representing collectivities on the other side leads to a theoretical dilemma in neocorporatist theory". The dilemma is: "either to analyze corporatist structures from a class theoretical perspective, thus focusing solely on class organizations and class conflict, or to include all interest groups into the analysis, thereby failing to transcend the pluralist paradigm". He says that both approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. Though the former has the advantage of taking into account "the aspect of repressive discipline imposed by corporatist arrangements specifically on unions" as a result of the ruling class strategy to contain the increased strength of the working class, it fails to account for the corporatization of non-class organizations. The latter approach, on the other hand, recognizes the fact of the corporatization of interests groups other than labour unions and business associations, but fails to account for the impact of corporatism on the terms and institutional channels of class conflict and its differential effect on labour and capital organizations. To solve this dilemma, Offe proposes a dual or combined explanation which "relies exclusively neither on the social class nor on the pluralist group paradigm". [Offe, 1981:139]. Such a combined explanation would account for the fact that the corporatization of labour unions on the one hand and the corporatization of ordinary pluralist interest groups on the other serve quite different purposes. In Offe's words:

For working class organizations what is to be achieved is restraint, discipline, responsibility and the greater predictability of conflict behaviour that results from bureaucratization. In the case of ordinary pluralist interest groups ...the dominant motive is the delegation, devolution of authority to reduce overloaded agenda. [1981:140]

In short, Offe's dual or combined explanation involves seeing the corporatization of working class organizations primarily in terms of restraint and discipline. In the case of

ordinary interest groups, however, corporatism is interpreted as a form of delegation or devolution of state authority.

In his attempt to formulate a combined explanation, Offe tends to incorporate into his corporatist scheme what he calls "policy takers" which include all kinds of interest groups such as associations of taxpayers, welfare recipients, students, hospitals, automobile associations. [Offe, 1981:138]. But in doing so, he blurs the distinction between corporatism and pluralism. Moreover, in his empirical studies he fails to give any concrete examples of corporatist arrangements which are supposed to include "policy takers". He focuses exclusively on labour unions and business associations.

6. Corporatism as a Type of Decentralization

In Offe's explanation, while corporatism is viewed as a mechanism of social control over the working class, it becomes a type of decentralization in the case of ordinary interest groups. State authority is delegated to interest associations in order to reduce administrative overload. Maier also sees corporatism as a form of decentralization. He defines corporatism as "a partial devolution of policy-making and enforcement on organized private interests". [Maier, 1981:49]. Whereas Offe differentiates between class organizations and ordinary interest groups, for Maier the corporatization of class organizations as well as ordinary interest associations is a type of decentralization. Maier says that this process can be initiated by public officials to increase their own control over economic and social life or interest group representatives themselves may initiate this process in order to benefit from the advantages associated with quasi-public authority. [Maier, 1981:49, 52].

7. Pluri-Dimensional Definition of Corporatism

We have discussed the main conceptualizations of corporatism that can be identified in the literature. As we tried to show, the students of neocorporatism disagree among themselves on the conceptual usage of the core concept. It is viewed variously by different authors. It is defined as "a system of interest intermediation", "a pattern of policy formation", "a distinct economic system" "a tool of social control" or "a type of decentralization". In the face of these varying approaches to the concept, some authors attempted to formulate a definition of corporatism which would cover its different dimensions pointed out by different authors.

In a later study, leaving aside the broad conceptualizations of corporatism Lehmbruch offered a pluri-dimensional definition of corporatism. He says that in Schmitter's definition, the emphasis was laid on the structural properties of the interest intermediation system, while institutionalized organizational participation in government is neglected, leading to an overaccentuation of the former dimension. On the other hand, Lehmbruch says that Panitch and he himself stressed the interaction between labour and capital organizations and the state, while largely deemphasizing the organizational and structural properties of the system. Lehmbruch comes to view these dimensions as strongly correlated with each other, though not in a deterministic manner. He proposes an alternative definition of corporatism that combines these dimensions. He says that one might define a fully corporatized polity by the following characteristics:

- (1a) Interest organizations are strongly coopted into governmental decision making. (1b) Large interest organizations (in particular labour unions) are strongly linked to political parties and take part in policy formation in a sort of functional

division of labour. (2a) Most interest organizations are hierarchically structured and membership tends to be compulsory. (2b) Occupational categories are represented by non-competitive organizations enjoying a monopoly (3) Industrial relations are characterized by strong concertation of labour unions and employers' associations with government which implies that unions refrain from strongly employing the strike weapon or other conflictual tactics. [Lehmbruch,1982:2-6]

This pluri-dimensional definition proposed by Lehmbruch is an extreme type of corporatism. As Lehmbruch himself points out, "fully corporatized polities are rare; a specific country may rank high on only one or perhaps two dimensions. [1982:6]. Lehmbruch also emphasizes that there is no uniform institutional framework of organizational participation in corporatist policy making. Institutional frameworks of organizational participation in government show diversity across the cases. In some societies like the Netherlands it is highly formalized and structured while in some other cases it takes the form of unofficial summit meetings between public authorities and the leaders of the peak associations of labour and capital organizations. [see Lehmbruch,1982:23-25].

8. A Working Definition of Corporatism

On the basis of our discussion on major approaches to the concept of corporatism, I will also leave aside the broad definitions. While some authors tended to see corporatism as "a distinct economic system", "a total political system or a state form", they failed either to explain how corporatism emerges as a total political system or to establish specific criteria which distinguish corporatism from other forms of economic system, more particularly capitalism. There are no concrete examples of a corporatist political system different from other forms of political systems, or of a corporatist economic system distinct from capitalism.

I view corporatism as a particular political structure within the capitalist system which acts as a linkage mechanism between the state and society. Such a view of corporatism avoids stretching the concept to a total characterization of political system or the state. It also locates corporatism within the framework of capitalism instead of defining it as a distinct economic system alternative to capitalism. This definition, however, needs further specification.

Some authors tended to include all sorts of interest groups in their corporatist framework. But doing so leads one to repeat the same theoretical problems associated with pluralist theory. At a minimum, such an approach puts all interest groups on the same plane and ignores their differential power position. It also assumes neutrality of the state vis-a-vis the interests in the society. To avoid this problem Offe proposed a dual explanation which would take into account the differential power position of the groups and that aspect of control and restraint imposed by corporatist arrangements specifically on labour unions, on the one hand, and the corporatization of ordinary interest groups, on the other hand. He nevertheless failed to give any concrete examples of corporatist arrangements which are supposed to include ordinary interest groups other than capital and labour organizations.

Corporatism basically remains limited to labour unions and capital organizations, that is those organizations which reflect the class divisions in the society. It specifically aims to regulate or contain class conflict and class struggle. Naturally, labour unions and business associations alongside the state constitute the basic units of corporatist arrangements.

Some students of corporatism laid emphasis on the structural properties of corporatism while some others focused on the relationship between the state and capital

and labour organizations. However, these two dimensions of corporatism seem to be closely interrelated as some studies showed. [see e.g Lehmbuch, 1982:16-27]. Corporatism involves cooperation of labour unions and capital organizations, at the leadership level, with the state authorities. They take responsibility for public policies, which implies a certain degree of restraint in their activities and control over their members. This appears to require an organizational structure which is central to Schmitter's definition, that is hierarchical centralization of the constituent organizations, their non-competitive character or near monopoly of representation in their respective fields. As a result, a study of corporatism needs to take into account both structural and interactive dimensions.

II. Major Subtypes of Corporatism: Liberal and Authoritarian

The primary concern of the early neocorporatist writers was to liberate the concept of corporatism from its identification with authoritarian regimes and fascism. Scholars came to realize that corporatist practices were not confined to authoritarian or fascist regimes. There were some corporatist tendencies in liberal democratic societies during the First World War and the inter-war period. These corporatist tendencies in some liberal democratic societies became more apparent especially in the postwar period. Obviously, the corporatist arrangements in democratic societies were different from the authoritarian or fascist version of corporatism. In contrast to authoritarian corporatism, the corporatist arrangements in liberal democratic societies developed within the context of democratic freedoms and rights. Therefore, there was an urgent need to distinguish between different types of corporatism.

Schmitter, making use of Mihail Manoilescu's (3) early distinction between subtypes of corporatism, labels two types of corporatism as "societal corporatism" and "state corporatism". Because Schmitter's intention is to establish corporatism as a different system of interest representation from other systems of interest representation, he deliberately covers both subtypes under his ideal definition. Yet he distinguishes between them on the basis of their developmental patterns and the configuration of power and influence relations:

When viewed statically, descriptively, institutionally, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity, one which sets them apart from pluralist, monist or syndicalist systems of interest representation. When viewed in motion, however, they are revealed as the products of very different political, social and economic processes, as the vehicles for very different power and influence relations and as the purveyors of very different policy consequences. [Schmitter,1974:104-5;1977:11]

The structural and behavioural elements that differentiate these two subtypes are dependent upon whether the characteristics of the constituent units, namely, their limited number, singularity, compulsory and noncompetitive character and their hierarchical nature are "imposed from above as a matter of deliberate public policy" (state corporatism), or "emerge voluntarily from below as a more or less spontaneous response to prior changes within civil society". [1977:10;1974:104]. He maintains that "the origin of societal corporatism is to be found in the gradual, slow decay of advanced pluralism, while that of state corporatism in the abrupt demise of nascent pluralism". He traces the gradual replacement of advanced pluralism by societal corporatism to "the imperative

(3) Mihail Manoilescu, a Rumanian theorist, is the author of *Le Siecle du Corporatisme*, which was published first in 1934 and revised in 1936.

necessity for including subordinate classes within the political process due to the concentration of ownership, international economic competition, expansion of the role of the state in order to maintain a stable bourgeois dominant regime". On the other hand, "the origin of the forceful replacement of nascent pluralism by state corporatism is to be found in the problems associated with delayed, dependent capitalist development". Because in the latter situation the national bourgeoisie is too weak to respond to the demands of the subordinate classes through their incorporation within the political system, they tend to repress and exclude the autonomous articulation of the interests of the subordinate classes. [Schmitter,1974:107-8]. In brief, according to Schmitter, societal corporatism emerges within advanced capitalist democratic societies while state corporatism is associated with delayed capitalist, authoritarian states. [Schmitter,1974:104-5]. He gives Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark as examples of societal corporatism and Salazar's Portugal, Franco's Spain, Fascist Italy, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Mexico as cases of state corporatism.

It should be pointed out that Schmitter comes to adopt a class perspective in his explanation of the emergence of corporatism, in contrast to his group approach in his conceptualization. The static nature of Schmitter's ideal definition of corporatism is avoided in his explanatory hypothesis regarding the developmental patterns of the subtypes of corporatism. He relates his corporatist model to the context of social and economic transformations. Nevertheless, in his attempt to differentiate societal and state corporatism, Schmitter tends to underestimate the role of the state in the development of societal corporatism. He constructs state and societal corporatism as polar opposites where the state actually plays no role in the emergence of societal corporatism while in

the case of state corporatism, it is the state that imposes the corporatist structures from above. As Lehmbruch (1982:8) points out "if this was the case, the existence of the compulsory associations in liberal democratic societies would prove puzzling as in Germany and Austria who have compulsory chambers that are in fact public law bodies". Moreover, by Schmitter's own definition, it is the state that recognizes, licences (if not creates) and grants monopolies of representation. Thus Schmitter's distinction between societal and state corporatism becomes rather blurred.⁽⁴⁾ Empirically too, the state in liberal democratic societies played different degrees of role in the establishment of corporatist structures. Therefore, following Lehmbruch (1982) it would be more appropriate to see Schmitter's two subtypes of corporatism as hypothetical constructs, similar to his generic definition, while concrete cases fall somewhere on a continuum between them.

Other neocorporatist writers have used similar typologies. Lehmbruch, for example, distinguishes between liberal and authoritarian corporatism. He argues that "in contrast to authoritarian corporatism, liberal corporatism develops within the framework of liberal constitutional democracy. Although in liberal corporatism, the membership in large interest associations largely loses its voluntary character, the organizations themselves voluntarily enter corporatist arrangements without coercion from the state and in principle remain free to withdraw from corporatist cooperation." [Lehmbruch, 1977:92, 1979a:54]. Similarly, Panitch notes that corporatist arrangements in advanced capitalist democratic societies have taken place within the context of liberal political freedoms, and state

(4) This point was also raised by Cohen and Pavencello (1987).

coercion has played a secondary or at least sporadic and indirect role in the process. He particularly emphasizes freedom of association. Yet he also argues that the state has played a crucial role in the emergence and functioning of the corporatist arrangements even in liberal democratic societies. [see Panitch, 1977 and 1981]. Jessop distinguishes between liberal corporatism and fascist corporatism in terms of their social bases. He argues that "not only is liberal corporatism associated with parliamentarism, it is also grounded in social democracy. Indeed, liberal corporatism is the highest stage of social democracy"... Contrary to liberal corporatism, the fascist type of corporatism aims at the destruction of parliamentarism and social democracy, and draws its social base from traditional and new petit bourgeoisie. Liberal corporatism develops in "normal" capitalist states, fascist corporatism in "exceptional" capitalist states. Although Jessop does not explain what he means by "normal" and "exceptional" capitalism, we can say that in his opinion liberal corporatism is found in advanced capitalist societies or what he calls "state monopoly capitalism". [Jessop, 1979:205-7].

Neocorporatist writers agree that no fully corporatist system exists. Therefore, they suggest that the concepts of corporatism and pluralism are two poles on a continuum with actual cases falling at varying points between them. With regard to Schmitter's distinction of state and societal corporatism, we also suggested that state and societal types of corporatism represent end-points on a continuum. Crouch also formulates a continuum, the end-points of which are authoritarian corporatism and contestation, as depicted in the following figure.

<----->

| | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Authoritarian corporatism | Liberal or bargained corporatism | Pluralism | Contestation |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|

This continuum is based on the functions of the groups themselves: "discipline of members in favour of general interest" and "representation of their particular interests". Contestation is all representation and no discipline, and authoritarian corporatism is all discipline without representation. In both pluralism and liberal or bargained corporatism interest associations perform both representative and disciplinary functions, but the more we move in the direction of corporatism the more we find discipline than representation, while the opposite is the case in pluralism. [Crouch,1983:456-8]. Nevertheless, focusing only on the relationship between leaders and members, Crouch's formulation neglects the relationship between the state and interest organizations, though he says that in authoritarian corporatism government imposes its own policy on the interest organizations. The interest associations do not participate in the determination of policy, yet they are required by law to enforce the government policy vis-a-vis their members. In contrast, liberal corporatism involves bargaining and exchange relationship between the state and interest associations. [Crouch,1983:458; 1979a:23]

To summarize, from neocorporatist literature it appears that the differences between liberal and authoritarian corporatism rest on the relationship of the interest associations to the state, that is, whether interest associations voluntarily enter into corporatist arrangements and remain free to terminate them, or whether they are coerced by the state; the functions of interest associations vis-a-vis their members (whether they have only disciplinary roles); and the extent to which liberal democratic institutions, rights and

freedoms are circumscribed, in other words, whether corporatist arrangements develop within the context of liberal democratic freedoms and rights or they are premised on their destruction. It should be pointed out once more that it would reflect reality better to consider authoritarian and liberal corporatism as a continuum rather than a dichotomy.

The distinction between authoritarian and liberal corporatism bears great significance for our study of the Turkish case. We will try to establish whether the organizational structure of capital and labour organizations and their interactions with the state can be characterized as an instance of authoritarian corporatism or liberal corporatism. We expect that in a certain period the Turkish case may come rather close to the authoritarian type of corporatism, while in another period it may represent an example of liberal corporatism, although it may not necessarily reproduce all the dimensions of either. Since we believe that Turkey came to show the characteristics of both types during different periods and that there were shifts from one type to the other at certain times, we need to analyze both authoritarian and liberal corporatism very carefully, and understand the processes that led to their emergence. In the following section, we will first discuss liberal corporatism, then more recent literature on the authoritarian corporatism found in Latin America.

III. Liberal Corporatism

1. Emergence and Determinant Conditions

A better comprehension of liberal corporatism requires an analysis of the conditions that led to its emergence. There are different approaches to the issue. We will discuss major explanations identified in the literature. Because it is commonly agreed that liberal

corporatism is the concomitant of advanced capitalism, these explanations were in fact formulated for the advanced capitalist societies. Although this is the case, on the basis of our discussion we can still reach some hypotheses concerning the emergence of corporatism in democratic societies, which can help us to explain the development of such liberal corporatist arrangements in a developing capitalist country like Turkey. A discussion on the explanations which have been advanced for the developed capitalist democratic societies may also allow us to identify the differences and similarities between the Turkish corporatism and the corporatist arrangements in the advanced capitalist societies of Europe.

At the broadest level, some authors trace the emergence of liberal corporatism primarily to the international economic system. Katzenstein (1984) and Zysman (1983:317-8), for instance, point out that such corporatist arrangements developed mainly in small nations with open economies, which are particularly subject to external competition and vulnerable to changes in international economic conditions. They argue that international vulnerability imposes strong pressure on those small countries with open economies to facilitate cooperation between the government and capital and labour organizations. The argument that corporatism is more likely to develop in small nations with open economies is also shared by some other authors as well. [see e.g Schmitter, 1985]. If we look at the concrete cases, we also see that liberal corporatism is most developed in small Scandinavian countries which are particularly subject to international competition. Nevertheless, by tracing the emergence of corporatism in democratic societies primarily to the international economic order, one risks missing the crucial importance of the domestic factors. Banting (1986:5) points out that "not all countries

with open economies have corporatist arrangements, as Canada itself attests".

Some students of corporatism such as Schmitter (1974), Crouch (1979a) and Jessop (1979) tend to explain the emergence of corporatism in democratic societies in terms of the socio-economic transformations, specifically the replacement of the competitive market economy by the monopoly stage of capitalism and the problems associated with it.

Schmitter linked the development of both societal and state corporatism to the functional imperative of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence. He related the gradual replacement of pluralism by societal corporatism to the processes of concentration of ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the state. He claimed that the corporatist associational configuration began to emerge from the period of accelerated capitalist development at the end of the 19th century. With the advent of concentrated capitalist development, interest associations gradually began to organize along corporatist lines. On the other hand, the regulative and integrative functions of the state necessarily expanded as the indispensable guarantor of capitalism. But the more its regulative role increases the more it needs special information and expertise and a knowledge of public opinion. Consequently, an osmotic process takes place, whereby the state and interest associations seek each other out. The state and interest associations enter into corporatist arrangements under which the state recognizes or licenses and grants monopolies of representation on these associations in exchange for observing controls over their activities. [Schmitter, 1974:107-111]. In short, Schmitter related the development of corporatist arrangements in liberal democratic societies to the macro socio-economic transformations which started during the late 19th century, more

specifically monopoly or concentrated capitalist development.

A similar approach is that of Crouch, who also links the development of liberal corporatism to such processes as cartelization, industrial concentration and increasing state intervention, which partially suspend market forces characteristic of the liberal or classical stage of capitalism. Because such processes suspend the market forces, alternative means must be found for restricting prices (ultimately the price of labour since every price reflects labour cost). This is achieved through the incorporation of organized labour in economic decision-making. [Crouch, 1979a:19-21]. With respect to the role of the state in the emergence of liberal corporatism, Crouch suggests that "it should be seen as a part of the wider processes that led to the suspension of market liberalism". [Crouch, 1979a:20-22]. Corporatism is rooted in a direct relationship between capital and labour generally at the national level. "The state's role is crucial, but limited to the means of access to the national level". [Crouch, 1985:85-6].

Jessop also explains the emergence of corporatism in democratic societies directly in terms of the advent of monopoly capitalism. He claims that the monopoly stage of capitalism requires increasing state intervention in the economy in order to guarantee the accumulation of capital. The changing imperatives of capital accumulation in the field of intervention in turn involve changing requirements in the field of representation. Under the circumstances of increased state intervention in the economy, the parliamentary system is unable to provide the necessary conditions for capital accumulation. Parliamentarism is liable to various political crises which restrict its capacity to function on behalf of capital. For instance, splits among political parties in parliament or between the parties and their supporters may lead to representational crises which in turn make the

government inefficient. Moreover, radical or revolutionary parties can obtain substantial representation in parliament. Elections also lead political parties to increase public spending to compete for votes rather than to ensure capital accumulation. These problems will be intensified to the extent that parliament has control over the means of intervention in the economy. Consequently, corporatism emerges as a new form of bourgeois domination. It can disorganize the forces of opposition and find an adequate social base in the working class. Jessop argues that social democracy is the most appropriate social base for corporatism. It secures working class support, and at the same time social democratic parties prevent or weaken the development of autonomous forms of working class mobilization that threaten to unify against the rule of capital. Thus social democratic parties play a key role in the establishment of corporatist structures. [Jessop, 1979:196-207].

Among students of corporatism there is a general agreement that liberal corporatism develops within the framework of advanced or monopoly capitalism. Yet an approach which tries to explain the emergence of liberal corporatism directly in terms of the replacement of competitive capitalism by monopoly capitalism, the problems generated by it and the necessarily expanded role of the state as the guarantor of capital accumulation like the approaches of Schmitter, Crouch and Jessop fails to account for the diversity of corporatist practices across advanced capitalist societies. For example, although the United States represents the center of monopoly capitalism, corporatism failed to develop in this country. The advent of monopoly capitalism, therefore, is not a sufficient condition for liberal corporatism. If some kind of liberal corporatism is observed in such a developing country as Turkey, then explanations directly based on the

nature of advanced capitalist development are incorrect. We therefore need to look at some other approaches to the emergence of liberal corporatism.

Schmitter linked the development of societal corporatism to the functional imperative of capitalism to reproduce itself in a context of advanced or monopoly capitalist development. In one of his more recent articles (1985), he came to argue that the necessity of capitalism to reproduce itself is too vague and indeterminate to explain the emergence of corporatism, especially the diversity of corporatist arrangements across the countries in West Europe and North America. Instead he emphasizes specific historical circumstances. He claims that corporatist arrangements that have emerged in the democratic societies of Europe in the postwar period have been largely *unintended* outcomes of disparate interest conflicts and policy crises in which none of the class or state actors was capable of imposing its preferred solution upon the others. He argues that "the state would have preferred authoritative regulation, business the reign of market forces while labour a redistribution of income. Yet corporatism satisfies none of these projects but incorporates elements of all". He emphasizes that "therefore corporatism emerges as the second best compromise which no one really wanted, hence its general invisibility and uneven development". [Schmitter,1985:37]. He specifies some conditions that, he argues, determine the emergence or development of corporatism in democratic societies. Schmitter maintains that corporatism is possible only where there exists some degree of balance in class forces so that no one can impose its hegemony over the others and where other cleavages such as religion, ethnicity, ideology do not divide class organizations internally. He also notes that corporatist arrangements are more likely to develop in small countries and in open economies that are specifically subject to external competition. [see

Schmitter,1985].

Schmitter's more recent explanation of the emergence of corporatism explicitly rejects the view of corporatism as a deliberate act of state control over the working class or a strategy of class domination.

Both Lehmbruch (1977) and Goldthorpe (1985) argue that corporatism emerged primarily as a response to the growing problems of the management of advanced capitalist economies.⁽⁵⁾ They maintain that the classical instruments of Keynesian policies of economic management such as demand management through fiscal policies were eventually found to be inadequate to affect macro-economic policies, especially in the stagflationary period. To use Lehmbruch's phrase, governments were faced with "control deficits". When governments realized that such indirect measures were ineffective for controlling the national economy and that economic parameters were largely affected by the behaviours of major economic interests, they increasingly turned to more direct measures such as statutory incomes policies in order to influence the behaviours of business and organized labour. Nevertheless, since such direct measures can not be successful unless governments obtain the consensus and cooperation of capital and labour associations, they attempted to establish some arrangements for political bargaining between employers' associations, labour unions and government that is, corporatist arrangements. In brief, according to Lehmbruch and Goldthorpe, the emergence of corporatism in the advanced capitalist democratic societies of Europe

(5) Goldthorpe argues that corporatism has not been the only response to the current crisis of advanced capitalism. He points to the development of "dualist tendencies" as an alternative response. [see Goldthorpe, 1985]

represents attempts by governments to establish some arrangements for cooperation in economic policy-making between government and the major economic interests in dealing with the rising problems of economic management in consequence of the actions of the major organized economic interests.

In seeking to account for the diversity of corporatist practices in the Western democracies, Lehmbruch identifies some prerequisites of corporatism. He maintains that incomes policies are the core domain of corporatist policy making. Since incomes policies essentially involve wage restraint, argues Lehmbruch, their success is largely contingent on the incorporation of organized labour in policy formulation. This, in turn, presupposes some structural and ideological characteristics of the union movement. Lehmbruch stresses that corporatism requires a centralized and concentrated union movement. This is also true for employers' associations, but it is vitally important in the case of labour organizations because a high degree of rank and file autonomy impairs corporatist arrangements. The ideological orientation of the union movement is also important, says Lehmbruch. A union movement with a strong class conflict orientation would not be willing to enter corporatist cooperation, as the French labour unions exemplify. Moreover, corporatism is more likely to develop where socialist or social democratic parties have been the leading party in government. [Lehmbruch,1977:110-12]. This last point is also emphasized by Goldthorpe. He maintains that since corporatist arrangements essentially involve labour unions in exchanging some restraint on their market power for institutionalized participation in economic policy-making, whether or not labour unions are willing to enter into corporatist arrangements constitutes a major question for the development of corporatism. In that regard, the presence of social democratic parties in

government plays a crucial role in inducing labour unions to agree to such corporatist arrangements:

The fact that the countries in which such tendencies have been most sustained are ones in which social democratic parties have played a dominant role in government is readily intelligible: union movements will be more prepared to enter into political bargaining, and will have greater confidence in eventual gains from it where they possess close ideological as well as organizational ties with the ruling party. [Goldthorpe, 1985:328-29].

Several other authors -Jessop (1979), Panitch (1977) and Maier (1985), for example- also agree that the strong presence of social democracy is a major encouragement to corporatist cooperation. However, we should note that both Goldthorpe and Maier also point out that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. [Goldthorpe, 1985:329; Maier, 1985:49-50]. Goldthorpe, for instance, argues that "labour unions in West Germany and the Netherlands have joined corporatist arrangements even when socialists have not been dominant, and in Britain even when the labour party has been in power, the effective participation of unions in corporatist arrangements has proved to be difficult to establish." [Goldthorpe, 1985:329]

We emphasized that liberal corporatist arrangements developed only in some Western European countries. We looked for some explanations in the literature for the divergent pattern of corporatist practices in democratic societies. We found that some authors stressed the structural and ideological characteristics of the union movement as an important factor accounting for the uneven development of liberal corporatism across democratic countries. Panitch also emphasizes that corporatism developed only in some Western European societies, while it failed to emerge in other developed democratic

societies. He argues that the critical factor accounting for the corporatist developments was the level of employment and relatedly the post-war state's commitment to maintaining full employment as a major policy goal. It was only in those countries where the working class was strong enough to secure an effective commitment of the state to full employment and at the same time well organized in the industrial arena (thus able to take advantage of full employment through wage pressure) that labour unions were included in economic policy-making through corporatist arrangements. This was the case in Austria, Sweden, Norway, Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany after the early 1960s. In contrast, in those countries where the working class was too weak or divided to secure an effective commitment by the state to full employment and Keynesian policies, increased state intervention in the economy took place without the incorporation of labour unions in the state economic apparatus. This was the case in the United States, France, Italy and Germany until the mid-1960s. [Panitch, 1981:30-1]. In other words, it was the changing balance of class forces in favour of labour that led to the state's commitment to full employment, and the economic as well as political consequences of full employment, in turn, gave rise to the corporatist arrangements.

Panitch argues that from the beginning of the postwar era, it was recognized that under near-full employment the absence of the fear of unemployment would have disruptive effects on workers' discipline at workplace. This caused considerable concern for the state and capital. It also became obvious that the problem went beyond that. Panitch points out that under the conditions of full employment the market strength of labour unions increased considerably. They were in a much stronger position to raise wages. But the increases in wages would have the effect of wage-push inflation or profit

squeeze. If the increases in wages or labour costs were to be passed on as price increases it would cause inflation, and this in turn would undermine the external competitiveness of the country. On the other hand, if wage increases were not offset through price increases, this would squeeze profits. To solve this dilemma, the state was forced to design income policies to abate wage pressure from the unions. Panitch emphasizes that incomes policies lie at the heart of corporatist development. Because it is the behaviour of labour unions that incomes policies are designed to affect, its success is dependent on the direct cooperation of unions in the formulation and administration of the policy to the rank and file. Thus corporatist arrangements, in which labour unions, employers' associations and government cooperate, came into being. [Panitch, 1977:76-8; 1986:42-7]. Maier also agrees with Panitch that full employment was a crucial factor in the emergence of corporatism:

The Neo-Keynesian political leaders of the years after 1945, convinced that the state must pursue high employment and growth, were responding to an agenda set by labour and naturally looked to unions as their major political interlocutors. [Maier,1981:48].

Panitch says that several domestic factors facilitated the development of corporatism. These facilitative factors cited by Panitch are the same factors that are specified by Lehmbruch as the preconditions of corporatism, that is the existence of highly centralized employers and labour union federations which can engage in bargaining at the national level and commit their members to accepting the agreements reached; control of government by social democratic parties and the effects of social democratic ideology on the labour movements with its rejection of Marxian class struggle as the dynamic of change. [Panitch,1981:31; 1986:44-5]. Although they advocate different explanations for

the emergence of liberal corporatism, students of corporatism generally agree that these structural and ideological properties of the union movement are crucially important and, as has been noted before, they also share the view that corporatism is most developed where social democratic or socialist parties have been in government. [see Maier,1985:49-50; Goldthorpe,1985:328-9; Lehmbruch,1977:110-2; Crouch,1985:80-2].

Having discussed major explanations formulated by the students of corporatism for the development of corporatist structures in democratic societies, we came to view the emergence of liberal corporatism in relation to the role of the state in macro-economic management. However, in view of the fact that corporatist arrangements occurred in some democratic countries while they failed to emerge in others, the development of liberal corporatism can not be read off directly from the expanded economic role of the modern capitalist state. For example, although France represents a case of elaborate state intervention in the economy, corporatism did not develop in this country. Organizational and ideological characteristics of the union movement, but particularly its strength in the industrial arena or at the level of collective bargaining, proved to be crucial factors for the emergence of liberal corporatism. It was in those instances in which labour unions were strong enough to upset economic policies of government through wage pressure and relatedly strike activity that attempts were made to initiate corporatist arrangements. The primary aim was to establish some arrangements for cooperation between central labour and capital organizations and government in the formation and administration of public policies, in the context of which labour unions could be induced to moderate their wage demands and refrain from using the strike weapon and other highly conflictual tactics in return for incorporation in the public policy-making. Since cooperation between the

representatives of capital and government in economic policy-making is hardly a new phenomenon, it is the inclusion of labour unions in this process that is crucial for the emergence of liberal corporatism. In those countries where labour unions were not strong enough in the industrial arena, they were largely left outside of the public policy-making. Because it is specifically the behaviour of labour unions that corporatist arrangements aim to affect, the development of corporatism presupposes some particular structural and ideological characteristics of the union movement as specified by Lehmbruch, Panitch and some other commentators. In our analysis of the Turkish case, we will explore whether those preconditions for the emergence of liberal corporatism also existed in Turkey. We expect that those arguments that we have made with respect to the emergence of liberal corporatism must also hold true for the Turkish case.

2. Why Do Labour Unions Enter Into Corporatist Arrangements Without Coercion From the State ?

In regard to the emergence of corporatist arrangements in liberal democratic societies, a crucial question that should be answered is *why do labour unions agree to corporatist cooperation in the absence of coercion from the state?* As some students of corporatism emphasize, the success of corporatist arrangements is contingent on the direct cooperation of unions, and it is the unions that are most affected by the participation in corporatist cooperation. [See Goldthorpe,1985; Lehmbruch,1977; Offe,1981; Panitch,1977] Why, then, do unions agree to underutilize their market strength and commit their members to accept that? Theorists of corporatism are well aware of the crucial importance of the question. For example, Lehmbruch says that "a central problem of a generic theory of

neocorporatism, thus, is how -in the absence of coercion from the state- the decision of large organizations to enter (or to continue) a liberal corporatist cooperation may be explained". [Lehmbruch,1977:92]. However, despite their awareness, they do not directly address the problem. Yet we are still able to identify in the literature basically three approaches to the problem.

According to one approach which was advocated by such authors as Schmitter (1985), Streeck (1982) and Pizzorno (1978), labour unions agree to participate in corporatist arrangements primarily because of the benefits from such arrangements which were mainly in the form of gains for unions as an organization vis-a-vis rival unions and power for their leaders vis-a-vis the rank and file. They argue that interest organizations, particularly labour unions, have an interest in avoiding voluntary membership which generates a free-rider problem. Workers join unions mainly due to the expectations of material benefits rather than out of solidarity sentiments. Most prefer to be free-riders and avoid paying union dues. To resolve the paradox of voluntary membership by making de jure or de facto membership compulsory, labour unions enter into corporatist arrangements under which they agree to observe some restraint in their activities in exchange for organizational support from the state. Pizzorno (1978) claims that union leaders are willing to engage in corporatist deals since their position and the interests of union organizations are tied to long-term gains as opposed to members who expect short-term benefits. Nevertheless, as Sabel points out, "if workers join unions because of the expectations of material benefits as those authors argue, why should they accept or continue to make sacrifices on their short term interests for the benefits for the union organizations and leaders?" (1981:225).

Another approach is taken by Crouch (1979a, 1979b), Korpi (1983) and Regini (1985), who emphasize that unions' consent to corporatist cooperation is to be understood in terms of the fact that the unions gain a far more direct role in economic decision making in return for sacrifices on their short-term interests. It is the possibility of making the policy outcomes more favourable to labour through direct access to decision-making that encourages labour unions to agree to corporatist deals. These authors consider unions' participation in corporatist arrangements as basically involving an exchange between government and unions. They indeed argue that it is this exchange that is fundamental to the development of corporatism or, as they would prefer to term it, "bargained corporatism", "societal bargaining" or "political exchange". [see Crouch, 1979a, b; Korpi, 1983 and Regini, 1985]. Crouch, for example, claims that "under corporatism the relations between the state and organized interests are characterized by bargaining: Something has to be exchanged for the social peace which organizations are expected to deliver". [Crouch, 1979a:23] He says that "how big the compensation for unions' cooperation would be depends on the structure of the working class movement and of the society concerned". [Crouch, 1979a:40]. Regini even argues that "under certain conditions unions may themselves move autonomously into the corporatist path as part of *their own strategy of exchange* by exercising self-restraint in their market actions and by inducing the government to grant them public status".⁽⁶⁾ He says that "unions will prefer a strategy of political exchange when they have more power in the political arena than in the industrial sphere, for instance, when a pro-labour party is in power, and when the state

(6) Italics are mine.

is a greater source of benefits than wage increases. [Regini,1985:127-31].

We should note that although Schmitter's, Pizzorno's and Streeck's explanations imply an exchange between the state and unions, for them the advantages that the unions derive from this exchange are mainly in the form of organizational gains or power for the leaders. For Crouch, Regini and Korpi, on the other hand, the main gain of the unions under political exchange is the possibility of making the policy outcomes more favourable to labour directly participating in economic policy formation. Obviously, all these authors consider corporatism as a form of political bargaining that unions enter primarily with government rather than business.

In contrast to such views of corporatism as a bargaining or exchange relationship between the state and labour unions, Panitch argues that the state's threat to intervene directly in the collective bargaining process by regulative and/or coercive means played a rather important role in inducing unions to cooperate under corporatist arrangements:

Ironically the readiness with which union movements have undertaken this development *voluntarily* in the modern era has to a large extent been a function of the threat made by the state to intervene directly by regulative, coercive means in the collective bargaining process. [Panitch,1981:32]

He argues that "the participation of the Swedish Confederation of Labour Unions (the Landsorjanisation, LO) in the centralized wage regulation in the late 1930s and the participation of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in Britain in the establishment of national wage norms in the mid-1960s took place under the direct threat of governments to legislate statutory wage controls". The unions, says Panitch, opted for cooperation on the grounds that in this way they could avoid statutory wage restrictions. [Panitch,1981:31-2;1977:84-5].

In distinguishing between authoritarian corporatism and the corporatist structures in liberal democratic societies, Panitch (1977:63) originally claimed that "state coercion has played a secondary or at least sporadic and indirect role in the process of the development of corporatist arrangements in liberal democratic societies". But later, putting the emphasis on the threat of direct state intervention in inducing labour unions to enter into corporatist cooperation in the democratic societies of Europe, he came to blur the distinction between authoritarian and liberal corporatism. It in effect renders our question "why do unions enter corporatist arrangements in the absence of state coercion," meaningless, at least to some extent. However, it should be acknowledged that Panitch's main intention in doing so was to raise the issue of the role of the state in liberal corporatism as a response to its neglect in other neocorporatist writings.

In contrast to his earlier emphasis on direct state threat, Panitch came to argue in one of his recent works:

Tripartism was not some imperfect capitalist plot, effected under conditions of high employment, to secure wage restraint from unions. It was rather a political response by the state under full employment conditions to long-standing demands made by strong and centralized trade unions for the right to be consulted and to bring their influence to bear in the making of economic policy. [1986:45].

Students of corporatism disagree among themselves on the conceptualization and emergence of corporatism. But no other question divides them as bitterly as the question of "who benefits under liberal corporatism", more particularly "whether liberal corporatism benefits the working class or not". Their disagreement is a direct product of their different theoretical frameworks in which their ideological and value preferences play a significant part, especially given the direct relevance of corporatism to

contemporary society.

3. Who Benefits: Does the Working Class Lose?

This question led to a major debate between non-Marxist and Marxist scholars. The former agree that corporatism benefits labour significantly while the latter insist on the class-biased nature of corporatism against the working class. Yet the issue also reflects a major debate within the Left itself. The debate is centred around the possibility of a reformist, democratic path to socialism, the very issue that demarks the major schism within the Left between those who believe in incrementalism and reformism and those who reject the possibility of an incrementalist way to socialism. The debate does not seem to be settled.

Such Marxist students of corporatism as Offe, Panitch and Jessop argue that corporatism favours capital and discriminates against labour, hence it is inherently unstable. For them, corporatism represents the latest form of class domination under capitalism:

The organizations of labour and capital, although affected by exactly the same forms of institutionalization, are inhibited to a greatly different extent in their freedom to pursue their respective interests and the current proposals for interest institutionalization are specifically designed to impose much more far reaching restrictions on labour than on capital. [Offe,1981:146].

According to Offe, this is so because the power of labour unions rests ultimately on the effectiveness of their organizations, while that of capital rests on the control of the means of production. But the means of production can not be transferred from the members of the capitalist class to their organizations; capital associations themselves do not generate

power and define the interests of their members. They merely state already existing power positions and already determined definitions of interests. Contrary to that, organization is crucially important for the defense of working-class interests because it is the only means for uniting labour. Therefore, the regulation of capital organizations through corporatist arrangements is much less important than the regulation of labour organizations. Because of the class-biased nature of corporatism, says Offe, there is an inherent unresolved tension in any corporatist system. [Offe,1981:146-153]. Similarly, Panitch and Jessop also emphasize the instability of corporatist arrangements due to their internal contradictions.

Panitch maintains that incomes policies lie at the heart of corporatist arrangements. Union participation in economic policy making is mainly designed to legitimize and administer it to their members. Nevertheless, since unions' legitimation and administration of state economic policy take place through their promulgation of wage restraint and their administration of it to their members, it eventually deligitimizes the leadership in the eyes of their members in the absence of effective price and profit controls. Inevitably, the union leaders are subjected to increasing rank-and-file pressure to withdraw from corporatist arrangements. Therefore, the unions have often had to withdraw from corporatist cooperation in order to avoid being repudiated by their members. Such an approach to union participation in corporatist structures leads Panitch to ask: "Whether state coercion, at least, in the form of repressing rank and file actions and insulating union leadership from its effects is not a sine qua non of establishing stable corporatist structures?" [Panitch,1977:68] In answer to this question, Panitch argues that the outburst of rank-and-file militancy in the late 1960s and early 70s, in most cases, led to state intervention by coercive measures. He points out that in Sweden, this took the form of

government suspension of the right to strike for public employees in 1971, while in the Netherlands, the government passed "the Wage Formation Act" of 1970 which authorized the government to invalidate wage contracts that were considered damaging to the national economy. Panitch says that in Britain state coercion was more striking during those years. [Panitch,1977:85]. In brief, according to Panitch, the unions opted for cooperation largely because of the threat made by the state to intervene directly in the wage bargaining process, and such inherently unstable corporatist arrangements seem impossible to sustain in the long term unless the state backs them up by coercive means. Such an argument, in the end, leads Panitch to question the compatibility of corporatism with political freedom. [see Panitch,1977:68-85].

To sum up, Marxist authors like Panitch and Offe argue that corporatism involves a marked imbalance in what capital and labour get out of such arrangements. It therefore is embedded in internal contradictions which undermine these arrangements through outbursts of rank-and-file militancy.(7)

Non-Marxist students of corporatism generally take a more or less favourable attitude towards corporatist arrangements in liberal democratic societies. They agree that corporatism generates significant benefits for labour as well. Schmitter even argues that "asymmetry of corporatism increasingly cuts the other way; therefore the greatest threat

(7) Marxist scholars are not alone when they insist that corporatism is subject to internal contradictions. For instance, Sabel (1981) tries to show the inherent instability of corporatism from a classical liberal approach. He does not accept that corporatism is class biased. He argues that because corporatist arrangements give the opportunity to the leaders of the unions to check the behaviours of business to some extent, and even to encroach on the prerogatives of capital, it eventually leads capital to launch a struggle against the unions through different means in order to weaken them.

to the persistence of societal corporatism comes from its allegedly greatest beneficiaries (industrial capitalist, agricultural producers and specialized professionals)". [Schmitter, 1982:277]

Lehmbruch agrees with the Marxist authors on the asymmetrical nature of income policies which, he argues, constitute the core domain of corporatist policy-making. However, he later comes to stress that the losses by labour in the field of incomes policies are compensated by gains in other issue areas. On the basis of Austrian and German experiences with corporatism, he points out that the unions agreed to participate in corporatist incomes policies in the expectation that they could enlarge the field of corporatist economic decision making beyond incomes policies. However, enlarging the field of corporatist policy making would mean labour exercised control over profits and investment, hence a structural transformation. Such a structural transformation presupposes a shift in power relations which can not be achieved in a corporatist framework, Lehmbruch argues. He notes that such projects, at least, have been brought onto the agenda in West Germany and Sweden. However, the unions' hopes that they could get the opportunity to exercise influence in the formulation of overall economic policy did not materialize in West German and Austrian cases. Because corporatist incomes policies require organized labour to renounce their redistributive objectives, they have rather served the function of integrating organized labour into the status quo. Lehmbruch maintains that because of this asymmetrical nature of incomes policies, corporatism is unstable as the outbreaks of strikes in such corporatist countries as Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany in late 1960s and early 70s demonstrated. [Lehmbruch,1977:109-110]. But in a later article (1979b), Lehmbruch admits that he

himself and some Marxist scholars like Panitch overestimated the importance of these strikes, thereby leading them to overemphasize the instability of corporatism. He points out that Austrian corporatism shows an astonishing stability. He comes to consider that corporatism may be subject to a particular logic of exchange. Because corporatist incomes policies require organized labour to put aside its redistributive objectives, this can not continue for a long time unless organized labour obtains compensation in issue areas outside wage policy. He notes that in Austria, tax policy has always been included in negotiations with labour. Lehmbruch also sees a trend in several countries such as Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden towards the extension of incomes policy negotiations to include income taxes, social security and prices. Another compensatory area that Lehmbruch identifies is co-determination in industry, which is specifically related to the Swedish and German cases. In short, according to Lehmbruch, although corporatist incomes policies are of an asymmetrical nature, which works against labour, their asymmetrical effects on the distribution of income and wealth might be compensated in some substantive issue areas outside wage policy. [Lehmbruch,1979b:302-307; 1985:66-8]

Both Goldthorpe and Crouch reject the Marxist view of corporatism as being inherently class-biased and lacking in radical potential. They argue that the unions agree to observe some restraints in pressing their demands; in return, they get the opportunity for the first time to exercise political influence in public policy making, hence the chance to advance labour interests in a wider and more permanent manner than is possible through action in the industrial sphere alone. Crouch maintains that "under bargained corporatism the fact that government itself becomes a bargaining partner and bargaining

takes place between the peak associations of labour and capital opens up a wider range of issues to labour demands that go beyond the limited and economistic demands of collective bargaining, such as workers' rights, social policy reforms, changes in economic and fiscal policy". He argues that "in some cases corporatism would constitute another compromise between labour and capital, yet it is by no means an easy way out". He goes even further to argue that corporatism holds out the possibility of radical changes not only at the political level but also within industry, that is the possibility of the extension of industrial democracy if organized labour can bargain knowledgeably about the terms on which it will offer its cooperation. [Crouch,1979b:189-95]. Similarly, Korpi claims that organized labour is in a better position in the political arena than in the industrial sphere. For this reason, by shifting the terrain of confrontation from the industrial sphere to the political arena, labour has much to gain. Yet he also emphasizes that the short term as well as the long term outcomes of societal bargaining largely depend on the distribution of power resources between the classes and the composition of government:

The smaller the disadvantage in power resources of labour and the stronger the position of the left party in government, the more likely the state authorities to side with labour, hence, the outcomes can be expected to be more to the favour of labour.
[Korpi,1983:25]

In examining the Swedish case, Korpi conveys an image of a shift in the relative balance of power between capital and labour in favour of the latter.

We agree with Korpi that whether liberal corporatism benefits the working class or not is an empirical question that can not be settled through theoretical definitions. In the face of contrasting arguments on the issue, after it is established that some kind of liberal corporatist arrangements emerged in Turkey during a specific period, it will be interesting

to see whether these arrangements generated markedly asymmetrical outcomes for employers and workers, which eventually led to the outburst of militancy from below, thus resulting in their collapse as the Marxist accounts would lead us to expect, or whether they produced significant benefits for the working class as well.

IV. Authoritarian Corporatism: Latin America

A study of Turkey's experience with corporatism also requires an analysis of the authoritarian variety of corporatism. Since the most important literature on authoritarian corporatism has remained concerned primarily with Latin America, our discussion will be limited to the Latin American context. Doing so, we will also be able to show the degree to which the corporatist practices in Turkey resemble or differ from the corporatist cases of Latin America.

Until very recently students of Latin American politics treated corporatism as a static phenomenon, emphasizing the homogeneity and continuity of corporatist arrangements over time and across the countries in Latin America. There is now a common tendency to disaggregate the concept of corporatism and identify its further varieties within the context of Latin America, which will better reflect underlying power relations and bases of political support. In the following section, we will outline the major typologies that have been advanced to account for the rise of different corporatist arrangements in the region.

O'Donnell (1977) argues that studies on Latin American corporatism tended to overemphasize the formal and legalistic aspects and associational structures while ignoring the differences in social bases and policy outcomes. This resulted in an

exaggeration of homogeneity and continuity of Latin American corporatism and a neglect of the significant differences between the corporatist regimes that emerged in the region during different stages of dependent capitalism. O'Donnell maintains that the social composition of the particular coalitions that supported and benefited from corporatism changed dramatically in different historical periods, as did the policy outcomes of these corporatist arrangements.

In the populist regimes of the 1930s and 1940s, political elites used corporatism as a mechanism to promote controlled political activation of the popular sector and to incorporate it in multi-class coalitions that ended the rule of the traditional oligarchy. The corporatist arrangements allowed the populist elites to mobilize a broad support base towards their policies of modernization and independent economic development, but at the same time they enabled the populist rulers to control this social base and structure its relationship to the state. The populist rulers exercised a certain degree of control over the labour unions, reserving the right to grant or deprive them of recognition, influencing the selection of their leaders and supervising the use of their funds. Some of the unions were established directly with the populist rulers themselves. The corporatism of the populist regimes, therefore, involved a degree of subordination of the labour unions to the state. Yet it also entailed a considerable increase in the political and economic power of the unionized section of the popular sector vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. In the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that emerged in the region during the 1960s and 1970s, however, a substantially more repressive type of corporatism was used to deactivate the popular sector and to exclude it from the newer ruling coalition that was formed by the military-technocratic elite, international monopoly capital and the national bourgeoisie. In other

words, in contrast to the corporatism of the populist regimes, which is a system of controlled social incorporation and political activation of the subordinate classes, the corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes exists within a framework of political and economic exclusion of the subordinate classes. It acts as a mechanism linking the state to the popular sector in order to guarantee its exclusion. The main link established between the state and the popular sector through corporatist structures is that of control. As O'Donnell put it:

The corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state is not a system of controlled incorporation as was the case in the populist state. It is a system of exclusion of the popular sector. It is not a case of heteronymously activating the popular sector as under populism or of increasing its consumption or of using it to recompose the dominant coalition or of increasing its weight vis-a-vis the state and the dominant classes. On the contrary, it is a case of guaranteeing an order and accumulation that requires postponing the economic demands of the popular sector, depoliticizing it, and subordinating or destroying the class organizations that had become more autonomous during the praxorian period. [O'Donnell, 1977: 68-9].

Thus O'Donnell draws a fundamental distinction between the corporatism of the populist regimes and that arising with a new type of regime, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, on the basis of the differences in their social bases and policy outcomes. He considers these two varieties of Latin American corporatism as different kinds of elite response to economic and political crises precipitated by different stages of dependent capitalist development. Populist corporatism was associated by the early stage of import-substitution industrialization which was a response to the failure of the primary product export oriented development model in the 1930s and aimed at creating an independent national economy. The corporatism of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, on the other hand, was a reaction to the problems created by populism. It was oriented to a drastic reorganization

of the society and establishment of a new domination in order to reconstitute the conditions for capital accumulation. It was directly related to the pattern of growth, which O'Donnell calls a "deepening" of dependent, uneven, late, but also extensively industrialized capitalism. Bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism involved strengthening the ties with international capital. [see O'Donnell, 1978] (8)

The social bases of bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism were the military-technocratic elite, international capital and also the national bourgeoisie, though the latter was included in the ruling coalition as a subordinate partner. Populist corporatism, on the other hand, was based on a multi-class coalition that was composed of the middle class as the mobilizing and leading elite and the working class and to some extent the peasantry as the subordinate partners. O'Donnell argues that bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism is not simply a passing phase; rather it involves some mechanisms that will ensure its continuity.

Not all authors agree with O'Donnell's analysis, particularly his arguments about the likely future of the bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism. Chalmers (1977) may be considered as the representative of the opposite perspective. He emphasizes the changing and fluid character of Latin American politics. He argues that the enduring quality of the politics in the region may not be a particular form of regime but change, and it is most likely that change will continue. Within this framework, Chalmers views corporatism as a set of formal ties between the government and social groups. These ties are an instrument

(8) For a summary and critique of O'Donnell's arguments regarding the relationship between capitalist development and political change, see the essays by Collier, Serra and Kaufman in David Collier (ed.) (1979), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

of political struggle, hence subject to continuous reformulation.

For Malloy (1974:55) corporatism is a subtype of authoritarian regime. Yet he also distinguishes between the corporatism of the populist regimes and that of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. [see Malloy,1977] He states that the corporatist arrangements under populism are oriented to the inclusion of the subordinate classes into the political game. In that, it is at least potentially democratic, whereas the corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes aims at forcing the previous players out of the political game. Thus Malloy agrees with O'Donnell's distinction between the incorporating corporatism of populism and the excluding corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. To sum up, according to both O'Donnell and Malloy the fundamental distinction between corporatism under populist regimes and that of the bureaucratic-authoritarian states rests on whether they constitute a mechanism of exclusion or incorporation of the subordinate classes.

Alfred Stepan, expanding on O'Donnell's classification, formulates his own typology and attempts to explain the conditions that led political elites in Latin America to adopt different kinds of strategies. While O'Donnell sees the corporatism of the populist regimes and corporatism existing under the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes as polar opposites, Stepan suggests a continuum, the end points of which are the inclusionary pole and the exclusionary pole. The inclusionary pole stands for those policies that aim at integrating the subordinate classes within the new economic and political order by relying more on co-optative strategies. Exclusionary policies, on the other hand, are designed to deactivate and then restructure the subordinate classes through highly coercive measures. Particular regimes, says Stepan, fall on different points along the continuum. Stepan

agrees with O'Donnell that inclusionary corporatism and exclusionary corporatism are two different elite responses to economic and political crises that occurred at different stages of dependent capitalist development and at different levels of political mobilization. But in explaining the rise of these varieties of corporatist strategies, Stepan, compared to O'Donnell, places much greater emphasis on the changing political conditions rather than on common structural factors. He points to some significant differences among the exclusionary corporatist regimes themselves that O'Donnell considers as similar cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. Stepan argues that the degree of organizational autonomy and the intensity of ideological and political polarization that ruling elites in those countries confronted are two important variables that account for the different strategies selected in each particular case. Within this framework, Stepan claims that in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, the authoritarian elites resorted to repressive exclusionary strategies because these societies were characterized by high levels of autonomous associational organization, mobilized polarization and previous social reforms. In Mexico, Peru and their populist predecessors, on the other hand, opportunities were available to the authoritarian elites for initiating the controlled incorporation of the subordinate classes in multi-class coalitions. But the authoritarian elites of Brazil, Argentina and Chile no longer enjoyed these opportunities. Stepan also attempts to explain the differences in the degree of coercion employed in each particular case of exclusionary corporatism, namely Argentina, Brazil and Chile in terms of the political power of the subordinate classes and the intensity of the political crises perceived. In Brazil an exclusionary corporatism was established without high levels of coercion because the particular combination of low level organizational autonomy and high ideological polarization provided the

authoritarian elite with a large base supporting the political deactivation of the still weak subordinate classes. In Chile, on the other hand, the combination of high associational autonomy and a high level of social and ideological polarization required the use of a much higher degree of coercion for the installation of exclusionary corporatism. Stepan describes the Argentine case as a failure. He claims that the organizational strength and low level of social polarization enabled the subordinate classes to resist the imposition of exclusionary corporatism by enlisting the support of other sectors. [see Stepan, 1978:Ch. 2 and 3].

David and Ruth Collier (1979) developed an alternative framework for distinguishing among varieties of corporatism based on their empirical analysis of the relationship between the state and organized labour in Latin America. Their study aims at further disaggregating corporatism beyond the dichotomous categories of inclusionary and exclusionary corporatism. They focus on the distinction between inducement, extended by the state to win the support of organized labour and the constraints imposed on the labour movement by the state to directly control it. The Colliers developed a historical inventory of legal provisions regulating labour organizations and labour relations between 1901 and 1975. They scored these legal provisions according to the degree to which they relied on inducements or constraints. The legal provisions regarding registration, right of combination, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership and subsidy of unions were included under the heading of inducements, and those regulating collective bargaining and strikes, and other controls on leadership, articulation of demands and provisions for state monitoring and intervention in internal union affairs under the heading of constraints. They found that in each particular case different combinations of

inducements and constraints were employed, depending on the political context. Yet they identified certain recurrent patterns in the relationship between the political context and combinations of inducements and constraints. The most important features of the political context that determine the relative importance of inducements and constraints include the degree of elite concern with winning the political support of organized labour, the strength and autonomy of the labour movement and the degree of concern with controlling labour. Their findings show that a higher level of inducements and a lower level of constraints tend to be associated with those political contexts in which labour unions are relatively powerful and autonomous, and government tries to gain the support of labour. In these cases government needs to offer greater inducements in order to win the cooperation of labour, and/or organized labour has a greater capacity to resist constraints. A high level of both constraints and inducements tends to occur in political contexts in which government is more concerned with controlling labour than winning its support by creating coopted and dependent labour unions. On the other hand, a higher level of constraints and lower level of inducements appear to correspond to the political contexts in which government is primarily concerned with controlling labour and it does not seek to gain even the passive support of the labour movement. The government relies on high level of constraints and open oppression of labour organizations rather than on co-optation. This pattern takes place in contexts where the labour movement is strong, hence it requires a high degree of coercion to deactivate and depoliticize the labour movement. At this point, it should be noted that the Colliers' study shows that strong labour movements appear to be associated with both high and low levels of oppression. While such recurrent patterns are identified, the Colliers also remind that there are

numerous intermediate cases as well.

The Colliers suggest that this model focused on inducements and constraints has the advantage of being interactive, in the sense that it points to an implicit or explicit bargain or transaction struck between the government and the labour leaders at a particular time. These bargains or transactions reflect the existing configuration of power relations and political goals. Hence, they are subject to renegotiation with changes in the relative power positions of the major actors. In that respect, their arguments are similar to Chalmers's. Pointing to the patterns of change over time and across the countries, say the Colliers, the model also has the advantage of being dynamic.

Thus the Colliers, like Stepan, attempt to account for the historical diversity of corporatism on the basis of the changing nature of the political context, unlike O'Donnell who emphasizes the structural imperatives of the dependent capitalist development. David and Ruth Collier also argue that although the model based on inducements and constraints was initially developed with the intent of distinguishing among the Latin American cases, it can also be applied to broader comparative cases involving different patterns of state-society relations. They say that the distinction between societal and state corporatism is based on the same issues of the configuration of power relations and the social bases of political support that constitute the basis for distinguishing among the Latin American cases. In that regard, they suggest that though as a first approximation Latin American cases can be characterized as state corporatism, some, particularly Mexico and Argentina during certain periods, come rather close to the societal type of corporatism; at least they appear to be intermediate cases between state and societal corporatism. They conclude that "it is useful to treat the distinction between state and societal corporatism not as a

dichotomy but as a continuum with some of the Latin American cases located at least part-way along this continuum toward societal corporatism." [Collier & Collier, 1979:979].

To summarize, while preserving the generic categories of liberal and authoritarian corporatism, an increasing number of authors are concerned with further disaggregating liberal and authoritarian corporatism to form some additional categories that would better reflect the differences among particular cases.

V. Summary of Main Analytical Tools Used For the Case Study

When we read through the neocorporatist literature, the first thing that struck our attention was the lack of agreement on the conceptualization and definition of the key concept, corporatism. Application of a theory to a case, first of all, requires clarification of the basic concepts. On the basis of our discussion of the major schools of neocorporatism, we refuted such broad conceptualizations of corporatism as a distinct economic system or a different state form. Instead, we came to view corporatism as a particular political structure in capitalist system, which links the state and society. To further clarify the concept of corporatism and reach a working definition we looked at other major definitions which do not extend the concept to a total system. Schmitter defined corporatism as a system of interest representation, thus avoiding the problem of extending it to a total description of society or political system. He nevertheless tended to include all sorts of interest groups in his corporatist framework. By doing so he failed to challenge the basic pluralist assumptions of equivalence of power and influence among the groups and state neutrality between the groups. Panitch emphasized that corporatism is basically

related to capital and labour organizations and their relationship with the state . It specifically aims to regulate or contain class conflict or class struggle.

Some authors, for example Schmitter and Streeck, defined corporatism primarily in terms of the structural characteristics of the constituent units. However, the results of a study which basically explores those structural properties which constituted the essence of Schmitter's definition within the framework of a single case can not have much analytical value. In other words, conceptualizing corporatism solely in terms of the structural characteristics of its units can not constitute a basis for an adequate analysis. It neglects the dynamic or interactional dimension of corporatism. Corporatism does not simply involve hierarchically structured, compulsory, non-competitive organizations enjoying monopoly of representation, but also the fact that capital and labour organizations cooperate at the leadership level with the state authorities and take responsibility for public policies, which implies a certain degree of restraint in their activities and control over their members. This interactional dimension exists in Lehmbruch and Panitch's definitions. In contrast to Schmitter's definition, they stressed the relationship between labour and capital organizations and the state while largely deemphasizing the organizational structure of the system. Instead we suggested that corporatism involves both structural and interactional dimensions. In our case study, we will analyze both the interactional and structural aspects of corporatism.

In our case study of Turkey's experience with corporatism, we will limit our analysis to labour unions and capital organizations and their interaction with the state. It is specifically the behaviour of labour unions that corporatist arrangements aim to control, and is most affected by the participation in corporatist structures, as emphasized by

several authors such as Offe (1981:146), Panitch (1981) and Goldthorpe (1985). Therefore, the focus of the case study will be mainly on the process of drawing the labour unions into corporatist arrangements.

While some authors formulated generic definitions of corporatism which covered its subtypes, they immediately made a distinction between its authoritarian and liberal varieties. These subtypes show a basic structural similarity, thus enabling one to characterize, at a very abstract level, different cases as generic instances of corporatism. As students of corporatism emphasize, however, they are the products of different political and socio-economic processes and based on different configurations of power and influence relations in society, which set them apart from each other.

In order to better account for the diversity of corporatist practices, an increasing number of authors are concerned with further disaggregating liberal and authoritarian corporatism to form some additional categories. Some authors formulated a set of key variables for the classification of particular cases along a continuum or an underlying dimension. Among students of Latin American corporatism, for instance, there has been a greater tendency to classify the corporatist cases according to whether they aim at the political and economic inclusion or exclusion of the subordinate classes and according to the relative importance of coercive or co-optative techniques employed by political rulers to control the working class organizations. Yet these attempts to identify additional varieties of corporatism do not refute the basic traditional distinction between liberal and authoritarian types of corporatism.

Within this framework we will ask whether the Turkish case shows the characteristics of authoritarian corporatism or liberal corporatism. We will try to find out whether a

transition from one type to the other occurred. If there was such a transition, how did it take place and how can it be explained? Although the Turkish case may not necessarily reproduce all the dimensions of either authoritarian or liberal type of corporatism, it comes close to one or the other during different periods. We will also try to show the divergences and similarities between Turkish corporatism and the general models.

The commentators on corporatism disagree among themselves as to whether socio-economic or political and organizational factors are most important in explaining the diversity of corporatist arrangements. Those who emphasize the socio-economic factors relate the emergence of types of corporatism to different stages of capitalist development. For them authoritarian corporatism arose as a response to political and economic crisis precipitated by delayed dependent capitalist development. Liberal corporatism, on the other hand, is directly linked to the advent of monopoly capitalism. Such explanations nevertheless fail to account for the diversity of corporatist practices among the advanced capitalist countries or late dependent capitalist countries themselves. In explaining the multiplicity of corporatist structures or its uneven development across countries with the same level of capitalist development, some authors therefore stressed the importance of political and organizational factors, particularly the organizational strength of the working class and the structure and ideological orientation of the union movement. We suggest that in explaining the emergence of different types of corporatist arrangements both socio-economic and political factors should be taken into account.

It is still commonly accepted by students of corporatism that authoritarian corporatism is associated with late dependent capitalist development. Advanced capitalist development is regarded as providing the most favourable context or even the necessary

condition for liberal corporatism. Turkey can not be characterized as an advanced capitalist society but a developing capitalist society. In other words, it lacks the theoretical conditions for the emergence of liberal corporatism. If it can be shown that some kind of liberal corporatist arrangements emerged in Turkey during a certain period despite the absence of advanced capitalist development, it may lead to a reconsideration of the commonly accepted argument that liberal corporatism is the concomitant of advanced capitalism while authoritarian corporatism is a defining element of late dependent capitalism. If Turkey displayed the characteristics of both authoritarian and liberal corporatism during different periods, then the conditions that led to these different types of corporatism in a single country need to be explained. We hypothesize that in order to account for the rise of different varieties of corporatist arrangements in Turkey, one should analyze both socio-economic conditions and political factors.

Our study of the Turkish case will also examine the outcomes of the corporatist arrangements. It will be interesting to raise the question of who benefits under liberal corporatism with respect to the Turkish case in the face of great disagreement between the commentators on the topic. We will try to find an answer to the question of whether the Turkish working class really obtained benefits from liberal corporatist arrangements, as non-Marxist students of corporatism would have predicted.

We will examine Turkey's experiment with corporatism from a historical perspective, starting from the founding of the Republic in 1923. The focus, however, will be on the post-Second World War period. Turkey was under an authoritarian single-party regime from its founding until 1945, by which time there was a transition to a multi-party system. It is our contention that a better understanding of the post-war developments in the

relations between the state and capital and labour organizations requires an analysis of the previous period as well. In this way we can also point to important changes in the field over time.

Chapter 2

TURKEY'S EXPERIENCE WITH CORPORATISM

I. General Developments

1. A Brief Historical Overview of Economic and Political Background

We consider corporatism as a particular linking structure between the state and society. Corporatism, therefore, should be analyzed with systematic reference to the state and society in which it emerges. A better comprehension of the Turkish case requires a brief historical overview of its economic and political background. This can also help us to understand the subsequent developments in the Turkish economic and political life.

The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after the War of Independence fought against Greece, France and England. Until the end of World War II, the Turkish political regime was an authoritarian single-party rule dominated by the military-civil bureaucracy.

During the early period of the Republic the military-civil bureaucracy, which had led the War of Independence and the subsequent reform movement from above, constituted the core domain of the ruling elite. This is easily understandable given the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in which the ruling class had been the bureaucratic elite consisting of the military, civil and religious bureaucracies, where a feudal landed aristocracy simply did not exist.⁽¹⁾ Social classes existed, but none of them were powerful enough to seize

political power. During the Ottoman Empire, commercial, financial and emerging industrial activities had been largely monopolized by the non-Moslem minorities. The deportations and hostilities during World War I and the Independence War resulted in a drastic change in the composition of the population within the borders of present-day Turkey. Most of the Armenian and Greek population left or were forced to leave. What this implies is that Turkey lost most of its commercial and financial bourgeoisie. [Keyder,1987:78-9; 1979:7-8]. The remaining largely native bourgeoisie was too weak to challenge the military-civil bureaucratic elite. [Keyder,1987:79, Tunay,1978:61] The local notables, though powerful vis-a-vis the peasantry and further strengthened during the War of Independence, did not constitute so a dynamic force that could seize state power. [Tunay,1978:61; Sunar and Sayari,1984:83]. Yet the group of notables had still enough influence to be included in the political party alliance of the regime, not as a core group but as a subordinate partner, however. [Sunar,1974:76; Akarli,1975:44]. Thus the ruling Republican People's Party was dominated by the military-civil bureaucrats at the national level and the local notables at the local level. [see Frey,1965 and Karpas,1959]. Until the transition to the multi-party system in 1945, the military-civil bureaucrats remained the core of the ruling elite. They carried out the modernization movement from above.

The Republic of Turkey inherited an undeveloped, backward economy from the Ottoman State. Though there were some attempts to encourage industrialization during

(1) See Keyder, 1987 and 1979; Sunar and Sayari, 1984; Ozbudun, 1976; Hecer, 1976; Mardin, 1973; Inalcik, 1969 and 1964; Frey, 1965.

the Ottoman period, the scope of industrialization was very limited. Turkey inherited a total of 386 industrial establishments which employed only 76,261 workers. [Gevgilili,1974:57]. At the founding of the Republic, the economy was predominantly based on agriculture. But the agricultural sector was also backward and had a very low level of productivity. Moreover, the extended period of the war years had devastating effects on the economy. [Hale,1981:35-9;Karpas,1973:53]. Under such conditions the essential principle of the political economy adopted by the ruling elite was to provide the necessary conditions for rapid economic development within the framework of capitalist economy. The economic policy of the period 1923-1929 was mainly liberal. The first Economic Congress of the Republic convened in Izmir in February 1923. It brought together the representatives of farmers, traders, industrialists and labour for the purpose of determining the main principles of economic policy. In his opening address, M. Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, declared that:

To propel our new Turkey forwards to the level of evolution of which she is worthy, we are obliged, whatever happens, to put the economy first... However great may be the political and military victories, the success achieved can not last unless it is crowned with economic victories, and will soon vanish. [quoted in Hale,1981:35]

The economic policy of the 1920s was essentially liberal. Partly because of the restrictions imposed on Turkish foreign trade policy by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Turkish economy remained largely open. [Gulalp,1985:334;Kepenek,1984:40]. Contrary to the common belief, foreign capital was also welcomed. [Kepenek,1984:37; Gulalp,1985:334; Keyder,1979; Hale,1981:40]. Private initiative was considered as the motor force of economic development and the government gave the private sector the primary role in industrial development. The 1920s were the period during which the legal

and institutional structures essential for a capitalist economy were established. The state was to encourage the accumulation of private capital if economic development was to be realized. The state undertook to stimulate the growth of private enterprise through numerous grants and concessions such as tax concessions, and bank credits. In particular, the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, which was passed in 1927, granted extensive privileges to private entrepreneurs in order to encourage them to invest in industrial production. [Esin,1974:109; Hale,1981:42-3]. Nevertheless, despite these numerous forms of encouragement to the private sector, economic growth fell far short of expectations. Private capital was still in short supply. The policy was least successful in the field of industrial investment. Those who had capital preferred to invest in easy money-making fields, that is speculation, real estate and trade rather than in the fields that would expand production. Towards the end of the 1920s, the faith in the private sector's capability to bring about rapid economic development began to wane. [Kepenek,1984:62-3; Berberoglu,1982:28-9, Sunar,1974:72]. Moreover, the effects of the Great Depression were soon to be felt. First of all, the Depression caused a substantial drop in the prices of agricultural products which constituted the traditional exports of Turkey, thereby leading to a substantial decline in Turkish export earnings. Furthermore, the Great Depression restricted Turkish imports, which were mainly composed of basic consumer goods. [Keyder,1987:95-6, Gulalp,1985:334]. The result was the adoption of state-led industrialization and a closed economy, commonly known as etatism. The weakening integration of the Turkish economy into the capitalist world system due to the economic and accompanying social and political crises in the center countries had now made etatism possible.

The period between 1929 and 1933 can be considered as a transitional period during which the ruling elite searched for possible forms of control of the economy while some measures were taken, which aimed at restricting imports and the exchange of foreign currency. [see Tekeli and Ilkin,1977]. But these measures were essentially of a static and restrictive nature that should have been followed by a dynamic policy if economic development was to be realized. These measures, therefore, were succeeded by a five-year industrialization plan, which was drawn up in 1933 and went into effect between 1934-1938. It was this plan that constituted the essence of the etatist policy. It envisaged import-substitution industrialization based on domestic inputs that was to be carried out under the leadership of state enterprises. The state became an entrepreneur itself in the absence of an industrial bourgeoisie. The state was to take the major responsibility for industrialization through the establishment of public enterprises in the key sectors of the economy which would use domestic raw materials in order to reduce the country's dependence on imported consumer and intermediate goods.

The policy of etatism was successfully pursued throughout the 1930s. High rates of economic growth were sustained, and industrial production doubled between 1929-1939. [Rosen,1962:253]. Domestic production of main consumer goods that had been largely imported until that time was completed under etatism. [Kepenek,1984:76] The state also launched a campaign of nationalization of foreign firms initially in public services, particularly railways, in the early 1930s and mine factories in the second half of the decade. [Gulalp,1985:334; Hale,1981:58; Berberoglu,1982:35].

Etatism has been variously characterized as "some form of socialism", "a third way outside capitalism and socialism". And some ascribed its origins to fascism. In fact,

etatism was not a deliberate policy intended to bring about some fundamental changes in the economic system. It was a pragmatic response to the problems generated by the Great Depression and to the crucial issue of rapid economic development. [Okyar,1979:328; Kepenek,1984:61-4; Gulalp,1985:334]. Etatism was neither socialism nor a third way outside capitalism and socialism. It can more appropriately be characterized as some form of "state capitalism". Yet It was mainly restricted to the sphere of industrial production. The government did not attempt large scale nationalization in the economy in general. The production of raw materials was essentially left to the private sector, as was the distribution of the goods produced by the state economic enterprises. The government consistently declared that they had no bias against the private sector. Indeed, the Act of 1938 (no:3436) which provided a uniform set of rules for all state enterprises expressly stated that state economic enterprises could be transferred wholly or partly to the private sector through the issue of equity shares, though this provision did not go into effect during the period. [Okyar,1979:329; Hale,1981:58].

Under etatism, the commercial and financial bourgeoisie obtained considerable benefits. They were granted concessions for providing raw materials and distributing state-refined goods. [Avcioglu,1968:212-228; Sunar,1974:77-8]. The state also played an important role in creating intermediary positions for the commercial class. It was in a position to benefit from enlarged trade activities. Furthermore, the expansion in the production of consumer and intermediate goods led to an increase in the prices of industrial plants, benefiting the large land owners. [Boratav,1962:75-6]. These last two factors were important externalities created under the etatist policy which worked in favour of private capital. It is true that the state had much easier access to capital than

private industrialists, with the result that the state tended to own the largest and most modern plants, and thereby had a competitive advantage. However, arguments made by some authors, for example Thornburg et al. (1948), that etatism brought the growth of private enterprise in industry to an abrupt halt have not been supported by empirical evidence. Although the number of private firms covered by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry decreased by 22.34 percent between 1932-1939, total private capital increased by 86.37 percent during the same period, indicating a trend toward concentration of private capital, which was in fact initiated by the etatist policies. [Fisek,1969:39-41]. In these enterprises the value of output also increased by a factor of about 2.4 percent between 1932 and 1939. [Hale,1981:59]. The would-be industrial bourgeoisie also gained important benefits in the form of greater exploitation of labour, increasing their profits. During the period wages were severely kept down. Between 1934 and 1938, real wages declined by 25 percent. [Keyder,1987:104]. As Berberoglu points out, extremely low level of wages and the long hours of work led to a dramatic increase in the rate of surplus value extracted by the state and the national bourgeoisie. According to the generally conservative figures of the State Institute of Statistics, the rate of surplus value increased from 172 percent in 1932 to 318.2 in 1939. [Berberoglu,1982:62] Thus as a result of the intensified exploitataion of workers, the industrial bourgeoisie achieved higher profits and rapid capital accumulation.

The military-civil bureaucrats were among the beneficiaries of the etatist policy. The bureaucrats themselves often established their own economic interests, not infrequently using their political influence. In other words they often themselves joined the ranks of the bourgeoisie. [Fisek,1969:41-2; Sunar,1974:78]. As Keyder (1987:105-6) points out,

"it was difficult to distinguish between the top ranks of the military-civil bureaucracy and the industrial bourgeoisie". He notes that "in 74.2 percent of all firms established between 1931 and 1940, the founding entrepreneurs were bureaucrats". During the etatist period, the bureaucratic hierarchy consolidated central political control over the economy not only through indirect fiscal and trade policies but also through direct intervention in the economy as an entrepreneur itself. Nonetheless, the state created all the conditions that facilitated the rapid accumulation of private capital. The externalities that resulted from the investment and pricing policies of the state economic enterprises constituted invisible funds that accrued to the private sector. [Keyder,1987:125]. Besides, state policy towards the peasantry and the working class was an important factor which increased profits and capital accumulation enjoyed by the bourgeoisie. As a result, a coalition developed between the bureaucracy and the emerging bourgeoisie at the expense of the working class and the peasantry, with the bureaucracy still retaining the upper hand in decision making. As Keyder put it:

This alliance had not meant that the bureaucracy was reduced to the accommodating role of state managers while the bourgeoisie had full control over the economy. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie was allowed to privately control portions of the economy only while it obeyed the rules of its association with the bureaucracy. [Keyder,1987:125]

Upon the success of the first five-year industrialization plan, a second five-year plan was prepared in 1936 and adopted in 1938. It was intended to be put into operation during 1939-1943. Unlike the first plan which aimed at domestic production of basic consumer goods, the second plan gave primacy to the production of capital and intermediate goods. Nevertheless, the onset of the World War II abruptly interrupted its implementation, signalling the end of the etatist period. [Kepenek,1984:70, Berberoglu,1982:39-41]

To summarize, Turkey was ruled by a single authoritarian party from its foundation until the end of the Second World War. The ruling coalition of the authoritarian regime was composed of the civil-military bureaucracy as the core group and the local notables as the subordinate partner. The national bourgeoisie was still too weak to challenge the bureaucratic elite. The etatist policies of the 1930s further consolidated central political control over the economy. Yet these same policies also created all the necessary conditions for the rapid accumulation of private capital. Consequently, a coalition was formed between the bureaucratic elite and the emerging national bourgeoisie. With respect to economic conditions, Turkey had inherited a backward capitalist economy from the Ottoman period. It was agriculturally-based. The level of industrialization was insignificant. During the first decade of its founding the Republic of Turkey followed trade-oriented development strategy. The economy was to remain open. With the exhaustion of this development strategy, there was a transition to state-directed industrialization and protectionism, known as etatism. This pattern followed by the Turkish economy was quite similar to that of Latin American countries. The establishment of the populist regimes in Latin America and the transition to etatism in Turkey were contemporaneous. Both were responses to the exhaustion of a particular phase of delayed dependent capitalist development, that is the primary product, outward-oriented development model.

At a first approximation, the political and economic context which is argued to be the most favourable to the emergence of authoritarian corporatism existed in Turkey during the period under investigation. Turkey represented a case of a delayed dependent capitalist development and anti-liberal authoritarian state. Did this economic and political

context lead to some sort of authoritarian corporatist arrangements in Turkey? With the transition to populism, an inclusionary type of authoritarian corporatism was established in Latin America. O'Donnell considers the inclusionary corporatism of the populist regimes as linked with the early stage of import-substitution development strategy which was a response to the failure of the primary product export-oriented development model. The essence of etatism was also import-substitution industrialization. Like populism in Latin America, etatism emerged as a response to the general crisis of the outward oriented development strategy in the 1930s. Did a similar kind of corporatist arrangement occur in Turkey under etatism as in the Latin American countries under populism? To give an answer to these questions we need to analyze the network of relations between the state and labour and capital organizations and the structure of these relations.

2. Historical Background of the State, Labour and Capital Relations in Turkey

A) The State and Labour Unions

Although one can trace the origin of the Turkish union movement to the late 19th century Ottoman period, most of the existing unions were indeed quasi-unions (or associations). It was not until the Second Constitutionalist Period (1908-1918) that some genuine unions were organized. This was due to the very low level of industrialization, on the one hand, and legal and political restrictions on labour organizations, on the other. [Mumcuoglu, 1980:381](2) Following the declaration of the Second Constitutionalist

regime, strikes broke out in Istanbul and soon spread to other cities. In order to prevent such militant actions the government passed the Work Stoppages Act in July 1909, which prohibited strikes and unionization in public services and utilities. The Act banned strike activity and unionization only in public services and utilities. But because at the time the bulk of the industrial labour force was concentrated in these sectors, the law virtually impeded the entire union movement. [Dereli,1968:56-7; Bianchi,1984:119]. The Work Stoppages Act remained in force until 1936, at which time a new Labour Code was passed. Meanwhile, to channel workers' unrest, attempts were made to organize those political parties that claimed to represent workers' interests. In 1910, the Ottoman Socialist Party was organized, for example. Soon these political parties were also closed. The years of the Independence War (1919-1923) were the period of the resurgence of a labour movement essentially directed against the firms that were owned by the citizens of the Allied Powers or non-Moslim minorities. Supporting the Independence War, the workers often resorted to strikes and demonstrations in the areas occupied by the allied forces and pressed the foreign employers to meet their demands for higher wages and better working conditions. These labour actions were primarily for political reasons rather than economic reasons. The Nationalist Government in Ankara also tried to foster such activities of the labour movement and gain its support against the Istanbul government and the Allied powers. [Hale,1976:612; Isikli,1972:293, Fisek,1969:31-2]. In short, during the Independence War the conditions were rather favourable to the development of the Turkish labour movement. In addition to labour unions, several socialist and

(2) For details of unionization during the Ottoman period, see Sulker,1955 Isikli,1972 and Fisek,1969.

communist parties were formed. It is important to note that these political parties were very weak organizations. The social base that they claimed to represent was very small.

During the first years of the Republic, the political environment appears to have been favourable to the formation of new labour unions and their operation. Following the foundation of the Republic, new labour unions were organized in different cities. The most important among them was the Istanbul Workers' Union. Marxist labour unions and socialist parties which were in fact functioning like unions were allowed to continue their activities. [Isikli,1967:67-8]. The Constitution of 1924 was in general a liberal democratic constitution. It recognized the right of association of all citizens, proclaiming that the freedom of association is a natural right of all Turks. (Art.70)

The Government in Ankara had invited workers' representatives to the Economic Congress which was held in Izmir about seven months prior to the declaration of the Republic. It was to determine the basic principles of new economic policy. Along with the representatives of workers, those of merchants, farmers and industrialists were invited to the Congress. The workers' representatives demanded the right to strike and to bargain collectively and the guarantee of the freedom of unionization together with some other demands regarding social policy and working conditions. The Congress was dominated in general by the representatives of merchants and land owners, the former at the time having the strongest organization. [Ekin,1985 :230]. Consequently, the workers' representatives were not very successful in getting the Congress to approve their demands. Still, among the workers' demands accepted in the Congress were the right to organize, the review of the Work Stoppages Act of 1909 and some other demands regarding minimum wages, work hours, health services and working conditions.

[Ekin,1985:230; Sulker,1955:26]. Nevertheless, in the draft law prepared to put into effect the decisions of the Congress, most of those in favour of workers were not included. [Isikli,1967:68; Sulker,1955:26]. In the meantime, the Turkish Labour Association, which was Marxist in orientation, was trying to unite the existing fragmented unions in Istanbul and other areas of the country to form a nation-wide organization. Largely due to the rivalry of the Istanbul General Workers' Union, its efforts to form a union organization at the national level failed. Later, the Istanbul General Workers' Union was transformed into a nation-wide organization through the unification with several unions in other regions of the country. As a result, the Workers' Union of Turkey was formed. Nevertheless, this organization, which was claimed to be established under the auspices of the ruling Republican Peoples' Party (RPP), soon disintegrated. [Isikli,1972:294; Sulker,1955:26-27]. All the attempts to unite the very weak and fragmented unions under the roof of a stronger organization at the national level failed to materialize.

In the relatively liberal and permissive atmosphere of the early republican period the rise of pluralist labour organizations was tolerated to some extent. This generally permissive attitude of the ruling elite towards labour organizations can be considered as a tribute to the support of the nascent union movement for the Independence War. More significantly, however, the military-civil bureaucratic elite had not yet consolidated its control over the country. It therefore avoided taking an immediate stance against the emerging labour movement. This early liberal and permissive context of the Republic was approaching its end as the bureaucratic elite was strengthening its position. To cope with an uprising in some eastern provinces of the country, the RPP government passed the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order on March 4, 1925. The Law gave the

government wide discretionary powers and established the institutional framework for authoritarian rule. Despite the liberal articles of the Constitution on the freedom of association, the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order effectively suppressed the formal freedoms. Relying on its powers existing under the Law, the government closed down opposition parties, associations and labour unions, and the formation of new ones was made conditional on prior governmental permission. The direct targets of the government were opposition parties, labour unions and religious orders. [Karpat,1959:46-49; Bianchi,1984:112]. Despite this, labour continued to have some organizations of its own. But these organizations were indeed restricted to mutual aid societies or some social assistance associations. [Tuna,1963:250; Dereli,1974:287-8]. Following the strikes of the workers at the Eastern Railways and Istanbul Tramcar Company in 1928, the Workers' Aid Society and some other workers' associations were also permanently closed down. [Mumcuoglu,1980:381; Fisek,1969:32]. Parallel to the spread of fascism in the world, an amendment to the Penal Code passed in 1933 severely increased the sanctions imposed on those who resorted to strike activity. With all these developments, the repressive nature of the political regime towards labour became rather obvious.

The ruling elite suppressed the emerging labour movement by depriving it of organization, democratic rights and freedoms. Yet unlike the situation in the contemporary fascist regimes of Europe and the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America, the Turkish authoritarian elite made no attempt to fashion some centrally controlled organizational networks which would structure the relationship of the working class to the state in order to control it. In other words, no authoritarian corporatist

structures were imposed on labour. The Republican People's Party remained the primary linkage mechanism between the state and society.

The government began serious work on a comprehensive labour code soon after Turkey joined the ILO (International Labour Organization) in 1932. Preparation for drafting a labour code had already been started as early as 1923 in deliberate anticipation of the problems that were certain to follow from industrialization and the growth of the labour force. In a draft labour law submitted to the National Assembly, the government stated that "Turkey will be endowed with a national industry in the near future. To give this budding industry more vigor, and to obtain the maximum output from the working masses, it is important to place the various branches of industry under the control of law, and to prevent conflicts between capital and labour." [quoted in Rosen, 1962:208 and Bianchi, 1984:119]. Some other proposals were also submitted to the Assembly. At that time, however, the regulation of industrial relations was not considered urgent, and it came slowly. [Rustow,1967:16]. This is understandable in view of the fact that industrial labour force was very small. In 1927 the total number of workers employed in establishments with ten or more workers was only 60,000 for the entire country. [Berberoglu,1982:60] With the transition to etatism and the adoption of the first five-year industrialization plan in 1934, the state assumed the main responsibility for rapid industrialization, and would become a major employer itself. It was rightly anticipated that the industrial proletariat would grow rapidly, so there was a need for a legal framework to regulate industrial relations. [Ekin,1985:233]. The government started serious work on a bill in 1934. This bill was submitted to the Assembly in 1936 and accepted as the fundamental law of industrial relations that year. The new labour code was

modelled on the principles of the Italian Labour Law of 1935. [Keyder,1987:104; Karpat,1959:74]. The real motive behind this law can be found in a speech made by the Secretary General of the of the RPP. He said:

The new labour law will wipe out the erroneous roads that lead to the emergence and persistence of social class consciousness... The Labour Law will be a regime law. By this law the industrial life will be brought into harmony and working as desired by our new regime... [quoted in Mumcuoglu, 1980:382 and Talas,1960:15-6].

Even though the industrial labour force was still small, the state wanted to prevent class struggle from arising well in advance before economic development would bring a sizeable working class.

The coverage of the Labour Code was limited to manual workers and those enterprises that employed ten or more workers. The restriction of the coverage of the law in this way can partly be explained in terms of administrative convenience. The fact that it was basically in those large enterprises that class consciousness might logically be expected to grow also played its part. [Dereli,1968:59]. The Labour Code of 1936 consisted of four basic principal sections. Two of these sections prescribed minimal standards regarding working hours, workers' health and safety and female and child labour. These provisions were to be enforced by inspectors from the Department of Labour organized within the Ministry of Economic Affairs to administer the Labour Code. Two other sections dealt with industrial relations, which were divided into two categories: individual and and collective. The principal instrument of the code was the individual work contract. It dealt only with individual workers' rights. There was no provision for collective action in the areas covered by work contracts. Disputes concerning work contracts were to be referred to the special labour courts. The only issue


in which collective action was permitted was wage claims. The Act prescribed that collective wage disputes might be settled through a system of compulsory mediation and compulsory arbitration. If wage disputes involved at least one fifth of the workers in a given undertaking, they could be submitted to the provincial arbitration boards by directly elected workers' representatives. The parties to the dispute had the right to bring the decisions of the provincial arbitration board to the Supreme Arbitration Board, whose decisions were final and binding. The members of these boards were government officials and public members selected by the government until 1954, by which time they were transformed into tripartite bodies composed of labour and employers' representatives and government officials. Labour unions had no authority to initiate collective disputes. It was only in 1951 that unions were given the authority to initiate collective disputes under certain conditions. Indeed, there was no mention of union organization whatsoever in the Labour Code of 1936. Yet strikes and lockouts were explicitly prohibited by the Law. [see Rosen, 1962 and Dereli, 1968].

Some argue that the Labour Code of 1936 was a modern law which brought very high standards into the field of industrial relations, and contained important protective provisions regarding the rights of individual workers. Dereli, for example, says that "the Code was more protective than regulative, signifying the benevolent paternalism of the state". [Dereli, 1974:289, 1968:49-50]. Similarly, Tunay claims that the Labour Law represented a substantial gain for labour at the time even without a struggle similar to those in the western societies in which the working classes fought bitterly to gain such protective rights. [Tunay, 1978:48]. It is true that the labour law prescribed some important protective provisions in such areas as working hours, workers' health and

safety, female and child labour. Yet these provisions were to be applied only to the larger enterprises with ten or more workers, which in practice meant mainly the state enterprises because at the time most private firms were small undertakings. [see Hale, 1981]. Although the Labour Code went into effect in 1937, due to the onset of the World War II, even this narrow application of protective measures was suspended. [Fisek, 1969:42].

The Republican government had indeed already passed a number of protective labour acts throughout the 1920s and 30s. Among them were such acts as those concerning welfare and relief funds (1928), safety, hygiene and protection of women and juveniles in industrial establishments (Public Health Law of 1930), medical treatment for miners (1935), weekly rest day for industrial and commercial workers in large towns (1935). [For details, see Andic,1957, Izveren,1970, Talas,1960 and Shabon & Zeytinoglu,1985]. We can say that these acts, which were passed in the absence of significant pressure from below, reflected the benevolent paternalistic nature of the state. They can also be considered as involving an implicit recognition on the part of the state that employers and workers were not equal partners and that the individual work contract was not a sufficient instrument for protecting individual workers' rights. [Bianchi,1984:118-9; Ekin,1985:234-5]. Yet the workers were denied the right to collective action in defending their interests. In a deliberate attempt to prevent or contain class struggle, the state's labour policy sought to hinder any collective action among the workers; at the same time, by focusing on individual workers and granting some protective rights, it tried to prevent mass discontent from arising among the workers. The state still retained the upper hand in taking away what it had previously granted to labour. [Tunay,1978:61]. With labour unions and collective labour actions prohibited, the state established itself as the dominant

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Microl

regulative and protective actor in the field of industrial relations in the name of national interests. The 1936 Labour Law consolidated the position of the state in the industrial arena, laying the necessary legal framework for state intervention. [Talas,1960:15; Rosen,1962:269].

The Labour Law of 1936 remained in force until the 1960s, with some amendments. It was well in conformity with the authoritarian nature of the political regime that was based on an etatist economic policy and single-party rule, the official ideology of which emphasized social harmony and organic solidarity, denying the existence of social classes. The 1931 Republican People's Party Congress defined the political order as "a single party regime where the RPP assumed the responsibility to rule in the name of the nation". [Keyder,1987:98]. The RPP described itself as "the synthesis of the people" and "the sole authoritative interpreter of the national interest". Acting in the name of the nation it would abide by the principle of populism, rejecting any privileges for family, class, group or individual. One of the basic principles of populism was "to consider the people of the Turkish Republic not composed of classes but as a community divided among various occupations in conformity with the division of labour for individual and social life". "The labour of each was indispensable to the life and well being of the others and society in general".⁽³⁾ It is evident that the ideological formulation of the authoritarian single party regime with its emphasis on social harmony and a community of interests and its denial of the existence of social classes was based on a corporatist image of society. The problem, of course, was how to put this image into practice. Instead of a socio-political order based

(3) From Ataturk's address to a group of RPP's candidates in 1931, quoted in Bianchi, 1984:102.

on functional organization and representation as suggested by corporatist ideology, the Republican Peoples' Party was assigned the task of "maintaining social order and solidarity instead of class conflict and establishing harmony among interests so that they would not injure one another."⁽⁴⁾ Consequently, strikes were banned and working class organizations were not allowed. The principle of populism provided the official justification for this. If there were no separate classes with conflicting interests as argued by the official ideology, then there was no need for working class organizations. Their interests could best be represented by a single party, and protected by a paternalistic state.

The Labour Code of 1936 contained no provisions regarding labour unions and there was no legal act prohibiting unions, although the Work Stoppages Act of 1909 was still in force at the time, which prohibited the formation of unions in public services and utilities. In other words, legally, the formation of unions was possible except in public services and utilities. [see Gulmez,1981:78-79]. But the government passed a new law of associations in 1938 which effectively forbade unions in all sectors by banning the establishment of associations on a social class basis. [Gulmez,1981:78-9]. The Law of Associations of 1938 clearly reflected the authoritarian character of the regime. It brought extensive restrictions on freedom of association, giving extraordinary powers to the government. It declared illegal any associations based on family, community, class and racial loyalties. It prescribed that prior permission from government was necessary to form associations and that associations could have only a single goal clearly stated in their constitutions. It subjected associations to permanent control and supervision by the government. [see

(4) Ataturk, quoted in Bianchi, 1984:102.

Bianchi,1984:112-3]. Keyder says that "among the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic intelligentsia hardly any voice was raised contesting the social and political measures of authoritarian repression... They were the main beneficiaries of the system which allowed greater exploitation of the working class and the peasantry". [Keyder,1987:100] Sunar also maintains that "the bourgeoisie supported the central bureaucracy because it benefited from the latter's policies and goals". [Sunar,1974:66]. Throughout the period, under the authoritarian rule of the RPP, the Turkish labour movement was not allowed to develop, and the existing working class organizations were suppressed.

Keyder (1979) characterizes the period of single party-rule, particularly the etatist period, as corporatist though not fascist. Bianchi also describes the same period as "a limited state corporatism that aimed primarily at filling out organizational space with semi-official occupational associations as supporting structures for etatist economic policies". [Bianchi,1984:140-3]. In contrast to such arguments, our analysis leads us to the conclusion that despite the corporatist rhetoric and delayed capitalist authoritarian character of the state, there was virtually no attempt on the part of the bureaucratic elite to corporatize labour interests either in the fashion of the populist regimes or of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America.

The Turkish political economy followed a pattern similar to Latin American countries. Etatism in Turkey and populism in Latin America were contemporaneous. They both emerged as a response to the crisis of the primary product trade-oriented development strategy, and advocated the idea of independent national economic development. They essentially signified the same level of capitalist development, that is the early stage of import substitution. As explained in the first chapter, in the populist

regimes an inclusionary kind of authoritarian corporatism developed. O'Donnell, in explaining the emergence of different varieties of corporatist arrangements in Latin America, connected the inclusionary corporatism of the populist period to the early stage of import substitution. In that regard we had also asked whether the etatist period in Turkey involved a similar kind of inclusionary corporatist arrangements. Our negative response to this question can be explained in terms of the different configurations of political coalitions that constituted the social bases of etatism and populism. Populism advocated a multi-class coalition to end the traditional rule of landed oligarchies. It therefore sought to mobilize the working class and to some degree the peasantry. To achieve the desired reforms and economic goals the populist elites tried to expand their support base by emphasizing the incorporation of the hitherto excluded subordinate classes directly into the political process. At the same time, to achieve a certain degree of autonomy from these mobilized masses, the political rulers attempted to control the subordinate classes and structure their relationship to the state by means of corporatist arrangements. Contrary to the populist elites of Latin America, the Turkish civil-military bureaucratic elite never attempted social mobilization. In Turkey there had never been a landed aristocracy against which the masses were to be mobilized, and no social reaction took place against the traditional polity, unlike the case in Latin America. There was not either an imminent threat from foreign capital or an imperial power like the United States, as was the case in Latin America. Thus there was no need for the Turkish bureaucratic elite to mobilize the subordinate classes. As a legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the bureaucratic elite remained distrustful of the subject it ruled. [Keyder, 1987:108-9]. The political and social reforms were all imposed from above without seeking even minimal

support from the subordinate classes. The bureaucratic elite preferred to rule over unawakened, tradition-bound masses. In the absence of any attempts on the part of the ruling elite to mobilize the subordinate classes, the authoritarian single party regime of the early republic was not oriented to controlled incorporation of the subordinate classes into the political process through corporatist structures. It rather remained as a regime above the society which aimed at the exclusion of the masses from the political game. [Sunar and Sayari, 1984:171].

In brief, etatism and populism were contemporary responses to the exhaustion of the primary product trade-oriented development model. They both signified a transition to import substitution development strategy. Yet they were based on different configurations of power and influence relations. This can account for the fact that while some corporatist structures were fashioned by the populist elite, which aimed at controlled incorporation of the subordinate classes as subordinate partners in the multi-class coalitions that ended the rule of the traditional landed oligarchy, the Turkish bureaucratic elite, in coalition with the local notables and newly emerging bourgeoisie, followed a policy of exclusion of the subordinate classes from the political process. Thus no corporatist arrangements similar to those of the populist regimes emerged in Turkey during the period.

The authoritarian single-party regime of the early Republic can not either be characterized as a type of authoritarian corporatism similar to that existing under the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America, despite the fact that it was marked by a deliberate policy of exclusion of the subordinate classes from the political game. O'Donnell maintains that the bureaucratic-authoritarian state emerges after a substantial degree of industrialization has been achieved. It arises after and largely as a result of the

political activation of the subordinate classes. [see O'Donnell, 1977]. This was the case in Latin American countries. These conditions were largely absent in Turkey. The Republican regime had inherited a backward economy. The level of industrialization was negligible. Capitalism had not yet produced the characteristic class divisions in social life and political organization. [Keyder, 1987:18]. The working class was very small and largely unorganized. The existing labour unions were very weak and fragmented organizations which comprised a very small part of the tiny working class. The largest subordinate class was the peasantry, which was marked by "tradition-bound passivity" and political inertia. [Sunar and Sayari, 1984:171]. The bureaucratic elite did not confront a politically mobilized and organized society, unlike the military-technocratic elite of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America. The Turkish ruling elite did not need to resort to a high level of exclusionary repression characteristic of the bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism. The state's labour policy aimed at disorganizing the nascent labour movement. Yet it did not attempt to fill the organizational space with authoritarian corporatist structures. It can be said that the state's strategy toward the working class was more defensive than active. The regime can best be characterized as "authoritarian political in an unincorporated society".(5)

It was only in the mid-1930s when rapid industrialization under etatism began to create the nucleus of an industrial labour force that the ruling elite began to give serious thoughts to organizing labour under the direct control of the RPP. The fourth Congress of

(5) The phrase stems from Clement H. Moore's article on Nasser's Egypt in *Comparative Politics*, 6 No:2, January 1974, 193-286.

the RPP in 1935 decided that the party should take the main responsibility of organizing "the Turkish workers within the main body of the nation so as to serve the interests of this main body, and within the framework of the Party Program". [Gulmez, 1981:78]. Such an experiment was first attempted in the province of Izmir. The RPP decided to bring together the existing workers' associations under a single organization. Consequently, the Industrial Workers' Union was established, which would organize industrial labour. Later the Workers and Artisans' (Esnaf) Union was organized. Its stated aim was to render the workers and Esnaf useful to the regime. All workers and Esnaf in the region were required to register with these workers' and Esnaf's associations and perform the duties as prescribed in the constitutions of these associations. This experiment with authoritarian corporatism, nevertheless, did not yield the expected results. It caused unrest among the workers and esnaf. [see Sulker, 1955:31-3]. The attempt to impose an authoritarian corporatist structure on labour remained largely limited to this experiment in Izmir.

To sum up, despite the delayed capitalist and authoritarian character of the state, which is argued to be the most favourable context for the development of authoritarian corporatism, no serious steps were taken by the Turkish ruling elite in corporatizing labour either in an inclusionary fashion as in the case of the populist regimes or in an exclusionary way as in the case of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America.

B) The State and Capital Organizations

The legacy of the Ottoman State was a very weak national bourgeoisie and the virtual absence of the industrial bourgeoisie. As a result of this, the state assumed the primary role in the economic field initially through indirect fiscal and trade policies. Later under etatism it consolidated central political control over the economy not only through indirect means but also through direct intervention as an entrepreneur itself. Yet the state was not anti-capital. It created all the necessary conditions for the rapid accumulation of private capital. In this process an alliance developed between the bureaucratic elite and the emerging national bourgeoisie, yet the former still retained the upper hand in decision-making. What was the organizational framework of this alliance? Was some kind of corporatist structure fashioned to link the national bourgeoisie to the state, while no corporatist linkage was established with the working class?

The Istanbul Chamber of Industry dates back to late 19th century. It was established in 1879 as a semiofficial association under the Ministry of Commerce to organize Ottoman manufacturing, and protect its interests against competition from foreign capital. But soon this protectionist mood waned in favour of free trade, and the comprador interests took control of the Chamber. It was renamed Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Under the Young Turks regime, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry were reorganized as voluntary associations, lacking semiofficial status, but still granted the status of "the representative of occupational members before the government and consultative organ for the government" in professional matters. [Bianchi,1984:132-3]. The Republican Turkey inherited some fifty chambers from the Ottoman period. [Weiker,1981:95].

Among the groups invited to the Economic Congress of Izmir in 1923, merchant capital was the best organized. It was represented by the National Merchants' Union of Turkey, which had been organized in 1922. [Esin,1974:104] The representatives of industrial capital in the regions where there existed local chambers were nominated by these chambers. Among the demands forwarded by the representatives of merchants and industrialists was the reorganization of the Chambers of Industry and Commerce. [Kepenek, 1984:38-9]. This proposal was approved by the Congress, and put into effect by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry Law enacted in 1925. This law granted the chambers the legal status of "public corporate bodies" (*muessesat-i umumiye*), and brought them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce. It made membership compulsory. It enumerated the membership dues to be paid by establishments of various sizes in detail. It did not, however, define the aims of the Chambers. It only stated that "keeping the commercial records of the respective regions is among the functions to be performed by the Chambers". Oncu argues, therefore, that "the major aim of the law in lending the legal status of the corporate body to the Chambers was to make membership compulsory, thereby bring together small and fragmented capital under a single network of organization". [Oncu,1980:462]. Through these chambers the government also intended to bring industrial and merchant capital under the same organization.

The Chambers were corporatist organizations in the Schmitterian sense. They were granted semi-official status and a monopoly of representation. Their membership was made compulsory. In return for these privileges, they were to be supervised by the state. The state's attempt to organize capital under semi-official, compulsory, public associations can be explained partly in terms of the weakness of private capital.

According to the first industrial census conducted in 1927, there were 65,245 establishments, and of these only 8.94 percent had five or more workers, and about 3.2 percent more than 10 workers. Those establishments with 100 or more workers constituted only 0.23 percent or totalled 155. [Hershlag,1968:54].

Despite the weakness of private capital, the state needed its cooperation for the realization of the goal of rapid economic development within the framework of capitalism. [Saybasili, 1976b:83]. To get the support of capital the state was to guarantee an institutionalized channel of representation for its interests. The state, however, sought not only to obtain the support of the bourgeoisie, but also to exercise a certain degree of control over its behavior. Consequently, the corporatist network of chambers was established, which granted the bourgeoisie an institutionalized channel of representation vis-a-vis the state, and at the same time provided the bureaucratic elite with a mechanism to supervise the activities of the bourgeoisie.

The Law of Associations of 1938, banning class-based associations, also made impossible the formation of employers' associations. Thus the corporatist network of Chambers, which were semi-official public associations based on compulsory membership similar to the German and Austrian Chambers, remained as the main organization of capital during the period. While no corporatist labour organizations were set up to structure the relationship of labour to the state, some corporatist capital organizations were established with a view to incorporating the emerging national bourgeoisie in the ruling coalition.

II. The War Years

The war years laid the groundwork for important changes in the configuration of power relations, particularly between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic elite. The developments of the war period produced the domestic conditions for the post-war transition to a new political economy and a new political regime. In this regard, this period needs to be carefully analyzed.

World War II interrupted the process of industrialization and imposed severe economic difficulties. The Second Five-Year Plan, which was to be put into operation during 1939-1943, had to be abandoned due to the outbreak of the war. Turkey was not involved in the war, but with all its neighbours either at war or occupied by one or another of the belligerent powers, it remained very close to the war, and experienced a state of war economy. The Turkish Government was compelled to take emergency measures. Etatism gave way to more direct state control of the economy under extraordinary conditions. The most important piece of legislation that provided the legal framework for increased state intervention in the economy was the National Defence Law (no:3780) which was passed in 1940. It empowered the government to determine in advance for the private sector what to produce and in which quantities. In order to achieve the predetermined production targets, the government could impose necessary changes in the establishments concerned. If the establishments failed to achieve the government-determined production targets or if they did not implement the measures imposed by the government, they could be confiscated or taken over by the government, yet the latter had to pay the owners compensation. According to the National Defence Law, the government could control or fix the prices in all markets, and nationalize trade in certain commodities. Furthermore,

severe restrictions were to be imposed on foreign trade. These provisions in fact equipped the state with total freedom to act in economic matters. [Keyder,1987:111]. Yet enacting and implementing law are not the same thing. These provisions were not fully implemented. [Hale,1981:60]. Whenever the provisions of the Law that authorized the government to nationalize the factories and mines were implemented, the owners were paid full compensation, and in some cases the compensation even included future and possible profits. The state also guaranteed profits and sales of some private enterprises and undertook to provide credits and foreign currencies to selected firms. [Esin, 1974:128-9].

The National Defence Law prescribed important provisions regarding labour. The protective rights granted by the Labour Code of 1936, such as an eight-hour workday and days off, were suspended, and forced labour was imposed to provide a stable supply of labour to industrial and mining enterprises in order to enable them to achieve the production targets, and prevent work stoppages. The law declared that "for this purpose paid work obligations may be imposed on citizens, and employees could not leave their work sites without an acceptable reason and prior notification. If deemed necessary, workday hours could be increased by three hours every day". [quoted in Bianchi,1984:121 and Esin, 1974:129]. By another law enacted in 1944 these restrictions imposed on labour were made even stricter. The Act authorized the use of security forces for the enforceable return of those who fled their work places, and stipulated that the provisions could be applied to those who left their work without a acceptable excuse. It also empowered the government to determine maximum wages. It is rather interesting that in some cases the government could delegate this authority to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

[Esin,1974:130]. The introduction of wage controls suspended the only issue on which collective action could be initiated. [Bianchi,1984:121]. These provisions concerning labour seem to have been fully implemented throughout the war years. [Fisek,1969:46; Sulker,1955:34-5]. These Acts enabled capital to exploit labour to the full extent and to enjoy extraordinary profits.

The shortages and a very high level of inflation due to the government's mobilization expenditures created an exceptional opportunity for profiteering. While the income of wage and salary earners was declining sharply, a huge amount of capital was accumulating in the hands of those involved in the activities of speculation and black-marketing. Under such conditions when there would have been the greatest necessity for price controls the government in fact abandoned them (in 1942). [Esin,1974:130]. Thus despite the contraction of the economy, the conditions of the war economy led to a rapid accumulation of private capital through, on the one hand, the intensified exploitation of labour and, on the other hand, speculation and black-marketing.

In the face of intensified activities of profiteering which caused increased discontent among people, the government attempted to take some measures. The National Defence Law had not provided the government with adequate means to control profiteering. Therefore, the government introduced a Wealth Levy, (Varlik Vergisi), which was passed in the Assembly on November 4, 1942. [Karpat,1959:114]. The aim of the Wealth Levy was to impose a tax on incomes and capital gained through unorthodox means in the war-time conditions which could not be subjected to ordinary taxes. In other words, it was supposed to soak up part of the extraordinary profits made by speculators. [Esin,1974:131, Karpat,1959:115]. This tax was to be applied to wealthy farmers,

businessmen, industrial enterprises, building owners, real estate brokers and landed estates on a non-repetitive basis. The Law, however, specified an unusual procedure for determining the rate of taxation: It was to be determined by local commissions according to their assessments of each individual taxpayer's wealth and ability to pay. [Hale,1981:71; Keyder,1987:113]. Although all properties were subjected to taxation under the law, in practice the main target of the law turned out to be non-Moslem minorities. The total tax collected amounted to about 315 million Turkish Lira (TL), and of this amount, 53 percent was paid by non-Moslems and 10.5 percent by foreigners. [Hale,1981:71]. According to Lewis (1968:298), "non-Moslems were assessed at ten times the Moslem rate and Donmes (those of Jewish origin converted to Islam) at twice". Those who failed to pay the tax, mostly non-Moslems, were forced to sell their firms and real estate at auction. They were bought by people who made money through different means, mainly profiteering during the war. Most of these non-Moslem businessmen left Turkey immediately after the War. [Keyder,1987:112]. Although the Wealth Levy was supposed to soak up part of the extraordinary profits made through speculation and black-marketing, the manner of its implementation brought substantial gains to the same profiteers who were in a position to buy from those less lucky non-Moslem merchants and industrialists who were not readily able to pay the assessed amount of tax. The Wealth Levy was subjected to such sharp criticism, both domestic and foreign, that its enforcement was relaxed during the second half of 1943, and abolished altogether in March 1944. [Karpas,1959:117]. However, despite the gains made by Moslem businessmen, the Wealth Levy seriously damaged bourgeoisie's confidence in the bureaucratic elite and caused an alienation between them. [Karpas,1969:117;

Keyder,1987:113-4].

Another measure by the government to bring the activities of capital under closer state supervision was the enactment of a new Chambers of Commerce and Industry Law in 1943 which superseded the Law of 1925. The new law of Chambers was intended to put the Chambers under tighter government surveillance. [Oncu,1980:463; Weiker,1981:96]. According to the 1943 Law of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Commodity Exchanges (no.4355), the Chambers were henceforth to be established only by the Ministry of Commerce when and where deemed necessary. Being public corporate bodies, the limits of their activities were to be determined by the same ministry. The Ministry of Commerce would appoint a general secretary to all the existing chambers. This general secretary would represent the Ministry on the Board of Directors and the General Assembly of the Chamber to which he or she belonged. The general secretary had the authority to veto and revoke any decisions taken by the Chambers by appealing to the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry could amend, approve or veto the decisions of the Chambers. The decision of the Ministry was final. [Oncu,1980:463; Esin,1974:132-3]. These provisions left virtually no room for free actions on the part of the Chambers. They were put under strict supervision of the government. Oncu argues that "that the need for such a law arose indicates that the local chambers had started to show more vigor in the inflationary conditions of the war years". [Oncu,1980:463] As explained before, the conditions of the war economy created an exceptional opportunity for rapid accumulation of private capital. The bourgeoisie, finding itself sufficiently strengthened, was beginning to flex its muscles. It expressed its dissatisfaction with the increased state intervention in the economy, and criticized various government policies, particularly the Wealth Levy,

which was claimed to have violated the sanctity of private property. It created animosity among capital towards the bureaucratic elite. The 1943 Law of Chambers, therefore, can be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the bureaucratic elite to retain the upper hand in decision-making in the face of the growing strength of the bourgeoisie. In other words, it was a measure taken by the bureaucratic elite to retain its dominant position in society.

To sum up, the conditions of the war economy provided the bourgeoisie with an ample opportunity to increase its wealth by leaps and bounds at the expense of wage and salary earners. The bourgeoisie's increased wealth in turn contributed to its strength vis-a-vis the bureaucratic elite. This resulted in a growing tension in their alliance, which was also reflected in the relationship of the corporatist Chambers to the State. The Chambers were put under tighter state control.

III. The Post-War Period

1. Democratization Process and Liberalization of the Economy

The end of the Second World War marked a transition to a democratic regime and a more liberal economy. The causes of this transition can be traced to both internal and external conditions. The new political and economic order involved a new network of relations between the state and capital and labour.

The developments of the war years had created a rift between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic elite. The Wealth Levy had seriously damaged capital's confidence in the bureaucratic elite. The imposition of strict regulations on the Chambers had also contributed to this alienation of capital from the bureaucratic elite. Some other developments during the last years of the War caused further deterioration of their alliance. Among these developments was the preparation by the bureaucratic hierarchy of an economic plan which suggested more state controls over the economy. During the War the government had authorized an inter-ministerial commission to prepare reports on the adaptation of the economy to the post-war conditions. The commission was dominated by a more radical wing of the bureaucracy. [Kepenek,1984:92; Keyder,1987:114]. This commission submitted detailed plans and reports to the government. These plans envisaged a state-controlled post-war reconstruction based on a left version of statist policy. [Keyder,1987:114]. Although the government did not endorse the projects proposed by the Commission, such an attempt on the part of the bureaucracy was enough to further convince the bourgeoisie of the necessity to terminate its alliance with the bureaucratic elite. [Keyder,1987:114]. It was convinced that it could guarantee its security

by putting effective checks on the bureaucratic elite or by replacing it if necessary. [Karpas,1959:118; Sunar,1974:81]. The bourgeoisie, whose wealth had increased by leaps and bounds in the inflationary war economy, now felt sufficiently strengthened to question the position of the bureaucratic elite within the political and economic arena.

The democratic powers had won the war, and the world was getting prepared for a new political and economic order under the hegemonic leadership of the United States. The clear preference of both the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy was to side with the Western powers who had emerged from the War as victors. The bureaucratic elite had always retained its aspirations of Westernization. The bourgeoisie also wanted to benefit from new international economic order. Turkey was to take its part in the world capitalist system. Under such internal and external conditions the ruling elite took steps to liberalize the regime. The government declared that there was a pressing need for opposition parties. Consequently, in the post-war period the first opposition party, the National Resurgence Party, was founded in July 1945. Although this party did not play any significant role in the Turkish political life, it had symbolic value, since its establishment actually showed the government's willingness to allow a multi-party system. And shortly thereafter, a major opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), was formally established on January 7, 1946. [Karpas,1959:148-9]. It was welcomed by both the ruling RPP and the government. Soon after its formation, the DP began to expand and act as a genuine opposition. [Karpas,1969:151-2]. The first general elections of the multi-party period were held on July 21, 1946. Amidst extensive allegations of fraud, the RPP won the great majority of parliamentary seats and returned to office. The DP, the main opposition party, remained a minority in the National Assembly. [Karpas, 1969:163-4]. The RPP ruled the

country until the next elections in May, 1950.

The end of the World War II also marked the beginning of a new phase in Turkish political economy. The view that fundamental changes in economic policy took place after the DP came to power in 1950 is the dominant one in the literature on Turkish economy. This view nevertheless does not accurately reflect reality. Turkish political economy had already started to take a new direction in the immediate post-war period which found its culmination in the 1950s. [see Gulalp,1985 and Kepenek,1984:ch.V.] The change was in the direction of the abandonment of etatism and a move toward liberalization of the economy. Etatism appeared to be no longer able to find a supporting base. First of all, the bourgeoisie had begun to see state intervention in the economy as a threat to its interests and wanted to take full control of the economy. Secondly, the peasantry and the working class which had suffered all the hardships of the etatist policy and the war years also tended to take a stance against the economic policies of the previous period. Finally, the big land owners had gained substantial benefits under etatism. They also did not suffer serious losses during the War. One might have expected, therefore, that they would constitute a supporting base for a moderate etatist policy in the post-war period as well. But the Land Reform Law of 1945 turned them against the RPP and its economic policies. [see Boratav,1962:193; Karpas,1959:117-25]. As a result, the RPP government was forced to make fundamental changes in its economic policy. The principle of etatism continued to be included in the party programme of the RPP, yet it was devoid of any meaningful content. The government redefined etatism in the light of the new conditions. The intention was to draw the limits of the public sector and state intervention in the economy. This reduced the state's economic role simply to supporting

and encouraging the private sector and supplying public services and infrastructure necessary for the development of the private sector.

The new political economy was in conformity with the model proposed by the United States. If Turkey was to qualify for American grants and aid that would be forwarded within the scheme of the Recovery Programme for Europe, Turkey had to liberalize its economy, abandon etatism in favor of the private sector, and specialize in those sectors in which it had supposedly a competitive advantage, namely agriculture. This new strategy found its expression in the 1947 Development Plan, which was prepared to qualify for Marshall Aid Programme. According to this plan, priority was to be given to agriculture and agricultural industries. Public resources would be diverted to investment in such fields as transportation and communication. The Plan provided for the transfer of the public enterprises to private sector except in mining, energy, railways and iron-steel. It assured private capital that it could enter every sector. Although the Plan was not directly implemented, it was important for signifying the transition to a new strategy of economic development. [for the Plan, see Tekeli et al. 1974]

To summarize, by the end of the World War II the bourgeoisie had gained sufficient strength to question the position of the bureaucratic elite in the political and economic field. It searched for an effective mechanism to check the bureaucratic hierarchy. It pressed for a multi-party system in which it could organize its own party. It also demanded the abandonment of etatism and liberalization of the economy. In the international arena, the Allies had won the War, and a new international economic and political order was emerging under the leadership of the United States. If Turkey was to take its part in the new international order it had to liberalize its political and economic

system. Under such domestic and international conditions the ruling elite proceeded to adopt a multi-party system and liberalize the economy.

2. Legalization of Unions and Corporatization of the Emerging Union Movement

One of the first products of democratization was the amendment of the 1938 Law of Associations on June 5, 1946. With the amendment of Article 9, the prohibition on class-based associations was removed. Thus labour unions were finally allowed to organize. Employers were also permitted to establish associations. A few of the more restrictive definitions of illegal associations in the 1938 Law were also repealed. For instance, the provision prohibiting groups whose goal was to destroy political and national unity was discarded, and civil servants were also allowed to form professional associations. Some important liberalizing provisions were introduced. Among them was the article that provided for the transition from the "system of prior permission" to the "liberal system". Henceforth, associations could be established without prior governmental permission. Instead of government officials, only the courts could decide to dissolve an association, after due process. Still, some restrictive provisions of the 1938 Law of Associations were preserved. For example, associations were prohibited from engaging in activities outside their stated goals, particularly political activities. [see Bianchi, 1984:113-4] Yet the punishment for such violations was reduced from closure and possible imprisonment to light monetary fines. [Karpát, 1959:159 and Tuncomag, 1975:11-2].

The official ideology of the authoritarian single party regime, known as populism, had been based on a corporatist view of society as a community divided into various

occupations in accordance with the division of labour. It had denied the existence of social classes. Populism had served as an important part of the justification for the single party regime and prohibition of the class-based associations. The amendment made in the Law of Associations now lifted that ban. This implied the government's recognition of the existence of social classes with specific interests and their need for organizations that would represent these interests. Accordingly, the principle of populism had to be modified. The 1947 Convention of the RPP redefined populism. Still avoiding the word class, the new definition recognized that various social groups make up the whole of the nation. The Party's duty was described as harmonizing the interests of these social groups. [see Karpas,1959:Ch.12, Weiker,1973:246 and Bianchi,1984:104-5]. The Democratic Party, as the main opposition party, also declared its position on the principle of populism:

We recognize the social classes. We completely accept that they have special interests and that if not regulated these interests may contradict each other. We find it useful and necessary for various classes in a modern society to organize themselves for work and activity in professional associations, trade unions, and cooperatives... but we can not accept the fact that social classes have irreconcilable interests and have to struggle with each other. Such a conception in our view is outmoded and baseless... [Fuat Koprulu's views, a leading figure of the DP, quoted in Karpas,1969:312]

Thus in effect both the main opposition party and the ruling Republican Party held similar positions on the principle of populism, particularly on the issue of social class. These views found their expression in the relations of both parties with labour and capital organizations.

Immediately after the ban on class-based associations was lifted, workers

spontaneously began to organize unions in large cities, particularly in Istanbul where the bulk of the industrial labour force was concentrated. A number of leftist parties were organized as well. Some of them were social democratic in orientation while others expressly advocated socialism and communism. Among them were the Turkish Socialist Party (May 14,1946), the Social Justice Party, the Turkish Social Democratic Party, the Turkish Socialist Labour and Peasants' Party (June 20,1946), the Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Workers and Farmers' Party. [Sulker,1955:37] Some of these leftist parties, particularly the Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Socialist Labour and Peasants' Party, actively assisted in the unionization of workers. Due to this assistance and the efforts made by workers on their own, an extremely rapid unionization among workers began. [Rosen,1962:281; Isikli,1972:298]. At first the government seemed to welcome such rapid unionization. In a speech on September 12, 1946, the Minister of Labour, Sadi Irmak, said:

In our view the unions being organized are completely legal and legitimate. From my heart and my soul I hope that they will advance both their own and the nation's welfare. We are ready to work together with the unions. I am sure that they will be valuable in achieving the goals of the Ministry of Labour. [quoted in Rosen,1962:281 and Sulker,1955:47]

The workers' organizations exhibited a very fragmented character. Various organizations emerged, which had different structures, programmes and ideological leanings. On the one hand, there was the Turkish Workers' Association which was established in July 1946, and soon organized quite a number of workers' associations in different regions. On the other hand, there were single unions which pretended to be nation-wide organizations by carrying a title starting with the word Turkey, as well as

unions named after the cities in which they were located and local unions and their alliances (birlik). Only limited attempts were made to establish a central organization at the national level. There was a rivalry between these organizations. The leftist parties, particularly the Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Labour and Peasants' Party, were also competing with each other for the support of the unions. Each wanted to establish links with the existing unions and organize new ones in accordance with its own goals and programme. In addition to the workers' associations and labour unions, the Workers' Club was formed as a non-political organization of labour. [see Sulker, 1955:50].

Rapid organization of workers created anxiety on the part of the government. Under such conditions, the government did not hesitate to halt freedom of unionization. By the Martial Law Authorities' order of December 17, 1946, the newly established unions, the Workers' Club, the Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Socialist Labour and Peasants' Party were outlawed, and their leaders were prosecuted. These political parties were accused of seeking to establish the dictatorship of one class over the other, that is proletarian dictatorship, and damaging national order. The unions, on the other hand, were accused of having become a tool of these parties in their activities. [Gulmez, 1981:87]. The Turkish Workers' Association with its close government connection was not confronted with this persecution. But it also faced a crisis situation. This harsh treatment by the government of labour organizations created anxiety and fear among the workers. They began to resign from the Associations. [Isikli, 1972:298-299; Sulker, 1955:55-56].

The government closed the newly established labour unions, workers' associations and socialist parties in order to prevent the emergence of autonomous network of labour organizations. At the same time, to win the electoral support of the workers it enacted new

legislation which brought important social benefits for labour. On June 27, 1945, An Act (no:4772) was passed to establish an insurance system for industrial accidents, occupational diseases and maternity. The Workers' Insurance Institution was created in July 1945. The State Employment Service was established in January 1946. [see Shabon and Zeytinoglu, 1985; Andic, 1957; Yazgan, 1982]. Another important development was the creation of the first Ministry of Labour on January 28, 1946. Until that time, the principal organ dealing with labour relations had been the Department of Labour attached to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This Department was a very small, poorly financed and inefficient organization. There was a need to deal with labour relations at the ministerial level. The Ministry of Labour was responsible for the regulation of industrial relations and the development of social policies and welfare programmes in the field of workers' health, work security and working conditions. [Yazgan, 1982:50-1]. From then on, the Ministry of Labour acted as the key instrument for the state's policies in the field of industrial relations. It also played, though indirectly, a dominant role in major welfare programmes and social policies. [Rosen, 1962:278-9].

These acts signified important benefits for labour. The main reason why the government passed them one after another in a matter of months can be found in the fact that with the transition to a multi-party system and the adoption of direct suffrage, the working class had become an important source of votes. The opposition parties were also trying to get the support of the workers, whose number was now considerable. [Talas, 1960:20; Sulker, 1955:36-9]. The number of workers employed in enterprises with ten or more workers had risen from only 60,000 in 1927 to 301,276 in 1943. [Andic, 1957:368]. It should be pointed out that these numbers greatly underestimate the

actual size of the working class because they include only those employed in enterprises with ten or more workers, and the large enterprises constituted a very small percentage of the total at the time. Therefore, the actual size of the working class must have been much larger. According to Rozaliev, the industrial proletariat totalled 643,000 by the end of the 1940s. [cited in Berberoglu,1982:66]. Thus the working class deserved attention from the political parties as an important source of votes.

Immediately after most of the existing unions were outlawed, the government hurriedly passed the Law of the Workers and Employers' Unions and the Federation of Unions on the pretext that unions were legal bodies of a special category different from all other associations. [B. Dereli,1977:50]. The Act was composed of thirteen articles. [Tuncomag,1975:12] It was the first act that specifically dealt with unions, and it stated that the unions rest on the constitutional right of every citizen to form associations without prior permission. [Tunay,1978:139] In other words, the Act granted workers the right to organize unions without prior governmental permission. To protect unions against arbitrary closure by the executive, it also stated that a union could be suspended or dissolved only upon court decision. It defined unions as any combination of individuals in the same branch of activity or related works belonging to the same branch of activity for the purpose of mutual aid and for protecting and representing their common interests. Thus the Act, by using the rather broad term "branch of activity", allowed the formation of both craft and industrial unions. [Tunay,1978:139; Sulker,1955:61-2]. Dereli argues that "the Act seems to put the emphasis on industry-based unionism as envisaged in the expression of "related works belonging to the same branch of activity", and the interpretation by the Ministry of Labour of the Act also emphasizes industrial unionism".

[Dereli,1968:72]. After this general provision pertaining to both employees and employers' unions, the second provision of the same article stated that only those employers in the same branch of industry or related branches could organize associations. Thus it laid the basis for industry-based unionism among employers.

The 1947 Unions Act contained rather liberal democratic, pluralist provisions. It allowed multiple membership. It provided that an employee who was employed in different types of work might join one or more of the labour unions corresponding to these types of work. It also stated that more than one union could be established in the same branch of industry. Thus the Unions Act adopted the principle of "rival unionism". [Rosen, 1962:283; Dereli,1968:50]. It emphasized the voluntary nature of unionism. It declared that "no person could be forced to join or to refrain from joining a union or to withdraw or to refrain from withdrawing from a union". [Tuna,1964:414; Dereli,1981:549]. The provisions that emphasized the voluntary nature of unions aimed at preventing closed or union shops. In brief, the Unions Act envisaged a pluralist structure for the union movement by allowing the formation of an unlimited number of unions in the same branch of industry, emphasizing the voluntary character of membership and forbidding closed or union shops. Unions could be formed without governmental permission, and they could be suspended or closed only by court decision.

Despite these rather liberal democratic provisions, the 1947 Unions Act introduced restrictive measures as well. It strictly prohibited unions from engaging in political activities or establishing any financial or administrative links with political parties. Article 5 stated that employees and employers' unions as an organization can not engage in politics, political propaganda and political publication, and can not be a tool for the

activities of any political organization. [Isikli,1972:299]. Moreover, although unions could organize cooperatives and mutual assistance funds, and provide social and legal assistance to their members, they were not allowed to use their funds for purposes outside the goals stated in the Act, particularly for political purposes. [Yazgan,1982:52; Rosen,1962:282]. The Unions Act especially stressed that unions were to be "national organizations" in the sense that they should hold national interests above their own economic and organizational goals. They could not pursue international goals and engage in activities contradicting "nationalism" and "national interest". In accordance with this restriction, Article 5 of the Act required that the Council of Ministers approve any request for affiliation of any union or union organization to an international organization. Kutal argues that "the reason behind this provision was to prevent unions from joining those international organizations which were at the extreme left". [Kutal,1961:113]. The Act covered only manual workers. It forbade white collar employees from forming or joining labour unions. It also excluded those who worked for small enterprises such as grocery stores or small retail enterprises. [Tuna, 1964:415; Dereli, 1968:73]. The 1947 Unions Act also contained some provisions which impinged on freedom of unions more directly. Unions' funds and accounts were subject to government inspection at any time. One of the most controversial provisions was the one that allowed the police to enter and investigate unions upon the written order of the highest administrative authority of a given locality.⁽⁶⁾ Furthermore, the annual amount of membership dues was limited to maximum TL. 120 per member (about US \$ 15 at the 1950s exchange rate).

(6) For the parliamentary debate on this provision, see Gulmez,1981

[Dereli,1981:549]. The freedom of unions to increase the rate of membership dues and own real estate was also restricted. Membership dues were to be collected directly by the unions from their members. More importantly, the Act did not recognize the right to strike and lockout, thus maintaining the basic prohibition of the 1936 Labour Code. According to Article 4 of the Unions Act, employers and employee unions may enter into collective contracts in the name of their members. Nevertheless, because of the ban on strikes, this provision was in fact born a dead letter. Labour unions had nothing at their disposal to compel employers to enter collective bargaining. Moreover, the right to make collective agreements with employers was not confined to labour unions. According to the Law of Obligations of 1926 any group of workers could engage in making such agreements with their employers. The only mechanism left for solving industrial disputes was the system of mediation and compulsory arbitration as laid down in the Labour Code of 1936. The 1947 Unions Act, nevertheless, did not contain any provisions which granted unions a role in the arbitration process except that when a dispute came before an arbitration board, they were entitled to submit their views and suggested solutions to the dispute. It was not until 1950 that unions were empowered to initiate collective disputes before arbitration boards. It should be noted that under the Unions Act labour unions were granted the right to demand the authorities concerned or the Arbitration Boards to take measures against any employers' alliances which were formed against workers' seeking employment for the purpose of reducing wages below the current level. Although this provision empowered unions to directly initiate a collective dispute, it was difficult to apply the provision in practice because of its vagueness. [Tuna,1963:266]

To sum up, the 1947 Unions Act envisaged a system of rival unionism based on

pluralist organizational principles. It provided for an unlimited number of unions and emphasized voluntary membership. Its liberal pluralist aspects, nevertheless, were limited. It contained rather restrictive provisions of an authoritarian character. It maintained the prohibition against strikes. It put extensive restrictions on union activities, placing them under effective state supervision.

The opposition criticized the government for hurriedly introducing the bill to the Parliament without enough work on it. In response to such criticism the government defended itself by claiming that the main reason for preparing the Act urgently was to fill the legal gap in the field of union organization. [Gulmez,1981:92]. It is our contention that the main motive behind the enactment of such an important act within a very short time was the government's desire to control unionization of the workers. A speech made by the Minister of Labour when submitting the bill to the Assembly seems to support our argument. Arguing for the necessity of the Act, he said:

Shortly after this development (referring to the amendment in the Law of Associations), in many places, among them the large cities, we found ourselves face to face with a unionist activity which quickly arose and made headway, their number approaching 100. Some called themselves unions, others assemblies or associations. Yet it was clear that they all shared the motive of advancing class or collective interests and needs. Although founded to meet these needs, some shortly moved far from their duty, imposing on us the duty to promulgate a new system of law and order. For example, we saw that in some instances group interests were abandoned, advancing their personal interests, and securing leadership posts occupied the energies of some who carried on political propaganda based on class or occupational interests. Others suddenly confronted us as alleged spokesmen for the whole nation, through their authority as officials of these groups; without any examination, those who represent their fellows in a particular area presumed to speak for all Turkish workers. The majority of our workers are patriotic and ready to work together with the state, and to rely on the guidance and help of the Ministry of Labour. It could not be a

question, as in totalitarian countries, of our free etatist government to arrange the union question to its own needs and direct unions through government officials. Our aim is to give the principles of freedom, nationalism and etatism to unions as a direction and assure that they will work in the benefit of nation, public interests and their occupation... A special law was needed to deal with this particular question. [quoted in Rosen, 1962:281-2 and Isikli, 1967:75]

The rapid proliferation of unions immediately after the formation of class-based associations was permitted, alarmed the government of the urgency of setting a legal framework that would enable it to control the direction of the union movement. But it was not simply the rapid proliferation of unions that created a need for the government to pass a special unions law. The reason was that the union movement was developing in the direction that it could not approve. [Gulmez,1981:93]. The government had tried to lead workers gradually into unionism, relying on the newly organized Ministry of Labour, and its well staffed and amply financed political party. [Rosen,1962:281]. But it was no longer the only actor on the stage. The growing opposition parties also wanted to influence the emerging union movement in the direction of their own views. In particular, the socialist parties and activists on the Left assisted union organization and tried to establish direct links with the unions. They also encouraged unions toward certain political goals. It was these two unacceptable developments that alarmed the government. The 1947 Unions Law took severe measures to prevent such developments from occurring again. It strictly forbade unions from engaging in political activities and establishing links with political organizations. It is interesting that the discussion on these provisions in the National Assembly did not lead to any controversy between the main opposition party, DP, and the ruling RPP. They appeared to have reached a consensus on the prohibition of unions from engaging in politics and establishing links with political

parties. However, it seems ironic that both of them wanted to establish links with labour unions and influence them in their own direction. For example, in October 1946 Celal Bayar, the Chairman of the DP, expressly stated that "he wanted to establish labour unions under the aegis of his own party". [Tunay,1948:140, Isikli,1972:299]. This provision did not prevent the RPP either from carrying its own activities among unions. The main reason why both the DP and the RPP agreed on this provision was the fear that some socialist parties might penetrate into the union movement. [Tunay,1978:140]. As will be shown later, this article, which was intended to keep unions out of politics, posed a real threat to freedom of unions, especially in the latter half of the 1950s under DP rule. As Talas rightly points out, "it is almost impossible to delineate the limits of politics, and define what is political and what is not political". [cited in Sulker,1955:64]. Therefore it could easily be manipulated against those unions which came in to conflict with the government.

The Republican government was determined not to recognize the right of strike. In response to criticisms from the DP, the Minister of Labour, Sadi Irmak, stated that " the right to strike can be said to be anti-democratic for the reason that it gives rise to the possibility of the workers who want to work being forced not to work". He argued that "under the etatist nature of our regime, the state assumed the role of an umpire in solving conflicts that might arise between the social classes, for that reason there was no need for the right to strike." [quoted in Isikli,1972:300 and Dereli,1974:330]. The dominant view of the time was that unions were not to be instruments for class struggle, but organizations that would cooperate with the state and employers in increasing production and expanding the economy. [see Gulmez,1981:96-7].

While the ruling elite now admitted the existence of social classes, it still emphasized that their interests were not irreconcilable; hence they did not need to struggle against each other. It was particularly stressed that labour unions were to hold national interests above their narrow economic and organizational interests. It was argued that labour unions could best serve national interests as well as workers' interests by cooperating with the state and employers in economic development. The state would play an active role in solving the disputes between the labour unions and employers. Thus whereas the government laid the basis for a pluralist organizational structure for the union movement through the 1947 Unions Act, ironically it advocated a corporatist network of relations between the labour unions and the state. The labour unions were to cooperate with the state authorities and mobilize and control the workers in the direction of state policies. The authoritarian provisions of the Unions Act provided the government with strong weapons to force the unions to cooperate with the government in a corporatist framework. Union activities and finances were put under close state supervision. The authoritarian provisions of the Act could easily be manipulated against those unions which refused to cooperate. It can be argued, therefore, that the adoption of the Unions Act actually signified the intention of the government to use labour unions as a control mechanism over the working class. Dereli argues:

The legislature's initial motives seem to be twofold. The first was the desire of the legislature to legalize trade unions for the purpose of social control. Once these structures were formed with certain activities accorded them, it was thought to be fairly easy to suppress conflict, to control and to manipulate a growing industrial work force, and to eradicate all the undesirable elements that might arise from within it... The state was deemed able to take care of the workers' welfare... The second motive was likely to be the desire to qualify as a state with modern and progressive policies. As in the adoption of protective labour

legislation, trade unions were legalized with this aim. [Dereli, 1968:106].

In accordance with these twofold motives, the Unions Act of 1947 which regulated industrial relations until the early 1960s attempted to accommodate both pluralist and authoritarian elements. It encouraged rival unionism by allowing the formation of an unlimited number of unions in the same branch of activity, and permitting multiple membership. It emphasized voluntary membership and forbade closed-shops or union shops. These provisions would, however, in practice lead to a fragmented union movement, promoting weak, small, competing organizations because the Act did not provide any incentives for unions to join together in larger, stronger organizations. It made it particularly difficult to form multi-union organizations by stating that affiliation of any union to a multi-union organization required the votes of two thirds of the membership. The clear intent of the Law was to create a multitude of weak, competing local unions under direct government surveillance, limited in their activities and deprived of any substantial powers to pursue the interests of their members. [Bianchi,1984:122-3; Rosen,1962:282]. In short, the 1947 Unions Act contained both liberal democratic, pluralist and authoritarian elements. Yet the former was mainly limited to the organizational structure of the union movement and applied in such a way that it would create a fragmented and ineffective union movement.

When the 1947 Trade Unions Law was passed, workers seemed hesitant and unwilling to establish unions. This was mainly due to the ban on unions in December 1946. Following the adoption of the Unions Act, the Republican government immediately attempted to establish some kind of corporatist relations with the union movement. For this purpose, a Worker's Bureau was formed within the RPP. [see Sulker,1955:68-9, Dilik

et al.,1965:41-2; Tuna, 1970:256]. It played an important role in the process of unionization. It prepared a prototype statute for unions. The Bureau required the unions organized through its assistance accept the principle that "the expansion of production" was to be their main statutory duty. The Worker's Bureau encouraged those workers who had sympathy with the RPP or party members themselves to organize unions or occupy the key posts in the unions. It was largely through this Bureau that the link between the unions and the RPP was provided. The Republican government also played an important part in financing unions. In addition to the financial assistance to labour unions made by the RPP from its own budget through the Worker's Bureau, the government also provided funds to unions. Article 30 of the Labour Code stated that the employers should forward the amount of money that they had received through the deductions from the wages of penalized employees to the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry would have to assist labour unions through this source. [Hale,1976:62, Sulker,1955:70-1; Dilik et al.,1965:42]. This provision provided the government with an important weapon against the unions because the financial weakness of the unions made them dependent on this fund. [Tunay,1978:137]. From March 7,1947 to November 28,1949, the total amount of money distributed amounted to TL.19,600. It all went to the unions in Istanbul. [see Sulker,1955:71-2 and Dilik et al., 1965:42]. Union organization therefore gained momentum in Istanbul, particularly in the textile industry. The Worker's Bureau gave special importance to this branch of industry and tried to organize textile workers under its own control. This was mainly because of the fact that the textile industry was the largest industry in Turkey at the time. Due to individual rivalries among the union leaders, however, the textile workers were soon divided among five unions despite some

attempts of the Worker's Bureau to prevent this division. After the Worker's Bureau more or less completed its activities in the textile industry, it began to play a more active role in the establishment of unions in other branches of industry. [Sulker,1955:72; Dilik et al.1965:42].

The Republican government used more co-optative and pre-emptive techniques than coercion in its attempt to corporatize the union movement. It played an active role in the formation of labour unions by providing financial assistance and expertise. Quite a few of these unions were created by the government through the Workers' Bureau. Pro-RPP unionists or party members were also placed in the leadership or other key posts in the union organizations. Deprived of any substantial powers these unions were dependent on the government for their survival. The union leaders also relied more on the government for their positions than on those whom they represented. Thus the unions seemed to have no alternative but to cooperate in the implementation of public policies and control and mobilize their members towards the governmental goals.

Unionization soon spread to other regions of the country. By the end of 1948 the number of unions had reached 73 with some 52,000 members. [Tuna,1963:252]. Confronted with the difficulty of keeping a large number of unions under its control, the RPP began to direct the unions towards unification. The immediate outcome of these RPP efforts was the formation of the Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions on March 24, 1948. This alliance was established by 17 unions in Istanbul under the direct supervision of the Worker's Bureau. Though the membership of the Alliance was limited to Istanbul region, the government intended to use it as a mechanism to direct the entire union movement. In the absence of a nation-wide union organization and due to the weakness of unions in

other regions of the country, the Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions acted as a peak association of the union movement during its initial years. [Sulker,1955:73; Dilik et al. 1965:43]. The formation of the Alliance was a pre-emptive move by the RPP. Some unions had managed to stay out of the party control, and there was a danger that these independent unions would be the first to establish a multi-union organization. This would obviously strengthen them vis-a-vis the government and those unions under the control of the ruling RPP. As a pre-emptive measure, the RPP hurried to create a multi-union organization under its aegis.

Slowly the issue of the low wage levels began to occupy the agenda of the newly established unions. The unions were deprived of any powers to force employers to increase wages. They were not empowered even to initiate collective interest disputes which was the only mechanism to be used when demanding higher wages. But the unions prompted workers'

representatives, who were mostly union members, to initiate collective disputes. The seven collective disputes initiated by the workers' representatives in 1947 equalled the total number of disputes brought before the Supreme Arbitration Board over the previous eight years. This was largely the result of union efforts. [Sulker,1955:82-3]. The swelling demand for wage increases led to a deterioration of the relations between the workers and employers. Under these conditions, the Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions was induced by the authorities to join the Union of Istanbul Chambers of Industry in forming a Conciliation and Arbitration Council in 1948. The creation of this council represented a state-induced corporatist agreement between the labour unions and employers' organizations at the very time when industrial relations were becoming more conflictual.

Forming this Council, the labour unions and employers agreed to solve their disputes through peaceful means. The Council was composed of three employees' representatives and three employers' representatives. The Council reached some principal decisions:

- (1). The Union of Chambers of Industry would write a letter to all member employers and advise them not to take a stance against labour unions.
- (2). All employers who were members of the Union of the Chambers were to prefer union members when hiring new workers.
- (3). Both parties were to accept the decisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Council. Regarding the issues on which no agreement was reached, they would be free to appeal to court. [quoted in Dilik et al., 1965:43-4 and Sulker,1955:83-4].

The Republican Government was rather happy to see the unions and employers' association work together. This was the first important step in the way of creating an understanding of cooperation between the employers and unions. However, despite this agreement the employers still continued their efforts to discourage unionization among workers and weaken the unions in spite of the fact that most of the existing unions had been established under the control of the government. [Sulker,1955:81,84]. The unions had no weapons at their disposal to use against the employers in order to force them to comply with the agreement. The corporatist agreement was, therefore, dead at its birth.

Economic conditions began to deteriorate throughout the country. Unemployment increased in many branches of industry. Particularly in the textile industry, unemployment reached an acute level. Under such deteriorating economic conditions, the Textile Industry Workers' Union wanted to organize a meeting to protest unemployment and the importation of nylon and sewing cotton which was seen as the main cause of the unemployment. The Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions, which was dominated by pro-

government unionists, declined this offer. Yet despite the decision of the Alliance against the meeting, the Textile Industry Workers' Union insisted on organizing a protest meeting. The meeting was held on September 5, 1949 after the permission of the provincial governor was obtained. On the night of the meeting, the Alliance decided to expel the Textile Union from the Alliance. [see Sulker,1983a and 1955:121-4; Isikli,1972:300-1]. Upon its expulsion the Textile Union joined several other unions that had preferred to stay out of the Alliance. They established the Free Workers Unions' Alliance in March 1950. [Dilik et al.,1965:44, Sulker,1955:127-9]. The Democratic Party played a significant part in the formation of this second union alliance. Those unions which were opposed to the government policies were now channelling their anger for the Republican government into cooperation with the major opposition party which was the main representative of the bourgeoisie. The Free Workers Unions' Alliance severely criticized the government for its economic policies. The DP was encouraging these activities while the Republican government was striving to keep the unions loyal to itself. [see Sulker,1955:128-32]. Thus despite the provisions of the Unions Act of 1947 that prohibited unions from engaging in political activities, labour unions, on the eve of the general elections, had been divided into two groups according to their sympathies with the two major political parties.

To sum up, immediately after the adoption of the Unions Act, the Republican government attempted to corporatize the union movement mainly through co-optative and pre-emptive techniques. Its intention was to use labour unions as a mechanism to control the rapidly growing working class and mobilize it towards the governmental goals. Quite a few of these unions were created by the government as an adjunct to its party. The RPP

captured the leadership and other key posts in the union organizations. The labour unions were to a great extent financially dependent on the government. The government also exploited their financial weakness to force them to enter into corporatist cooperation. The system came close to the authoritarian type of corporatism in terms of its logic and functioning. But since the RPP was not the only actor in the arena and it was also trying to get the political support of labour, the government had to tolerate the existence of some independent unions or pro-DP unions. It avoided using open oppression against those unions which managed to retain their independence from the the RPP.

Although the system showed authoritarian corporatist characteristics in terms of its functioning or the interaction between the labour unions and the state, its organizational structure can not be characterized as corporatist. It was not based on a limited number of hierarchically structured, compulsory union organizations. Instead, it exhibited pluralist features. Despite some limited attempts by the RPP to direct the formation of a nationwide union organization and the establishment of the Alliance of the Istanbul Unions, the union movement displayed a very fragmented character during the period. There were several unions in the same branch of industry. A large number of small local unions were organized, which had just a few hundred members. [see Hale, 1976; Isikli, 1967:77; Tuna, 1963:252-3]. The number of unions had risen to 88 by the 1st of May 1950 from 73 in 1948. Total membership had increased from 52,000 in 1948 to 78,000 in 1950. (see Table 1 in Appendix). Thus the average number of members for each union was only 712 in 1948 and 886 in 1950. This phenomenon is referred to in the Turkish literature as "union inflation". As Hale (1976:62) notes, this was largely a product of the 1947 Unions Act. As explained, it permitted the formation of both craft and industrial unions. It also allowed

an unlimited number of unions in a single branch of industry. It made it relatively easy for a few individuals to organize unions. These were liberal democratic pluralist provisions. Yet the Unions Act made it specifically difficult for the unions to form alliances among themselves without the backing of the government. Depriving the unions of the right to strike, it provided no incentive for small unions to merge within larger, potentially stronger organizations. The advantages of larger unions, in terms of greater strike funds and better organization, were unattainable. [Hale, 1976:62] The result was a multitude of small local unions with few members, no substantial powers and largely financially dependent on the government. This initial organizational structure also continued to affect the union movement in the later periods. In brief, during the period under investigation, the system attempted to accommodate a pluralist organizational structure with a network of relations which showed authoritarian corporatist characteristics.

3. The State and Labour Unions During the General Election Period;

Polarization of the Union Movement Between the Major Parties

Under the worsening economic conditions which particularly affected workers, some unions began to show their discontent with the RPP government. They were specifically encouraged by the DP. Benefiting from the relatively more permissive atmosphere of the election period several unions withdrew from the orbit of the RPP to support the DP. Thus just a few months prior to the general elections of May 14, 1950, the system acquired a more competitive character. On the one hand there were those unions which were under the control of the ruling party, and on the other, there were those unions which supported the main opposition party.

The labour unions were polarized between the two major parties. Neither of these parties could be considered as a representative of the working class. The RPP was dominated by the bureaucratic elite at the national level and local notables at the local level. [see Frey, 1965 and Karpat, 1959] The DP, on the other hand, emerged as the main representative of bourgeois interests. There were other political parties besides the DP and the RPP. Some of them, such as the Social Democratic Party and the National Resurgence Party, were trying to gain working class votes. But they were not strong enough to rival the DP or the RPP in influencing labour unions. [Isikli,1972:300]. Polarization among the unions was so obvious that union leaders would expressly defend their party's position towards labour. For example, the leader of the pro-Republican Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions said that "the working class community is really disappointed at those irresponsible unionists who demand the right to strike". [quoted in Tunay,1979:25]. As Isikli (1972:301) points out, "the union movement had been pushed far away from independent action to be carried out for the workers and by the workers themselves. The unions became a tool of the two major parties in their struggle to mobilize the workers towards their respective goals". By the end of 1940s there were just a few labour unions that were not under the control of either the ruling or the main opposition party. But having the advantage of being in power, the Republican Party's control over the unions had reached a very high level.

Towards the end of the 1940s, the living conditions of workers further deteriorated. There was not much that the unions could do in order to meet their members' demands. They were left largely dependent on the good will of the government and employers. However, the Republican government was far from meeting the demands of labour for

better wages and better working conditions. [Fisek,1969:47; Isikli,1972:300]. According to a report prepared by a group of experts from the ILO in 1949, wages were at near subsistence level or even below the subsistence level. Although the Labour Code of 1936 had provided that the government could determine minimum wages when deemed necessary by internal and external conditions, this provision was not put into effect until an amendment was made in 1950. It provided for the establishment of tripartite minimum wage commissions. It was in 1952 that the first minimum wages were set. [Talas,1960:33; Rosen,1962:275]. Under such circumstances, the DP appeared to be the only alternative for labour to liberate itself from Republican Rule. In order to catch working class votes and get the support of the unions, the DP presented itself as the main defender of workers' rights as well as the interests of other opposition elements. The Democrats put the recognition of the right to strike on their party programme of 1949 as among the major goals, and promised that as soon as they came to power they would recognize it. So when the election day came, workers went to the ballot-box to cast their votes, by great majority, for the Democratic Party, despite the fact that the coming to power of the DP would bring a more articulated class rule of the bourgeoisie. [Keyder,1987:ch.VI and 1979, Tunay,1978].

4. Capital Organizations in the Post-War Period

In the second half of the 1940s, there were important developments in the field of business associations. The shift from etatism to a liberal economic policy meant a leading role for the private sector. After the ban on the formation of class-based associations was lifted, capital also began to establish its own associations separate from the Chambers. In

1947, the Merchants' Associations of Istanbul was set up by "independently minded merchants and businessmen who claimed that the Chambers of Commerce in Turkey are not representative bodies of merchants but governmental organizations established for purposes of registration and control of merchants". [Oncu,1980:464] This association originated the idea of an economic congress and played an important part in organizing the congress as the major promoter. The Economic Congress was held between November 22 -27 1948. This was the first economic congress since the 1923 Economic Congress of Izmir. Mainly private sector representatives were invited to the Congress, and it was the Merchants' Association that set the general tone. [Esin,1974:139-40; Oncu,1980:464]. In 1949 the Textile Employers' Association was established. [Yazgan,1982:82]. By 1950 there were two employers' associations. With the coming to power of the DP after the May 14, 1950 elections, their number increased to five in 1951 and 10 in 1952, and thereafter steadily continued to increase. [see Table 2 in Appendix]. These were mainly small local organizations, yet they were still important. Unlike the Chambers, which had been created by law and made compulsory, these associations were established by the employers themselves as voluntary organizations. Thus the employers slowly began to organize associations of a pluralist nature.

Capital also pressed the government to amend the 1943 Law of Chambers. This law had been passed by the Republican government under the conditions of war economy in order to bring the Chambers under stricter state supervision. Consequently, a new law (Law No:5590) governing the establishment and functioning of the Chambers was drafted by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce in cooperation with such big Chambers as in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. It went into effect about two months before the elections. It

provided legal backing, for the first time, for the establishment of a Union of Chambers that would represent the Chambers at the national level. [Saybasili,1976b:84] The Union of Chambers of Commerce, Chambers of Industry and the Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (the Union of Chambers, for short) convened its first General Assembly on February 6-7 1952. [Oncu,1980:465]. The new Law of Chambers liberalized some provisions of the 1943 Law. These chambers could no longer be established by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, and the Chambers would appoint their general secretaries themselves. Thus to some extent it liberated the Chambers from the jurisdiction of the Ministry though its supervisory powers would continue. Both the Chambers and their union were recognized as public associations with a legal personality (Tuzel kisiligi haiz ve mesleki tesekkul mahiyetinde kamu kurumu). The law enumerated important corporatist duties for the Union of Chambers in the implementation of the economic policies. It stipulated that among the duties to be discharged by the Union of Chambers were the following: to work towards the development of the economy, trade and industry in accordance with the general interest; to collect data and information regarding industry and trade, disseminate them to those concerned, and provide information upon the request of the official authorities. [Esin,1974:141]. Article 2 of the Law stated that "the Union has the responsibility to perform any other duties to be assigned under the present law, and to act in an advisory capacity on economic affairs as may be requested by the Commissions of the Turkish National Assembly or Ministries, and to perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance". Under such provisions, the Union of Chambers indeed acquired the potential of becoming a quasi-governmental entity. [Saybasili, 1976a:122]. As will be explained in the

following section, the Union of Chambers performed important **quasi**-governmental functions as provided by the Law. More important among them were the **allocation** of the private sector's share of the import quotas and licences to individual **firms** and industrial branches and the registration and control of the import prices from the **mid**-1950s to the early 1970s. [Bianchi,1984:252-3; Saybasili,1976b:86-7]. In return for **such** semi-official duties, the Union of Chambers was granted important opportunities to **carry** out activities to represent and advance capitalist interests. For instance, governmental **departments** and offices were required to provide necessary documents and information **for** the Union of Chambers. It was recognized as the most authoritative and legitimate **spokesman** for the interests of capital. [Bianchi,1984:251].

Despite the formation of some employers associations which operated in the pluralist arena, the Union of Chambers remained the dominant organization of **capital** until the early 1960s. The pluralist employers' associations lacked the privileges **that** the Union of Chambers had been granted by law. It had direct access to decision **makers**. It was based on compulsory membership. Kocatopcu says that "although some **employers** established some local employers' associations as distinct from the Chambers after **the** 1947 Unions Law was enacted, most still believed that the Union of Chambers **would** best represent their interests in both industrial relations and the economic field". [Kocatopcu,1963:281]. Thus the Union of Chambers continued to play a dominant role in state-**capital** relations.

In brief, after the ban on class-based organizations was lifted in 1945, **capital** began to form some organizations separate from the corporatist Chambers. There **was** no attempt on the part of the government to control or restrain these pluralist organizations, whereas the development of autonomous labour organizations was hindered **through** some kind of

corporatist arrangements as a deliberate policy. A new law of Chambers was also adopted by the government, which provided the Chambers with more autonomy from the state. It also laid the legal basis for the creation of a union of Chambers. The Union was assigned important duties in the implementation of economic policies. In return it was granted significant privileges. Thus the social impact and functioning of the corporatist arrangements differed according to social class which the organizations represented. The main aspect of the corporatist link established with the labour unions was one of control. On the other hand, the corporatization of capital organizations involved their incorporation into the decision-making and institutionalized representation vis-a-vis the state. Although there also existed a degree of control, it was more of a mutual character.

IV. The Years of Democratic Party Rule, 1950 - 1960

1. Economic Policies of the DP Government

The general elections of May 14, 1950 constitute a watershed in Turkish history. The Democratic Party, in Turkey's first honestly contested general elections, came to power with an impressive majority, putting an end to 27 years of Republican rule. [Robinson,1965:141-2]. The DP's accession to power marked the end of the dominant position of the bureaucratic elite in Turkish society, and the capture of political power by the bourgeoisie. As Keyder put it:

The bureaucracy lost its status as a social class with its own project and became a group of state managers whose level of autonomy depended on the nature of the accumulation process and intra-bourgeois balances. Despite the rich historical heritage of a state tradition, political power in the 1950s remained in the hands of the bourgeoisie. From then on, the relative autonomy of the state managers could be understood in terms of the weakness

of the dominant bourgeois fraction, conflict within the bourgeoisie or by reference to Turkey's conjunctural relationship with the world system. [Keyder, 1987:127]

The DP government actually brought the economic policy that had been initiated under the Republican rule to its culmination: according priority to the private sector if necessary at the expense of the public sector, opening up of the economy to the world market, liberalization of state policy towards foreign capital and giving priority to the agricultural sector and agricultural industries. The first years of DP rule saw a rapid growth in the economy, with a moderate level of inflation. The rapid increase in the number of tractors and other agricultural equipment, which had been imported through the use of American credits, combined with good weather conditions, led to a boom in agricultural production. Moreover, the upturn in the world market and the increase in world agricultural prices due to the Korean War resulted in a rapid growth of Turkish export revenues. Partly the growth in export revenues and partly the flow of foreign credits enabled Turkey to abolish the restrictions on foreign trade. Foreign currencies were easily available for imports. Under such favorable conditions private investment in industry also increased. By 1952 private investment in industry exceeded that of the public sector. [Hale,1981:90]. A substantial increase in industrial production occurred in the first half of the 1950s, despite the fact that there were no special measures taken by the government to encourage industrial investment, which was in conformity with its economic policy. The expanding domestic market had the effect of stimulating industrial investment. With the contribution of foreign capital, investment in industrial consumer goods increased. [Kepenek,1984:ch.5]

This considerable growth in industrial investment increased the demand for labour.

During the same time the rapid mechanization of agricultural production caused unemployment in the countryside. This forced a large number of peasants to migrate to big cities in the hope of finding jobs. Thus they provided an important source of cheap labour force for the industrialists. As a result of the massive migration of the peasants and the increased demand for labour in the industrial sector, the size of the working class grew rapidly.

By 1954 the economic boom was over, and the economy entered a crisis. There was a sharp drop in agricultural production mainly because of bad weather conditions. Inflation reached a very high level. External trade balances deteriorated severely. Turkey confronted a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. As a result, the Democratic government could not help but resort to restrictions on foreign trade. Anxious to keep the economy growing, the Democrats attempted to offset the shortfall in private investment by expanding public investment, leading to the growth of public sector. Once again by 1954 the state became the dominant investor, despite the priority given to the private sector. This was due to the desire of the government to meet the increased domestic demand that the private sector was unable to meet. It also wanted to serve private industry by increasing public investment in intermediate goods. [Kepenek,1984:ch.5] Thus after the mid-1950s, the government became increasingly interventionist on both the domestic and foreign fronts. The liberal policies of the early DP period gave way to increased state intervention in the economy. As a result of the restrictive measures imposed on foreign trade, trade deficits declined to some extent. But inflation continued to rise. This was because of the deficit financing of the state economic enterprises and public investments. Because total output did not increase as much as money supply, the outcome was a high

level of inflation. In 1958 the government was forced to accept a stabilization programme imposed by the IMF.

After 1956 total private industrial investment declined because the high rate of inflation made easy money-making fields more attractive. Due to the restrictions on imports from 1955 until about 1960, the domestic market was highly protected. Despite the decline in overall private industrial investment, therefore, private investment in some sub-sectors of industry increased rapidly. The shortages of some imported goods caused by the balance of trade difficulties made domestic production of these goods very profitable. The DP government also took some steps to encourage such import-substitution production. This was to become a deliberate economic policy in the 1960s. [see Gulalp,1985:337; Kepenek,1984:ch.5; Keyder,1987:134-5]

To summarize, the DP advocated liberal economic policies. It was strictly against state intervention in the economy. The private sector was to be given priority. Under favourable domestic and external conditions of the early 1950s, the economy grew rapidly. Despite the absence of formal encouragement of industrial investment, private investment in industry also increased considerably. This in turn led to the growth of the industrial labour force. The increased demand for industrial labour was met through massive migration of the peasants, who had lost their jobs as a result of agricultural mechanization. By the mid-1950s, however, the economy entered crisis. The DP government was forced to intervene in the economy to a great extent in spite of its liberal economic policy.

The DP was the first party that assumed office through honestly contested democratic elections. Its party programme was based on liberal democratic principles. It came to power with great popular support. It was also successful in winning working class votes

despite the fact that it was indeed the principal representative of the bourgeoisie. As explained, it advocated economic liberalism, rejecting state intervention. It might reasonably be expected, therefore, that the coming to power of the DP would be accompanied by a liberal, non-interventionist state policy towards organized labour. Neocorporatist theory also leads us to expect that under such liberal political and economic conditions, at least during the early 1950s, the relationship of the labour unions to the state would show pluralist characteristics rather than corporatist. In the following section, we will analyze the interaction between the DP government and the labour unions and the structure of the union movement within a corporatist framework.

2. Labour Unions under DP Rule: Development of Authoritarian

Corporatism

The DP's accession to power created an atmosphere of optimism and hope among the workers and unions. There was an immediate sharp increase in the number of unions and unionized workers: from a total of 88 in May, 1950 to 137 in May 1951, reaching 148 in 1952, and from 78,000 to 110,000 in 1951 and 130,000 in 1952 respectively. Accordingly, the proportion of unionized workers to total labour force rose from 20.9 percent in May 1950 to 25.7 in May 1951 and 26.6 in 1952. [see Table 1].

While the DP's victory in the elections brought encouragement to pro-Democratic unions and unionists, it caused great anxiety among pro-Republican ones. The reasons for their anxiety did not prove to be just a fallacy. The DP government did not wait long to unleash its weapons against pro-Republican and independent unions and union leaders. Already, before the expected victory in the general elections of May 14, 1950, the DP had

established a base for itself among the labour unions in Istanbul. The Free Workers Unions' Alliance had been formed by pro-Democrat unionists with the great encouragement of the party about 2,5 months prior to the elections. Simultaneously, the pro-Democrat forces were carrying out a similar struggle in other industrial regions of the country, particularly in Bursa, which was an important industrial zone with large textile plants. Shortly after the DP election victory, pro-Democrat unionists ousted pro-Republican unionists from the administrative and leadership posts of the Labour Unions of Bursa, with the backing of the DP government. [see Sulker,1975:82-5]. The purge of pro-Republican and independent unions and union leaders was carried out successfully by the Democrat forces. The pro-DP unions and union leaders were financially and organizationally backed by the DP government against the opposition unions. The frequent interference by the Ministry of Labour in the administrative relations of the unions played an important role in the seizure of the key posts in labour unions by pro-Democrat force. [Tunay, 1979:35-37]. Thus at the very beginning, the DP government seemed determined not to allow the development of an independent union movement despite its liberal economic and political programme.

When in opposition the DP had made important pledges to labour and its organizations. The most important was to recognize the right of strike once in power. As a result of these pledges, an increasing number of unions had begun to offer their support to the DP towards the end of the 1940s. Workers had also put great hope in the DP government. To demonstrate that it was faithful to its promises to labour, the DP government introduced important pieces of legislation in the areas of social policy and industrial relations during the first half of its rule. Rather than initiating new programmes,

however, it largely preferred to expand on the previous legislation passed under the Republican rule. [Rosen,1962:273]. In 1950 an amendment to the 1936 Labour Code provided for the establishment of minimum wage commissions by the Ministry of Labour. First minimum wages were determined in 1952, and the number of industries and regions covered increased steadily, reaching 27 provinces and 19 industries in 1958. [Rosen,1962:275]. Act 5837 of September 9, 1951 recognized paid weekly rest and national rest days with full payment. By a decision of the Council of Ministers dated September 29,1952, the coverage of the Labour Code was extended to establishments with four to nine workers in cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants. Originally, the Labour Code had covered only those enterprises with ten or more employees. [Tuncomag,1975:12]. Accordingly the number of workers protected under the social insurance system rose from 392,000 in 1951 to 554,000 in 1955, a 55 percent increase. The benefits provided also increased from TL.11,889 000 to 44,017 000 between the same years. [Andic,1957:368]. In 1952, by a special act (no 5953), those employed in the press agencies and communication institutions were brought under the scope of the Labour Code, and granted the right to unionize. The Unions Act of 1947 had denied white-collar employees the right to form unions. This special Act now constituted the first exception to this restriction. In March 1954 a special Act included seamen in the Labour Code, granting all the benefits that were recognized for industrial labour, including the right to organize.(7) The DP government also introduced new legislation regarding unions and industrial dispute settlement. Tripartite Labour Courts were established in 1950 by the

(7) For the progress in the field of labour law, see Tuncomag,1975 and Zeytinoglu & Shabon,1985.

Courts Act (no 5521). They were authorized to solve right disputes between employees and employers. Nevertheless, labour unions were not permitted to play any roles in the election of employees' representatives. An important development concerning labour unions was the introduction of Act 5518 which amended Article 78 of the Labour Code to authorize labour unions to initiate collective disputes under certain conditions. According to the Act, labour unions could initiate a dispute only in those establishments where workers were not required to elect a representative, that is small and seasonal establishments, on the conditions that the majority of the workers were union members, and that they requested the union to represent them in the dispute. Secondly, a labor union which represented the majority of the workers in a workplace could itself initiate a collective dispute, regardless of whether a workers' representative was required to be elected, if it received a written request to do so from one-fifth, a minimum of ten, of the workers. [Dereli,1968:66-7; Rosen,1962:271] Though these conditions were very limiting, a great majority of collective disputes began to be initiated by labour unions rather than workers' representatives. It led to a significant increase in the number of collective disputes referred to the Arbitration Boards. [Dereli,1974:290; Rosen,1962:271] In the last six months of 1952, of 49 disputes brought to the Supreme Arbitration Board in Ankara, 34 were initiated by labour unions. [Dereli,1968:83]. In 1954, through some amendments to the Labour Code, unions were endowed with some other activities as well. They were entitled to designate their own representative to the minimum wage commissions, and appeal decisions of the commissions to a central board of government officials appointed by the Ministry of Labour. They were also entitled to elect those who would represent workers on the Advisory Board of the Employment Services Department

and to nominate a candidate as the representative of workers to be sent to the annual meetings of the International Labour Organization (ILO). By Act 6298 passed in 1954, Provincial Arbitration Boards, which had been heavily dominated by government officials, were transformed into tripartite bodies with a judicial character. The Supreme Arbitration Board was also composed along the same lines. Labour unions were not, however, given any official role in the selection of workers' representatives to sit on the Arbitration Boards. In fact, the tripartite composition envisaged for the Arbitration Boards was not put into effect until 1958. [Dereli,1968:82].

These new pieces of legislation enlarged the role of unions somewhat, and brought benefits to individual workers. But they did not provide unions with any substantial powers. They were still deprived of the right to strike. An important reason why some labour unions had supported the DP against the RPP in the late 1940s was the Democrats' promise to repeal the ban on strike activity as soon as they came to power. The Democrat government put the issue of the right to strike in their first government programme dated May 29, 1950, and declared that a bill was being prepared which would recognize the right to strike. This draft law contained extensive restrictions. It was therefore subjected to criticism by the unions. [Sulker,1983b:46] Despite its very restrictive nature, the bill was never submitted to the Assembly. There was no mention of the right to strike and collective bargaining in the DP's programme of October 15, 1951. After 1952, the government began to declare that "it would not be easy to recognize these rights which required extensive analysis." [Isikli,1967:79 and 1972:301-2]. Thus the Democrat government showed its unwillingness to recognize the right to strike in spite of the fact that the ILO's Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949 was

ratified by Turkey in August 1951. In brief, as a deliberate policy, the DP government was careful not to grant the unions any substantial powers in order to keep them under its control.

The DP had already established an important base among Istanbul unions before it came to power. It was now trying to bring the existing unions under the umbrella of a single organization at the national level. The idea of forming a nation-wide organization had already been under consideration during Republican rule. The Republican government had played an important part in the formation of the Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions with the intention of orienting the union movement in the direction of its own views. As noted, this organization had been established with a consideration that it would act as a central organization and direct the union movement in accordance with governmental policies. As union organization gained momentum in other regions of the country, some independent unions and union leaders emerged. They began to follow policies which were considered to be against the interests of the Republican government. Yet the Alliance of the Istanbul Workers' Unions was not in a position to effectively control such unions and union leaders in other parts of the country. Therefore, the idea of forming a larger organization began to gain currency in late 1948. The local unions were requested to give their opinions about the idea of a nation-wide organization. Most of them seemed to support the idea. The Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions was assigned the task of preparing a constitution for the organization. [Sulker,1955:197]. However, by that time some unions had already begun to turn their back to the Republican government and support the DP, leading to polarization of the union movement by the end of 1940s. Under these conditions, obviously, a nation-wide union organization could not be

established. Moreover, as it was becoming increasingly obvious that the RPP would lose the coming general elections, the idea of a larger labour organization lost its currency among the Republican forces. Thus during the rule of the Republican People's Party there was no central labour organization that would bring the existing unions under the same roof. As soon as they came to power, the Democrats began to take important steps in the way of forming a central labour organization. The first step was to force the pro-Republican Alliance of Istanbul Workers' Unions to join the Free Workers Unions' Alliance, which was an adjunct of the DP. [Sulker,1975:65-6]. The National Workers Unions' Alliance of Istanbul was founded on September 10, 1950 as a result of the pressure exerted by the Democrats on the former organization. Thus the major pro-Republican union was dissolved in the new larger organization. Tunay says that "this was an early indication of the intentions of the Democrat government regarding the union movement". [Tunay,1979:37].

The realization of the fact that the government was reluctant to recognize the right to strike and that it was trying to shelve the issue caused disappointment and discontent among the workers and their unions. The increased pressure put on the government regarding the right to strike led the Democrats to establish a central labour organization under their own control. This organization would act as a link between the government and the working class, orienting the workers in the direction of Democrats' goals. Tunay says that "although the Democrats would prefer a multitude of small weak local unions in general, they considered one powerful labour organization essential in controlling the labour movement". [Tunay,1979:37]

Under the post-war RPP rule, the interaction between the state and labour unions had demonstrated authoritarian corporatist characteristics. But the organizational structure of the union movement had been more of a pluralist nature. The DP government now, however, took important steps to establish a corporatist organizational structure as well in the face of the difficulty of controlling a fragmented union movement. A nation-wide union organization was to be created and recognized as the sole representative of labour. It was through this central organization that the government would control the working class.

After the major pro-Republican union organization was forced to join the pro-Democrat Free Workers Unions' Alliance in forming the National Workers Unions' Alliance of Istanbul, the next step was to purge the leadership positions of pro-Republican unionists. This goal was achieved at the Congress of the new organization held on January 20, 1952. At this Congress, two leading pro-Democrat unionists, Mehmet Inhanli and Naci Kurt, were elected as the chairman and supervisor of the National Workers Unions' Alliance, respectively. [Sulker,1975:66]. The majority of the unions in Istanbul had come under the control of the government. The DP government achieved a major goal in controlling organized labour in Istanbul. This organization was not, however, adequate in directing the union movement as a whole. There were still some labour unions in other parts of the country that were either controlled by pro-Republican or independent unionists. There was a need for a larger, nation-wide organization in order to control the union movement as a whole.

These efforts to establish a central labour organization coincided with the visits of some American labour officials, representatives from International Confederation of Free

Trade Unions (ICFTU) and American unionists. In January 1951 some American Embassy members and Boris Shiskin, the European representative of Marshall Plan and an expert of American Federation of Labour (AFL), had visited the National Workers Unions' Alliance of Istanbul, and they pledged assistance for the foundation and functioning of a labour confederation. Following this event, Irwing Brown, the member of the executive committee of the ICFTU and the representative in Europe of the AFL, came to Turkey. In his meetings with the Turkish unionists he expressed the views of the ICFTU and emphasized the necessity of a labour confederation. He promised financial assistance for the confederation and training of the Turkish unionists in the United States. He continued his frequent visits to Turkey in subsequent years. [see Sulker,1955:219-20 and 1977:45-6; Dilik,1965:46]. In its new role as hegemonic power, the United States was very interested in creating docile labour movements in the peripheral countries. [Isikli,1972:307]. Such efforts on the part of American unionists and the ICFTU played an important role in convincing the Turkish union leaders of the need for a central union organization. The accession to power of the DP had also provided an important encouragement to unionization efforts. The political atmosphere of the first few years of DP rule was generally permissive and favorable. The number of unions and unionized workers increased considerably. As Rosen (1962:285) notes, "all these events united to create a growing conviction that the time was propitious for a major effort". Union leaders and workers were increasingly convinced that there was a need for a union confederation. Some intellectuals also supported the idea of a nation-wide labour organization in the belief that this would overcome the problem of fragmentation. [Talas,1972:291] More importantly, the government was very enthusiastic about the formation of a central labour

organization because that would also mean the establishment of centralized control over labour.

A series of meetings was organized in Istanbul and Bursa in early 1952, involving each time a greater number of union representatives. A committee was appointed to draft a constitution. A meeting was held in Bursa to discuss the draft constitution. At the same meeting, a temporary executive committee was elected and assigned the task of completing the necessary legal formalities for the official foundation of the Confederation, and organizing the first general congress. It was decided that the Confederation would come into operation by July 1952. Consequently, the new Confederation was formally founded on July 31, 1952 by the participation of ten union alliances and union federations from seven cities. The Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions (Turk-Is) held its first general congress in Izmir on September 6, 1952. The Minister of Labour, Nuri Ozsan, attended the opening of the Congress and openly declared the government's support for the Confederation. In expressing the official view of his government, he stated that:

As a government, we accept unions as a major element of economic and social life... This Confederation which gathered almost all the existing unions of the nation under its roof could play important roles in government, employers and labour cooperation which is vital for the measures that we will take in the economic and social fields. It could harmonize the efforts made by this Ministry and by labour unions to improve labour relations..[Talas, 1960:28; Sulker,1955:229].

A pro-Republican unionist became the first Chairman of Turk-Is. But within less than a year Turk-Is held its second congress, and this time, Naci Kurt, who was known for his very close ties to the DP, was elected as chairman. The DP played a significant role in Turk-Is's decision to hold an extraordinary congress and ensuring the election of a pro-

Democrat unionist as chairman. The new Chairman became a candidate of the DP in the 1954 elections campaign and was elected as a deputy in Istanbul, thus exposing the links between Turk-Is and the governing party. [Isikli,1972:305-6] The government continued to play an active role in the selection of Turk-Is leaders, bringing the only labour confederation under its close control.

The DP government was equipped with strong weapons under the existing Unions Law of 1947, which it could use to keep the unions loyal to its authority. Among these was Article 5 of the Unions Law that forbade unions from engaging in politics. Relying on this article, the government restricted almost all kinds of activities of the unions, and prevented them from articulating the interests of their members independently. Ironically, however, while the government was prohibiting union activities on the allegation that they were political, it spent a great deal of energy to politicize the unions in the direction of its goals. [see Isikli,1969:83-5; 1972:303-4 and Tunay,1979] The government prohibited those union activities which it considered as against its own interests on the pretext that they were political. On the other hand, it directed the unions towards those political activities which contributed to its objectives. [Isikli,1972:304]. The union leaders could find no other alternatives but get involved in partisan activities and sympathies with the DP in order to get even very small concessions for themselves or their members. [Dereli,1968:99]. Another government weapon against the unions was related to the financial resources of the unions. Due to the restriction of union dues to an annual maximum amount of TL.120 per member, the unions were in great financial difficulties. They were largely dependent on the money that was forwarded by the employers to the Ministry of Labour through the deductions from the wages of penalized workers. For

example, the total amount of money that Turk-Is received from the Ministry of Labour in the first year of its existence totalled TL. 26,500, while the amount of dues collected from the members was only TL. 8,177. [Sulker,1955:252]. These monies were of course made available according to the nature of the relationship between the Turk-Is leaders and the Ministry of Labour, and the policies followed by Turk-Is. The government provided financial assistance to the Confederation so long as it cooperated with the government authorities. [Isikli,1972:305; Tuna,1963:261; Dilik,1965:50]. Furthermore, by virtue of the authority held by the Ministry of Labour in the conciliation and arbitration process the political authorities got the opportunity to make a distinction between "pro-government" and "anti-government" unions. It is known that the extent of the relationship between the DP and a labour union that was involved in a dispute was a very important factor influencing the decisions made by the Ministry on the dispute concerned. [Isikli,1972:305]. The DP government also exploited the eagerness of some union leaders to become deputies in order to increase their loyalty. It did not hesitate to use these weapons to the fullest extent. In brief, by using these weapons the DP government prevented the development of those pluralist elements that had begun to emerge during the late RPP rule. Some independent or pro-opposition party unions had been tolerated by the RPP government. The DP government, nevertheless, seemed intolerant of even the existence of a very limited number of unions outside its control. It played an active role in the formation of a union confederation in order to bring labour under centralized control. It forced the Confederation to cooperate in controlling the workers and orienting them in the direction of governmental goals.

There were some independent leaders in Turk-Is who worked for the interests of the

working-class. But they could not exert any influence with the political authorities. They could only split the leadership of the Confederation and face difficulties if they attempted to criticize Turk-Is policies. Discriminated against by the government, they could not influence the decision making of the Confederation. A few leaders in Turk-Is and some independent unions who criticized government policies and attempted to exert pressure on the government regarding the right to strike "experienced difficulties ranging from discrimination in employment to arrest and interrogation". [Rosen,1962:288]. Under such conditions, Turk-Is and most other unions remained controlled by those who were affiliated to the DP. An elite cadre of leadership was created. It was distanced from the rank and file. It failed to meet workers' expectations. Turk-Is, therefore, suffered some losses in membership; for example, membership dropped from 155,000 to 104,000 between 1953 and 1957. [Bianchi,1984:215]. But in the absence of an alternative organization that could provide strong leadership and meet some expectations of labour, the bulk of the workers preferred to stay in Turk-Is.

The functions of the unions were restricted to economic matters, but without much success. They were denied any say in decision making in the fields that were closely related to the interests of the working class such as employment, wages and taxation policy. [Tuna,1964:424] Although the 1947 Trade Unions Act provided that unions could enter into collective agreements in the name of their members, in the absence of the right to strike and any provisions that compelled employers to enter into collective bargaining with unions, the number of collective agreements during the period was very limited. Indeed it can be said that collective bargaining was virtually absent. In this field the role of the unions did not go beyond initiating collective disputes. [Tuna,1963:265- 7;

Talas,1960:29-30; Dilik,1965:51-2]. In view of these facts, it is understandable why some Turkish authors have used such adjectives to characterize the union movement of the period as "static", "dependent", "ineffective", "unions legalized for the purpose of social control". [Dilik,1965:51; Isikli,1972:305; Dereli,1968:106].

During the early years of its rule the DP government generally avoided using open oppression against the unions. It generally resorted to administrative interventions or political manoeuvres in bringing the unions under its control. The political regime was generally permissive and liberal in the post-election years. Nevertheless, coincident with the deteriorating economic conditions after 1954, the political regime began to take on an authoritarian character. Although it was a parliamentary democracy in theory the government increasingly became intolerant of opposition elements and resorted to repressive measures against opposition parties, the press and the universities. Those labour unions and union leaders who were not willing to cooperate with the government were also among the direct targets of these repressive measures. By 1954, relying on Article 8 of the 1947 Unions Law which required that affiliation of a union to a multi-union organization receive the votes of two-thirds of the membership, the Ministry of Labour outlawed some multi-union organizations, claiming that they failed to meet this requirement. These organizations encountered the danger of being closed by a court decision. [see Sulker,1955:ch.6 and Dilik,1965:50]. As part of this authoritarian tendency, the government passed a law (no 6761) in 1956, which severely restricted the freedom to organize unions without prior permission. [Dereli,1968:100]. The First Article of the 1947 Unions Law allowed the formation of unions in the same branch of activity or types of works belonged to the same branch of activity. However, until 1957,

this provision had been interpreted broadly so as to permit the establishment of multi-union organizations on an urban or regional basis regardless of the occupation or industry (called *birlik*), which were similar to city-centred labour unions or state federations of labour in the United States.[Rosen,1962:282, Dereli,1968:90]. Relying on this broad interpretation of the Article, a great number of *birliks* had been established throughout the country. But after 1956, the government tended to interpret it in a very rigid way. Consequently, by court decision most of the *birliks* were abolished, demonstrating that even the judiciary, which had thus far been able to preserve its independence, could not avoid succumbing to the dictates of the government in this field. [Dereli,1968:101]. What is surprising is that not all *birliks* were disbanded. Some were allowed to exist. If the reason for the closing of these *birliks* was their violation of the requirement that they should be formed by locals of a certain area in the same branch of industry like federations, then all of them should have been abolished. It was only those *birliks* which had showed their unwillingness to cooperate with the government which were closed. On the other hand, those *birliks* which were under effective control of the government and probably a source of political support for the DP were allowed to exist. [Isikli,1967:81-3; Dereli,1968:101]. It is important to note that among the existing union organizations it was *birliks* that played the most active role, since in the virtual absence of collective bargaining, there was little that the federations could do. But *birliks* could exert influence through their connections with local party organizations. [Rosen,1962:284].

Turk-Is also found itself faced with the danger of being closed. Particularly between 1955 and 1957 some pro-Republican unionists were elected to the leadership and administrative positions in Turk-Is. This seriously strained the relationship between the

government and Turk-Is. In order to force the Confederation to replace the pro-Republican chairman with a leader affiliated with the DP, the government cut its financial assistance, sending Turk-Is into a crisis. A solution to the crisis was found in electing a pro-democrat unionist, Nuri Beser, as Chairman of the Confederation. Upon this the relationship between the government and Turk-Is improved rapidly. Financial assistance made by the government to Turk-Is increased correspondingly. [Sulker,1977:67]. Thereafter, the government control over Turk-Is reached its peak, the latter becoming a tool of the government for controlling the working class.

The relationship between the state and labour unions increasingly took on the characteristics of authoritarian corporatism. A centralized control was established over labour through the imposition of a union confederation from above. The leadership posts in union organizations were occupied by those affiliated with the ruling party. The government played an active role in the selection of Turk-Is leaders. In order to force the unions to act in accordance with the governmental policies, the political authorities exploited their financial dependence on the government. Those unions which seemed unwilling to cooperate with the government were denied financial assistance. The government manipulated the restrictive provisions of the Unions Act against any potential opposition union leaders or union organizations in order to render them ineffective. Put under effective state control, the unions were used as an instrument to influence the political orientations of labour. They mobilized the workers to support the DP which was the main representative of capital. In accordance with the interests of capital the corporatist structures well served the purpose of hindering the development of a radical political thrust within labour and containing or preventing class struggle during the period

under investigation.

Under the worsening economic conditions of the late 1950s the DP government increasingly resorted to authoritarian repressive measures to silence opposition elements. Those unions and union leaders who showed their discontent with the government were also among the direct targets of these repressive measures. While the government increasingly used repression against the unions in order to keep them under its close control it preferred to maintain instead of abolishing them. This was in the interest of the DP government and the social class it represented. The union organizations were used as a social control mechanism over the working class. Particularly in a situation of economic crisis, these corporatist structures played a significant part in preventing the development of opposition forces among the workers. They were assigned the task of mobilizing political support for the DP in labour ranks.

Parallel to the growth of the economy in the first half of the 1950s there were increases in real wages. But the workers and fixed income groups suffered considerably from inflation in the latter half of the 1950s. Despite increases in money wages the high level of inflation cancelled out these gains, causing declines in real wages. [Berberoglu, 1982:74; Kepenek,1984:132]. Discontent among the workers increased. [Isikli,1972:306] Nevertheless, deprived of independent organizations and put under centralized control through corporatist structures, they were not in a position to fight for their interests.

What were the reasons for this high pressure exerted by the government on the labour unions? The reasons can not be the political and organizational strength of the working class in society. Its organizations were still weak and ineffective. The Turkish working class was not yet class conscious. Yet, as Tuna says, "it had reached a potential stage at

least in terms of quantity if not quality". [Tuna,1954:61]. The state policies, therefore, aimed to prevent the emergence of potential power centres which could lead working class struggle.

Democrat Party rule signified a period in which the pluralist elements disappeared, the necessary conditions for liberal corporatism could not emerge and a system which was very close to the authoritarian type of corporatism was established. In comparative perspective this system shows some rather interesting features. Students of corporatism generally agree that authoritarian corporatism emerges to enforce social peace by preventing autonomous articulation of subordinate class interests in a situation where the national bourgeoisie is too weak and subordinate to the state. The authoritarian corporatist arrangements in Turkey aimed to accomplish exactly that. However, although the Turkish bourgeoisie had not yet reached its maturity, it can not be argued that it was too weak. The coming to power of the DP represented the consolidation of its power and a more articulated class rule. Having gained sufficient strength through politically mediated capital accumulation, the bourgeoisie was now strongly opposed to interventionist state. It saw state intervention in the economy as a threat to its interests. Accordingly, the DP preached the virtues of liberal capitalism. It came to power on an anti-state platform and proceeded to carry out its electoral promises. Despite its anti-state position and liberal economic policies, the DP government did not avoid establishing centralized political control over labour through authoritarian corporatist arrangements. The main link established with the working class through corporatist structures was one of control. But the DP also wanted to get the political support of the workers and mobilize them against opposition parties, particularly the RPP which was a symbol of the bureaucratic rule. The

economic and social policies of the DP, therefore, were not specifically anti-labour. As the corporatized union organizations acted as mobilizers among the rank and file, the DP government also provided some social benefits to the workers. It expanded the scope of social programmes available to labour. [see Rosen, 1962:272-7 and Dereli,1968:53-4]. Bianchi (1984:215) says that "the Democrats sought electoral support from the workers by making a modest budgetary commitment to ostentatious housing and welfare programs".

According to some authors such social and economic programmes were of a populist character in the sense that they were a reflection of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the subordinate classes against the rule of the military-civil bureaucracy. Keyder, for example, characterizes the period of DP rule as populism. He argues that the subordinate classes were mobilized to form a common front with the bourgeoisie against the rule of the bureaucratic elite. In this struggle the bourgeoisie was the mobilizing elite and probably stood to gain most from the victory against the bureaucratic rule. Nevertheless, the struggle based on the universal principles of economic and religious freedom, the ideological content of which did not reveal any class basis, potentially unified elements of all social classes. What is however historically unusual, Keyder says, is that the organizing principle of Latin American populism was anti-liberalism aimed at replacing the rule of the market with political mediation of economic outcomes. In contrast, the motto of DP rule was liberalism. [see Keyder, 1987:ch. 6]

The corporatism of Latin American populism entailed a considerable increase in the economic and political weight of the working class vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. O'Donnell says that "It implied a substantial improvement in the direct relations between the

bourgeoisie and the unionized layers of the popular sector... Above all, the recognition of the unions' right to represent the working class before the bourgeoisie, the codification of the right to strike (at least in principle) all emerged together with corporatization". [1977:68] While the DP sought to mobilize the subordinate classes against the rule of the military-civil bureaucracy, in contrast to the populist regimes of Latin America it also specifically aimed to prevent the strengthening of the working class vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie through corporatist structures. As a deliberate policy it deprived labour unions of any substantial powers. The labour unions were left outside of the decision-making process. Yet they were required to enforce governmental policies vis-a-vis their members. Even though the DP government provided some social benefits to labour in order to win its electoral support, these benefits did not involve any increase in its political and economic strength vis-a-vis capital. We can say, therefore, that the corporatism of the DP period was different from the inclusionary corporatism of the populist authoritarian regimes of Latin America, even though some authors characterize the period as populist on the grounds that it involved an alliance between the subordinate classes and the bourgeoisie against the rule of the bureaucratic elite. The corporatism of the DP period can be considered as an unusual case of authoritarian corporatism. It developed under the rule of a bourgeois party which came to power after democratic elections and with great popular support. It advocated a principle of competitive liberal economic system, opposing the interventionist state.

3. Capital Organizations Under DP Rule

With respect to the relations between the state and business associations under DP rule, an important development was the convening of the first General Assembly of the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Chambers of Industry and the Commodity Exchanges of Turkey on February 6-7 1952. In his address, the Minister of Economy and Commerce declared:

My friends, as a member of political party and a government which aims to give priority to private initiative, and as an economist defending the primary place of the Chambers and Exchanges in the development of domestic trade, it is a very good circumstance for me to be here to give birth to the Union of Chambers and Exchanges. [quoted in Oncu,1980:465 and Saybasili,1976a:86j.

The Union of Chambers came into being and grew in significance under DP rule, and became identified with it. [Saybasili,1976b:126]. As one commentator put it "until 1958 there was no difference between the government and the Union. They were one and the same thing." [quoted in Oncu,1980:465] A founding member of the Union and prominent figure in the DP also said that "the Prime Minister of the Democratic Party Governments, Mr. Adnan Menderes, did not appoint his cabinet without consulting the Union of Chambers". [quoted in Saybasili,1976a:126]. The fact that after the military takeover in May 1960 Law no:2 disbanded all the organs of the Union of Chambers, while Law no:1 abolished the Constitution and the National Assembly, should give an idea how intimate relationship between the Democrat government and the Union of Chambers was. The Military did not see any difference between the Democrat government and the Union of Chambers. [Saybasili,1976a:122].

When Turkey faced serious balance of payment difficulties by 1954, the government

was forced to abandon its policy of opening of the economy and imposed restrictions on foreign trade. Import licensing and price checks on imported goods were instituted. [see Kruger,1974:434-9]. The Union of Chambers was assigned important functions in the implementation of these measures. A Department for the Registration and Control of the Prices of Imported Goods was formed within the Union of Chambers. Through this Department the Union of Chambers controlled the foreign trade between 1955 and 1962. During this period, the Department's approval of the offered import prices was required if foreign currency was to be allocated to the goods to be imported. This policy was in effect until 1962; by that time the role of the Department was reduced to inform the government of whether import prices were in line with those in the world market. The Union of Chambers also received the responsibility of allocating import quotas both among commodity groups and among individual entrepreneurs. This indeed meant control by the Union of a significant portion of the already scarce source of foreign currency reserves of the country. It is important to note that these duties constituted an important source of revenue for the Union of Chambers because it was entitled to charge for these functions. [see Saybasili,1976a and 1976b; Oncu,1980]. Thus this corporatist organization served the inclusion of capital in the making and implementation of crucial decisions while the corporatist structures imposed on labour from above aimed to inhibit the development of independent collective action among the workers and exclude them from decision-making.

V. The Period of 1960 - 1971

1. The 1960 Military Intervention and the Return to the Parliamentary Democracy

The political atmosphere in the late 1950s became very tense as the DP government increasingly resorted to repressive and authoritarian measures against the opposition parties, the press, the universities and the labour unions. It was at this point that the military stepped in and took over the administration of the State on 27 May 1960. [For details see Weiker,1967]. There was hardly any resistance and the military coup was accomplished with minimum bloodshed. [Ahmad,1977:160]. The military coup was enthusiastically supported by the intelligentsia, civil bureaucracy, the press and the university circles. The stated aim of the military in seizing power was "to save democracy and prevent internal strife". It was declared that free elections were to be held very soon and power restored to the party which won the elections. On the same day of the coup a constitutional commission was formed, which was composed of university professors, and assigned the task of drafting a new constitution. [Karpat,1973:232; Ahmad,1977:162]. At the same time, activities of all political parties were prohibited. The military officers who had led the coup proclaimed themselves as the National Unity Committee (NUC) under the leadership of General Cemal Gursel. The following day a provisional cabinet was set up, with General Gursel as the Head of the State, Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. The remaining fifteen ministers were all civilians, mainly technocrats from the civil service and the universities. The Cabinet was in fact simply an executive agent of the NUC, which was henceforth the sole decision-making body. [Karpat,1973:234].

According to the Constitutional Commission's Provisional Constitution which went into effect on June 14, the NUC would act as the sole legislative organ until the Grand National Assembly was convened after general elections had been held, and the new constitution was in force. The NUC would also exercise the executive power through the cabinet appointed by the Head of the State and approved by the NUC. The Judiciary retained its independence of the Committee.

The NUC was by no means a monolithic organ. Its size was relatively large. It was composed of the President and 37 other military officers. The ideological orientation of the NUC members ran from moderate socialism to strongly authoritarian and ultra-nationalist views.(8) [Tachau and Heper,1983:22] Soon after the military takeover, the different factions within the NUC seemed to clash. The Committee was divided into two main factions. One faction wanted to relinquish power to an elected government as soon as possible while the other faction defended a longer military rule in order to carry out some political and economic reforms, and supported the idea of state-directed economy. The former, led by Gursel, came to be designated as "the moderates" and the latter group, which was composed of junior officers, came to be known as "the radicals or extremists". [Ahmad,1977:165; Keyder,1979:25]. Initially, the radical group was able to exert considerable influence in decision-making. Yet the power struggle between these two groups within the NUC resulted with the victory of the moderates. Fourteen radical junior officers were expelled from the NUC, and the original NUC was dissolved on November

(8) Alparslan Turkes, then colonel, who later became the leader of an ultra-nationalist fascist party, was the leading representative of the ultra-nationalist authoritarian faction within the NUC.

13, 1960. A new committee of 23 members was reconstituted. [Ahmad,1977:167]. The position of the moderate group had also been supported by the Republican People's Party leaders. As Keyder (1979:25) points out, "it was also reinforced as the bourgeoisie gradually succeeded in imparting a technocratic character to the provisional government established under the military". The expulsion of the radicals from the NUC brought great relief to the bourgeoisie. Immediately upon the dismissal of "the fourteen", Gursel declared that the preparation of a new constitution would proceed rapidly. Turhan Feyzioglu, an influential figure of the RPP and a former professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Ankara, was asked to draft a new election law and a law to establish the Constituent Assembly. [Karpat,1973:237]. Consequently, the Constituent Assembly was formed, whose main task was to prepare a new constitution. The Constituent Assembly was organized principally on the basis of functional representation. The president appointed 10 members and the National Unity Committee selected 18 members. All of the Cabinet members became ex-officio members. The provinces selected 75 representatives, the RPP 49, the Republican Nationalist Peasant Party 25, the Bar Associations 6, the press 12, the Veterans' Union 2, professions 6, youth organizations 1, labour unions 6, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry 10, agricultural organizations 6, university representatives 12, and justice courts 12 members. [Karpat, 1973:238]. The Constituent Assembly convened its first meeting on 6 January 1961, and began to share legislative powers with the NUC. [Ahmad,1977:168].

Initially, the NUC claimed that "the military intervention had been impartial, it had not been carried out against any individual or group. Every citizen regardless of his identity and party affiliation shall be treated in accordance with law and the principles of

justice." Despite such declarations, soon the leading ranks of the Democratic Party and its representatives in the National Assembly were arrested and tried on the charges of violating the constitution, corruption and a variety of other crimes. Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister of the Democrat Governments, and two of his ministers were condemned to death, and ultimately executed while a number of DP members also received prison terms of varying lengths. The DP was also dissolved. But the other existing political parties were not touched, and as pointed out, they were authorized to select members to the Constituent Assembly.

The restoration of political parties was allowed on January 12, 1961. New political parties immediately began to organize. On April 1, they were allowed to begin political activities. [Ahmad, 1977:170]. In the meantime, a draft constitution was prepared by a committee of university professors, and accepted for debate in the Constituent Assembly. After the debates, the new constitution was eventually accepted by the Constituent Assembly on the day of the first anniversary of the military coup. July 9, 1961 was set as the date for the popular referendum on the Constitution. The nation-wide referendum was held on the said day, and the Constitution was approved by the popular vote. Soon after the popular adoption of the Constitution the Constituent Assembly voted to hold general elections on October 15, 1961. The political parties had already started their activities, and new political parties had been established . Some of these new parties were trying to attract the former DP members and supporters. The Justice Party, which was organized in early 1961, emerged as the main heir to the DP and rallied the former Democrats. The political parties carried out their election campaign in an atmosphere of freedom without interference from above. [Karpat,1973:245]. The new Law of Elections established an

electoral system which was based on a strictly proportional system of representation in contrast to the former majority system. The 1961 Constitution provided for the formation of a second chamber, the Senate, to check the powers of the Assembly. The General Elections of October 15, 1961, however, failed to produce a clear majority. The RPP won 36.7 percent of the votes, thus coming first, and the JP won 34.8 percent of the votes and came second. [Karpát,1973:249, Ahmad,1977:172] After seventeen months of military rule, parliamentary politics resumed. Because no party had a clear majority, after hard bargaining lasting a month, a coalition government consisting of the RPP and the JP was formed on November 20.

The 1961 Constitution was prepared with a view to preventing the re-emergence of authoritarian party rule based on massive parliamentary majorities. [Tachau and Haper,1983:22] The new Constitution provided an effective system of checks and balances. As noted, a second chamber, the Senate, was constituted. Proportional electoral system was adopted. A Constitutional Court was set up to review legislation and governmental decrees. The functions and prerogatives of the Council of State were reinforced. Such salient institutions as the universities and the Broadcasting Corporation (TRT) were provided with broad authority and declared self-governing. A wide set of democratic individual rights, civil liberties and freedom of association were introduced and put under constitutional guarantee. An institutional structure to safeguard democratic rights and freedoms was set out in detail. The 1961 Constitution adopted the principle of "the social state", which can be defined as the welfare state. In accordance with this principle it provided important social and economic rights under the section headed "Social and Economic Rights and Duties". Article 46 of the 1961 Constitution recognized

the right of unionization, and Article 47 granted the right to strike and to bargain collectively. Articles 35 to 53 of the Section Social and Economic Rights and Duties set out a number of economic and social goals such as "assuring everyone a standard of living befitting human dignity", a universal social security system and medical care and land reform. Article 53 stipulated that "the State shall carry out its duties to attain the social and economic goals provided in this section only in so far as economic development and its financial resources permit". Karpas (1973:241) says that "this was an important provision for it prohibited the state from using political means that is to say forced measures to attain these economic and social goals. Theoretically at least the state was to utilize economic means to reach its economic and social ends". Although these goals were stated in terms of future ideals rather than immediate possibilities it at least gave voice to aspirations for social justice. Hale (1981:118) says that "these provisions provided powerful backing, though not legally enforceable, for those who demand the realization of these goals". It intended to incorporate the demands of the subordinate classes into the political process. Keyder (1979:26) notes that "through this document the authors of the military intervention attempted to lay the foundations for a sort of *social democratic* balance to obtain within the society".

2. A New Strategy of Economic Development

Under the military rule of 1960-61, important developments took place in the economic field. When the military took power, the Turkish economy was in very bad condition. The rate of inflation was around 25 percent, the gold and foreign currency reserves had been virtually exhausted, while foreign debt, according to the Ministry of

Finance, stood at approximately 1,345 million dollars. [Ahmad,1977:268; Karpat,1973:234]. Under such circumstances, the military government immediately introduced an economic program to check inflation and solve the problem of financial instability. The DP government had already introduced an economic stabilization program in August 1958 under the pressure of the IMF and other international creditor institutions. Initially, the military government continued a stricter application of this stabilization program. The government expenditures in the budget were reduced by TL. 500 million and some public investment projects were cancelled and some others postponed. To increase the government revenues, state bonds were compulsorily sold to all wage and salary earners.

Some measures taken by the military government and radical declarations and aspirations of some NUC members created an atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty among the capital circles, which resulted in the absence of new investment, hence stagnation. For example, a number of personal bank accounts were frozen and loans were suspended. The military government increased the tax on land ten times and the tax on buildings two to six times. The income tax law of December 13, 1960 required all those subject to annual income declarations, that is mainly private enterprises, to submit an additional declaration listing all their assets, which was called a wealth declaration. [Ahmad,1977:271; Karpat,1973:234,255]. The Chambers of Commerce and Industry were asked to dissolve their administrative boards in order to hold new elections "in accordance with the integrity of the profession and the need for solidarity". [Saybasili, 1976a:122; Karpat,1973:235].(9) Upon such actions and some radical declarations for

social reforms by the military officers, business circles asked for assurances and pressed the government to abolish the economic restrictions that had led to economic stagnation. Consequently, on October 16, 1960, President Cemal Gursel apologetically admitted that "there had been some extreme and unbalanced actions in the economic field", and assured business as the Head of the State that "events up to now are past and ended. Henceforth, the defense of your rights is as important as our own. Believe in these words and decide your future actions accordingly." [quoted in Karpas, 1973:236]. About a month later, "the fourteen" radical officers were removed from the NUC, and the moderates strengthened their position. Several trusted managers were appointed to ministerial positions in the cabinet established under the military. [Keyder, 1979: 25] These assurances brought relief to capital.

The military government was not content with only short-term measures to balance the economy. They also intended to design a long-term development strategy and establish its institutional structure. Ahmad (1977:269) says that "the fact that nine of the fifteen important decisions taken by the government on 20 June 1960 dealt with economic matters actually shows the primary importance given by the military rulers to the economy." Among these decisions was the setting up of a State Planning Bureau to formulate investment policies. Soon this Bureau developed into a State Planning Organization. The State Planning Organization (SPO), attached to the Prime Ministry, was established by Law No.91 of 30 September 1960. The principle of planning was also incorporated into the 1961 Constitution. Article 129 stated:

(9) Law Number 2 of June 14, 1960. This was the second law adopted by the military.

Economic, social and cultural development is based on a plan. Development is carried out according to this plan. The Organization and functions of the State Planning Organization, the principle to be observed in the preparation and execution and application and revision of the plan and the measures designed to prevent changes tending to impair the unity of the plan shall be regulated by special legislation.

Thus the State Planning Organization became a constitutional organization. It would draw up five-year development plans together with long-term perspective plans for the whole economy and yearly programs implementing each stage of the five year development plans. Once the plans were approved by the Cabinet and the Grand National Assembly, they would be binding on the public sector and public administration. Though some arguments occurred about the authority and scope of the plans with respect to the private sector, it was recognized that the plans could not be binding but indicative for the private sector. Yet the plans would also ensure the necessary degree of coordination between the private sector and the public sector. [Hale,1981:141-2; Okyar,1979:333].

The framers of the Constitution were aware that rapid economic development might exacerbate the already existing large inequalities in wealth and income. The principle of social justice was, therefore, written into the Constitution. Article 41 stipulated that

Economic and social life shall be regulated in a manner consistent with justice and the principle of full employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a standard of living befitting human dignity.

It is the duty of the State to encourage economic, social and cultural development by democratic processes and for this purpose to enhance national savings, to give priority to those investments which promote public welfare, and to draw up development projects.

To deal with the social problems that would be inevitably created by economic development, a Department of Social Planning was organized within the State Planning

Organization.

The transition to the new model of economic development had both internal and external causes. The liberal economic policies of the DP government were short-lived. After the mid-1950s, the economy entered into a crisis situation. The DP government, despite its hostility toward state intervention in economy, was forced to intervene in the economy to a large extent and adopt some statist measures to control the economy. The increased state intervention and control over the economy were not carried out according to a plan. This haphazard state intervention in the economy led to discontent among certain factions of the bourgeoisie. The results of a survey conducted by the Istanbul Merchants' Association among businessmen in the late 1950s showed that the private sector actually supported the idea of economic planning. [cited in Esin,1974:155-7]. It was particularly the industrial bourgeoisie that emphasized the necessity of economic planning and regulation. The economic policies of the DP period had given priority to the agricultural sector. Moreover, the high level of inflation had caused the diversion of scarce resources from the industrial sector to easy money-making fields. This situation had led to the increasing alienation of the industrial bourgeoisie from DP rule in the late 1950s. The industrial bourgeoisie wanted a stable economic environment and a rational and planned allocation of scarce economic resources at the service of rapid industrialization. The model of planned economic development also accorded with the aspirations of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. From the viewpoint of the bureaucracy, the new model of development could restore, to some extent, its lost social status, and improve its economic position that had been undermined in the inflationary conditions of the late 1950s. [Kepenek,1984:152; Keyder. 1979:24-5, 1987:142-5]

There is a tendency in the literature on Turkish politics to interpret the 1961 military intervention as the result of a power struggle between the traditional ruling elite, that is the civil and military bureaucracy, and the more recently emerged bourgeoisie, which had been successful in mobilizing the popular masses behind itself. Accordingly, the coup was evaluated as "the recalcitrance of the Turkish public bureaucracy to the bourgeois politics".⁽¹⁰⁾ What such an interpretation misses is the crucial point that there had been a convergence between the hopes of the bureaucracy and the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie. This conformity between the interests of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia and the industrial bourgeoisie, which was certainly not yet the hegemonic force of the bourgeoisie, made possible the transformation of the economy to the new phase of capitalist development. The new model, which also incorporated the demands of the subordinate classes into the system, was successful in getting the support of organized labour as well. It is important to note that certainly with the new pattern of capitalist development, the bureaucracy obtained some material and social gains, and the economic planning and regulation increased the status of the more technocratic group within the bureaucratic ranks. But, as Keyder (1987:144) says "the bureaucracy was never able to regain its class status with its own projects reminiscent of the pre-war period".

The new development strategy was also supported by the main international economic organizations of the world capitalist system. The OECD-organized consortium of Turkey's foreign creditors had pressed the DP government to link public spending to a

(10) The phrase is from Heper, 1976. For such arguments, see Akarlı, 1975; Mardin, 1973; Frey, 1965; Ulman and Tachau, 1965.

plan and form a planning board. This was the first instance that an international organization urged a developing country towards more planning. The DP government consequently had taken some measures in this direction. Turkey was also exempted from the liberal foreign trade regime, and allowed to continue the protectionist measures that had been taken by the DP government in the late 1950s. [see Kepenek,1984:153; Culalp,1985:338 and Keyder,1987:135]. The protectionist measures introduced by the DP government, despite the absence of formal encouragement for industrial sector, had proved sufficient to inaugurate import-substitution industrialization (ISI) which was to become the core of planned economic development of the 1960s. The coming together of all these internal and external factors permitted the successful transition to the new model of capitalist development based on the regulation by the state of the process of capital accumulation, and import-substitution industrialization. This model was carried out for the following two decades without fundamental changes and relatively successfully until the mid-1970s.

With the transition to a new model of planned economic development based on import-substitution industrialization labour-capital relations gained particular significance. If this model was to be successfully carried out the material conditions of production and accumulation had to be guaranteed. In other words, a planned development strategy can not tolerate disruptions in the process of production. It requires a considerable degree of labour discipline. Import-substitution industrialization is itself "a tightly staged process".(11) It does not easily allow technological alterations or

(11) Hirschman's description, quoted in Keyder, 1987:166.

modifications necessitated by increasing labour demands concerning the process of production. Keyder says that "the ISI industrialist of a developing country like Turkey must be more rigid in his response to such labour demands because unlike his counterpart in advanced countries he has to work with a given blueprint and imported technology, and is unable to make the necessary technological adjustments". [Keyder, 1987:166] The crucial question, then, was how to maintain industrial peace and secure moderation of labour demands.

The 1961 Constitution firmly established the institutional and legal framework of a democratic system. It provided the necessary guarantees for democratic rights and freedoms. Through this Constitution the authors of the 1960 military takeover also intended to incorporate the subordinate classes into the political process. The principle of the social state was incorporated into the Constitution. Under this principle, generous promises of social and economic welfare were made to the economically and socially underprivileged groups. Within the framework of this new regime authoritarian corporatism did not seem to be a likely answer to the question how to preserve social peace and prevent labour disturbances. Under the new strategy of planned capitalist development, instead of authoritarian corporatism, some sort of liberal corporatist arrangements emerged.

3. The State, Organized Labour and Employers' Associations in the Post-Coup Period; The Emergence of Liberal Corporatism

A) New Legal and Political Developments Concerning Labour

Immediately after the military takeover, on May 28, 1960 the members of the Administrative Board of Turk-Is called an extraordinary meeting to evaluate the situation. In a later meeting held on June 13, 1960 the Administrative Board of Turk-Is agreed on some principles which would guide the activities of the Confederation in the post-coup conditions. It was stated that "in the democratic order based on human rights that was being established by the revolutionary government, the primary aim of the labour unions was to secure the guarantee of union freedom and the right to strike". [quoted in Isikli, 1967:88 and Dilik et al., 1965:67-8]. The DP-appointed Chairman of the Confederation did not participate in this meeting and was later expelled. The military government displayed a permissive attitude towards the unions. Immediately after the coup, the government extended its permission for the affiliation of Turk-Is to the ICFTU. Turk-Is's demand for affiliation to the ICFTU had always been rejected by the DP government. [Kutal, 1977:13]. The Birlik which had been closed by the DP government were allowed to resume their activities. [Dereli, 1968:113]. The labour unions were authorized to send workers' representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, workers were entitled to only six representatives while the Chambers had ten representatives, and the universities, a much smaller group in number, were represented by twelve representatives.

The atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity caused by the military coup had resulted in a general recession in the economy which continued into 1961, increasing the level of unemployment. [Ahmad,1977:271]. Because wages were frozen by the military government and all wage and salary earners were obliged to buy state bonds, the financial situation of the workers immediately after the coup deteriorated. While salaries of the bureaucrats and the military officers were increased, the Finance Minister declared that "workers' wages would not be increased since they had kept pace with inflation whereas the salaries of the bureaucrats had remained stagnant." [quoted in Karpas, 1973:271]. Because of such developments against their interests, the workers began to express their discontent. Turk-Is and the labour unions pressed the Constituent Assembly debating the Constitution to give fair recognition to the workers' demands and include specific labour rights in the Constitution. Union leaders declared that "if necessary, they would secure by force workers' right to strike". [Karpas,1973:272]. Consequently, under such pressure from labour, the right to strike and bargain collectively and the freedom of unionization were put under constitutional guarantee. Article 46 of the 1961 Constitution stated that "Employees and employers are entitled to establish unions and federations of unions without having to obtain prior authorization, to enroll in them as members and to resign from such membership freely". More significantly, by Article 47, for the first time, the right to strike was formally recognized. It declared that "in their relations with their employers workers are entitled to bargain collectively and to strike with a view to protecting and improving their economic and social status". During the debates in the Constituent Assembly, employers' representatives demanded that the right to lockout should also be incorporated into the Constitution. This demand of the employers was

rejected, but the sentence that "the rights of employers shall be regulated by law" was added to the original statement that "the use of the right to strike and its exceptions shall be regulated by law". [Esin,1974:176-7; Dilik et al.,1965:86]. Upon the inclusion of the right to strike and bargain collectively in the Constitution, Turk-Is decided to support the Constitution and the system it envisaged. [Karpas,1973:272].

The liberal democratic atmosphere of the post-coup period was rather favourable to the development of the left. The socialist circles found an opportunity to speak up, for the first time. Socialism became a widely discussed topic, not only as an ideology but also as a strategy of action that was advocated as a way of rapid economic development. Some groups within the intelligentsia, particularly university professors, teachers, writers, journalists and some labour leaders, became spokesmen of socialist ideas, and old-time Marxists obtained the opportunity to express publicly their views. [see Karpas,1967 and Sunar,1974:147-52, Landau,1974]. In such a leftist climate, on February 13, 1961 the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP) was formed by twelve union leaders initially with the aim of providing an independent channel for labour representation in the Parliament. The unionists who founded the Turkish Workers' Party were mostly presidents of the unions then affiliated to Turk-Is. Among them were such influential union leaders as Kemal Turkler, President of the Mine and Metal Workers' Union (Maden-Is), and Riza Kuas, President of the Union of Rubber Workers (Lastik-Is). Some of these unionists were also the members of the Administrative Board of Turk-Is. [Mumcuoglu,1980:383; Hale,1976:63; Karpas,1967:150]. However, the TWP faced negative reaction from other unionists in Turk-Is and failed to get the support of the Confederation. The new president of Turk-Is said that "it was too soon to establish a labour party". [Isikli,1972:335]. Due to

the negative reaction from the majority of Turk-Is executives, the TWP appealed to socialist intellectuals, and in 1962, Mehmet Ali Aybar, a Marxist intellectual, assumed the leadership of the party, which led to the adoption of a new party program inspired by socialist principles. [for the TWP, see Karpas,1967, Landau,1974]. Despite the opposition of Turk-Is executives to the TWP, shortly after its establishment, they got involved in the organization of another labour party. The idea of forming "a working men's party" was adopted in the meeting of the General Assembly of the Confederation in January 1962, and the President of Turk-Is called for the formation of a new workers' party (Calisanlar Partisi). The idea of forming another workers' party also attracted the attention of some intellectuals mainly from the universities. But in the face of increasing support for the TWP, this attempt failed, and the idea of forming another labour party soon evaporated. [Isikli,1972:335]. Consequently, Turk-Is adopted the principle of "above party policy" according to which Turk-Is was to abstain from establishing any links with political parties and engaging in partisan activities. It was to remain absolutely independent vis-a-vis the political parties on the grounds that it was only in this way the Confederation could preserve the unity of the union movement and keep workers under its own organization who had already committed to either the RPP or the JP. [see G. Kutal, 1977:226-31,1972; Balci, 1974.]

Such important legal and political developments as the recognition of the right to strike and collective bargaining and the freedom of unionization as constitutional rights, the establishment of a labour party and the rise of a leftist movement certainly strengthened the power position of the working class vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. Immediately after the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, the newly established

Constitutional Court abolished Article 72 of the 1936 Labour Code which prohibited strikes. [Tuna,1964:417, 1963:270]. The Constitution, however, stated that the use of the strike and its exceptions and the employers' rights were to be regulated by law. In other words, these rights were to be postponed until specific legislation pertaining to the use of the right to strike and lockout was enacted. [Hale,1976:63]. The Constitution also stated that the regulatory statutes were to be enacted within two years at the latest. Despite this, the government delayed the regulatory statutes. This was partly because of the conflict between the coalition partners (the JP and the RPP) that formed the government. Only six months after its formation the first coalition government collapsed on May 30, 1962. After protracted negotiations the second coalition government was established, including the RPP, the New Turkey Party, the Republican National Peasant Party and the independents, under the premiership of Inonu, the Chairman of the RPP, on June 24, 1962. [see Ahmad, 1977:ch.VIII].

The delay of the regulatory legislation and the rise of unemployment caused unrest among the workers. In order to press the government to pass the legislation and take measures against unemployment, the union leaders declared that "they would use workers' constitutional right to strike regardless of the absence of the regulatory legislation". [Karpat,1973:273] A series of strikes and protest meetings broke out throughout the country. On November 25, 1961, in Izmir a demonstration was held with the participation of five thousand workers who carried such placards saying that "if you don't give us our rights, we will get them". On December 31, Turk-Is organized a massive rally at Sarachane in Istanbul with the attendance of about hundred thousand workers who made demands for the implementation of their constitutional rights. Similar

demonstrations were organized in other regions of the country, demanding the implementation of the right to strike, higher wages, better working conditions and the initiation of policies likely to create new employment. The number and type of labour actions during the period of 1961-1963 are given in the following table.

Table A Labour Actions 1961-1963

| Type of Action | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | Total |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|-------|
| Strike | - | 5 | 5 | 10 |
| Sit-Down | - | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Beard Strike* | 7 | - | - | 7 |
| Silent March | 7 | 3 | 2 | 12 |
| Demonstration and Meeting | 2 | 3 | - | 5 |
| Declaration, Speech, etc. | - | 109 | 17 | 126 |
| Others | 4 | 2 | 4 | 10 |
| Total: | 20 | 124 | 32 | 176 |

* A form of silent protest in which workers grew beards.

Source: Fisek, 1969:57

Turk-Is sent a manifesto to the Prime Minister, urging a solution to the workers' problems. [Fisek,1969:55]. In the meantime, a number of strikes called in various parts of the country led to disagreements between the unions and employers as to whether they were legal or illegal, and put the government in an ambiguous position. [Hale,1976:63] The right to strike had already been conceded by the Constitution, but the enabling legislation had not yet been enacted. The seriousness of the problem became rather obvious in February 1962 when the workers at the Istanbul factory of Kavel cable company went on strike. During the Kavel strike violent clashes occurred, which dramatized the event and attracted great public attention. The strike lasted 35 days, and

eventually the dispute was settled by an agreement between Turk-Is and the newly established Turkish Employers' Confederation (TISK). [Dereli,1968:116; Hale,1976:63]. Consequently, under strong pressure from labour, the government began to pay closer attention to the workers' problems and meet some of their immediate economic demands. Karpas says that "even the most conservative parties were forced to acknowledge the importance of the workers' problems and adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the labour unions". [Karpas,1967:158, 1973:274-5]. The required Acts were passed by the Parliament as the Unions Act (Law No. 274) and the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act (Law No.275) both on July 15, 1963. These Acts conceded most of the demands of the Turkish labour movement.

It is generally argued by Turkish authors that the workers' rights recognized by the 1961 Constitution and these two Acts were granted from above without struggle on the part of labour, unlike the case in the Western Democracies. In a speech delivered to the Grand National Assembly when introducing the Acts 274 and 275, the then Labour Minister, Bulent Ecevit, expressed this view very well in the following sentences:

In almost all the Western Democracies the rights that are to be given to the Turkish workers by these laws had been conceded only after long and bloody struggles... Within a few days, by granting the Turkish workers these rights without a need for such struggles it is beyond doubt that you will serve a great deal to the society and to the history... In the Western countries, practice came first and then legislation, in our country legislation will come first and then practice...[quoted in Isikli,1981:354].

In our view, such a claim fails to reflect reality. The Turkish workers' struggle for the recognition of their rights goes far back. As already pointed out, these rights were conceded by the political authorities only under strong pressure from the working class.

B) Important Aspects of the 1963 Labour Legislation

The basic principles of the new Unions Act and the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act were laid down in a tripartite conference held in January 1962. [Tuna,1964:415; Dereli,1968:118]. Several draft bills were prepared by the government, by Turk-Is and by the Union of Chambers. A tripartite ad hoc committee was formed to study these bills. After the tripartite committee gave the final shape to the draft bills, they were submitted to the Parliament. [Dereli,1968:118]. The Acts were passed in the Parliament on July 15, 1963. Because it is not possible to discuss the new legislation in detail, we will try to explain the main provisions that are more directly related to the subject matter of this study. [for details see Dereli,1968; Sonmez,1968; Celik,1979]. Article 1 of the Unions Act explicitly stated the voluntary character of labour unions and employers' associations. According to Article 9, labour unions could be established by the employees of an undertaking or the employees of undertakings in the same branch of activity or in related branches of activity. Thus labour unions could be formed on both an industrial basis and at the workplace. The employers' associations, on the other hand, could be formed by the employers in the same branch of activity or in related branches of activity. The Unions Act of 1963 adopted the same structural pattern of multi-union organization as established by its predecessor of 1947 in that it allowed the formation of federations of unions in the same branch of industry, of regional labour unions and national confederations. The Act defined the organizational structure of unions in a rather detailed manner in order to prevent the emergence of any disputes regarding the boundaries of local unions, industrial national unions, regional unions, federations and confederations. Local unions are organized at the workplace. Industrial national unions

are nation-wide unions organized along industrial lines. Federations are vertical organizations of federated local unions operating in the same branch of activity or industry, and birliks are horizontal organizations of unions operating in a certain region or geographical area regardless of the branch of activity. [Dereli, 1981:551, 1968:127; Sonmez,1968:35-38]. Similarly, the Act defined the organizational structure of employers' associations and their confederations so as to match the structure of labour unions. But the employers' associations could not form birliks. The Act stipulated minimal numerical requirements for the establishment of birliks, federations and confederations (for all, at least two affiliates) with a view to preventing excessive splits within the union movement. At the same time, to facilitate the consolidation of the union movement, it reduced the requirement for the affiliation to a multi-union organization from 2/3 majority of all members of the union to an absolute majority of the attended members. The 1947 Unions Act had required that affiliation of any union to a multi-union organization receive two-thirds of the membership of the union, a condition that was very difficult to meet. The new Union Act reduced this requirement to an absolute majority of the members who actually attended the meeting of the General Assembly of the union. To facilitate the formation of industry-based unions, and thus prevent the fragmentation of the union movement, it also provided that each branch of activity and the sub-branches related to it were to be determined by a regulation of the Ministry of Labour after receiving the advisory opinion of the Supreme Arbitration Board and the employees and employers' confederations which had the biggest membership. At this point it should be noted that during the parliamentary debates on the Unions Act, the union representatives were opposed to the authorization of the Ministry to set the branches of activity. One

unionist deputy said that "by this provision an important opportunity to form strong unions was lost to a governmental organ which was itself in an employer position, hence in a sense the Ministry of Labour was given an important opportunity to intervene in the establishment of strong unions". [quoted in Isikli,1972:313].

In the first draft bill submitted to the Parliament it was stated that "more than one union could be formed in the same workplace or in the same branch of activity". The reason given for this provision was to prevent the unions from becoming a repressive instrument and to encourage a beneficial rivalry between them. This provision was rejected on the grounds that it seemed to encourage unnecessary splits within the union movement. Yet it was also stated that the rejection of this provision did not mean prohibiting the organization of more than one union in the same branch of industry or at the same workplace. [Sonmez,1968:33] The 1961 Constitution had already provided that unions could be established without prior permission, and emphasized the voluntary character of unionization and union membership. The principle of union freedom was confirmed by the Unions Act 274. In other words, the principle of rival unionism was adopted by both the Constitution and the Unions Act, but unlike the 1947 Unions Act, the Unions Act of 1963 was designed to encourage the formation of strong and centralized unions. This policy of the Legislature can also be seen in some other provisions of the Act, which we will try to explain briefly.

An important novelty introduced by the new Unions Act was the granting to white collar employees of the right to form and join unions. Thus in contrast to the previous legislation, union membership was not confined to manual workers only. It was provided that all workers who were above the age of sixteen could become union members, even


those under sixteen could join unions with the written permission of their guardians. This also meant that the prohibition of the former Unions Act against the unionization of employees working for small business such as grocery stores and small retail enterprises was lifted.

Civil service personnel in government employment, nevertheless, were left outside of the scope of the 1963 Unions Act. Though the 1961 Constitution granted the public civil servants the right to unionize, for the first time, it stated that public civil servants who did not fall under the definition of employee should be regulated by law. Accordingly, on June 8, 1965, the Law of Civil Servants' Unions (law No:624) was passed by the Parliament. [for details, see Sonmez, 1968] However, they were denied the right to strike and bargain collectively. Strict regulations were imposed on the activities of their unions. Civil servants, particularly teachers, organized many unions during the late 1960s. But since they were not allowed to strike and bargain collectively, these unions did not play any significant roles. [Dereli, 1981:558-9]

The 1963 Unions Act aimed to protect union members against arbitrary action and discharge by the employers for having participated in union activities, and established certain safeguards and penalties thereto. It obliged the employer to compensate for the damages not less than the annual total amount of the employee's wage. But the employer was not required to reassign the discharged union member to his or her job. Union officials and leaders were provided with job security. According to the Unions Act, if a union leader or a member of the executive committee of a union resigns from his post or fails to be reelected and wants to be rehired, the employer is required to assign him to his previous job or similar job.

Like the previous Unions Act of 1947, the Unions Act of 1963 also emphasized the voluntary character of union membership. Article 19 stipulated that "to join or to refrain from joining a union or to withdraw or to refrain from withdrawing from a union can not be made a condition of hiring and employment. No provisions contrasting this article can be included in labour contracts". By this article, the Unions Act explicitly prohibited the practices of "closed shops", "union shops" and so called "yellow dog contracts". But at the same time, in order to protect the unions and prevent the free-riding problem, Article 21 stated that "nonmembers can utilize the services rendered and rights conferred by the unions only upon the written permission of the union concerned". Besides, Article 7 of the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act stipulated that "workers who do not belong to the union which has concluded the collective agreement may avail themselves of the benefits provided by the agreement on the condition that they pay a monthly solidarity contribution to the signatory union. The amount of the solidarity contribution can not be more than the two-thirds of the regular membership dues paid to the union by its members at the same workplace". Dereli (1968:141) says that "the requirement of solidarity contribution was adopted as a result of the pressure from the labour unions". In the report of the Parliamentary Committee, it was stated that "the rationale behind the solidarity contribution was the desire to strengthen labour unions as well as involving some ethical and moral considerations". [quoted in Dereli,1968:120]. While the Unions Act aimed to prevent such practices as union shops or closed shops, relying on Article 21 of the Unions Act and the provision for the solidarity contribution, in practice the labour unions were successful in including in most collective agreements such a provision that "in order for the nonmembers to benefit from the agreement a special written permission

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of the union was required". Thus the mere willingness of the workers to pay the solidarity contribution did not automatically enable them to benefit from the collective agreements; it required the written consent of the signatory union. The unions mostly did not give their permission, depriving non-members of the benefits provided by the collective agreements. Thus some kind of union shop practices emerged. [Dereli,1978:104-5; 1968:203]. In a dispute regarding the requirement for the written permission of the unions the verdict of the Court of Cassation issued in 1964 also supported the views of the unions by stating that "the union's written permission was to take precedence over the ability of the nonmembers to benefit from the collective agreement by merely paying the solidarity contribution". [Dereli,1968:208; Sonmez,1968:66-7]

Though the Unions Act emphasized the voluntary character of membership and prohibited the practices aimed at compulsory membership, in practice the unions established some kind of union shops in order to avoid the problems associated with voluntary membership. Most students of corporatism point out that in the liberal corporatist countries of Europe, union membership tends to be compulsory due to such practices as union shops, closed shops or similar arrangements. Schmitter even includes compulsory membership in his definition of corporatism as one of the defining structural elements. Compulsory membership provides union organizations or union leaders with greater control over and greater autonomy from the rank and file. If labour unions are to cooperate with employers and government within a corporatist framework, this requires that they have a certain degree of control over their members. Partly through some sort of union shop practices, the Turkish labour unions were also able to increase their membership by leaps and bounds in the subsequent years. At the same time they gained

more control over the rank and file.

The new Unions Act lifted the restrictions imposed by the former Act on the unions to determine their membership dues. The unions were no longer bound by the provisions of the Association Act which limited the membership dues to a maximum annual amount of TL. 120. They could now fix the amount of dues without any limitations imposed by legislation. Another important novelty introduced by the Unions Act was the check-off system. According to Article 23, employers were required to deduct membership dues from the wages of their employees upon the request of the union if at least one-fourth of the workers in a workplace belonged to this particular union or several unions acting together. The reason given for the adoption of the check-off system was to strengthen the financial position of the labour unions. [for the check-off system, see Kutal,1979]. In some countries such as France the check-off system was specifically forbidden by legislation on the grounds that it impairs freedom of unions and union membership by allowing the employers to interfere in the relationship between the unions and their members. Some also argue that it has negative effects on internal union democracy. [see B. Dereli,1977:130 and Kutal,1979]. Yet it is also true that the check-off system is highly likely to strengthen labour unions financially.

One of the most important novelties brought by the 1963 Unions Act was the authorization of the labour unions to appoint themselves the workers' representatives at the workplace, commonly known as shop-stewards. Thus, for the first time, the labour unions were granted representation at the workplace which they had been denied under the previous legislation. The shop-stewards were provided with important safeguards against the unfair treatment and discharge by the employers. The Unions Act of 1963

abolished the requirement of prior permission of the government for the affiliation of any unions or multi-union organizations to an international organization, which had been imposed by the Unions Act of 1947. They were now permitted to affiliate with and withdraw from international organizations without prior governmental permission.

Article 14 of the Unions Act enumerated the functions that labour unions and employers' associations could perform in pursuing their goals. It can, therefore, be said that unions were required to regulate their activities within the limits set by law. Yet the article stated union activities in rather broad and general terms with a view to preventing any limitations on union activities that fell under the capacity of unions but were not stated in the Act. [Sonmez,1968:89]. Of course, unions were not obligated to include in their statutes all the activities they were entitled to perform. In the said article, the rights to conclude collective agreements, to initiate collective disputes, to call strikes or lockouts in the case of employers' associations were clearly protected; they did not exist in the 1947 Act. Nevertheless, the Unions Act of 1963 also imposed some restrictions on political activities of unions. [for details see Kutal,1965:132-6; Sonmez,1968:93-6]. In the 1961 Constitution, no restrictions had been imposed on their goals or activities. During the debates on the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, some members, referring to the German Constitution which stipulated that the goals of unions were occupational and they could not perform activities outside their occupational goals, had demanded that a similar provision be included in the Turkish Constitution as well. This demand had met with reaction from other members and had been rejected on the grounds that it might be interpreted as a general prohibition on political activities of unions, hence it would impair union freedom. [Sonmez,1968:94-5; G. Kutal,1977:176-7]. Despite this, the 1963 Unions

Act placed some restrictions on unions' political activities. Article 16 stipulated that "unions shall not accept material aid in any form from political parties and any organs connected to them, and shall not extend material aid to them, and shall occupy no position within their organizations, no professional organizations shall be established under the name of a political party". This provision also applied to the employers' associations. Thus unions were forbidden to establish administrative and financial links with political parties. But unlike the 1947 Act, which barred unions from engaging in any sort of political activity, under the 1963 Act unions could get involved in political activities as also stated in the Report of the Parliamentary Committee. For example, there was no legal provision forbidding unions from supporting political parties in election campaigns except forwarding material aid to them. [Dereli,1974:297, 1968:132-3; Kutal,1965:133; Sonmez,1968:95-6; B. Dereli,1977:55]. The penalty for violating the provisions on unions' political activities was three to six months suspension of the activities of the union concerned by the decision of the courts dealing with labour cases.

The Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act (Law No:275) was the first specific act dealing with these matters. The first article of the Act stated that "the only organization empowered to make collective agreements with employers or employers' associations is the labour union". In some countries such as Germany and France the legislation concerned also adopted this principle. In other words, in these countries only labour unions can enter into collective agreements. In some other countries like Switzerland, however, unorganized workers' groups or non-union workers' associations are also entitled to conclude collective agreements. In the Turkish case, according to Act 275, unorganized workers or non-union workers' associations were not allowed to

negotiate or conclude collective agreements. Some criticized this provision for denying non-unionized workers a constitutional right. According to the Parliamentary Committee the rationale behind this restriction was to facilitate the emergence of strong and centralized unions by preventing the split of workers among fragmented organizations. This objective was also expressed in the first Five-Year Development Plan which was adopted in 1963. [Isikli,1967:93]. This policy can also be seen in Article 7 on the authorization of unions for collective bargaining according to which a federation of unions or a national industry-based union which represented the majority of workers in a particular industry was entitled to conclude collective agreements on behalf of all workplaces covered by this industry. At the workplace level, a local union or a national industrial union through its local branches which represented the majority of workers in a workplace or more than one workplace was authorized to make collective agreements covering the workers in these particular workplaces. It should be noted that according to these provisions, while a federation could enter into collective agreements only at the industrial level, national industry-based unions could conclude collective agreements both at the industrial level and at the workplace level through its local organizations, thus having an advantage over the federations. Dilik et al. (1965:89) and Dereli (1968:119) argue that these provisions seemed to put the emphasis on the principle of industry-based unionism, hence centralization of authority within the union movement. As will be explained later, these provisions encouraged the organization of the Turkish union movement on an industry basis. Turk-Is immediately took important steps in reorganizing its structure. [Talas,1983:226; G. Kutal,1977:26-47, Dereli,1968:141; B. Dereli,1977:71-4]. It should be noted that under the Collective Agreements, Strikes and

Lockouts Act not only employers' associations but also single employers or a group of employers could make collective agreements.

The Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Act regulated the right to strike and lockout in a detailed manner. According to this Act, a strike or lockout could be called only after a conciliation stage. If a labour union and employer failed to reach an agreement in their negotiations, the Regional Director of Labour or the Ministry of Labour, depending on the level of bargaining, would arrange a conciliation meeting between the parties, with the attendance of the neutral representatives of the parties concerned and a neutral conciliator who was to be designated by the representatives of the parties. The conciliation meeting could not last more than fifteen days unless the parties agreed to extend it. If the conciliation proceeding resulted in failure, then the parties were free to apply for voluntary arbitration or call a strike or lockout. Nevertheless, some restrictions were imposed on the use of these rights. First of all, according to article 17, for a strike to have the status of "legal strike", it was to be called for the purpose of maintaining or improving the economic and social conditions of workers, and conducted in conformity with the provisions of this law. This was also valid for lockouts. This meant that strikes called in pursuit of political objectives (general strikes) were declared "illegal". Moreover, by Article 23 which stipulated that workers who were affected by a strike or lockout action had to leave the workplace, sit-down strikes were declared illegal. The Act also enumerated some areas where work stoppages were not allowed: services concerned with the saving of life, public corporations dealing with the production or distribution of water, electricity and gas, transportation services during the journey, public notary services, educational institutions and day-care services. In these fields, parties were

required to appeal to the compulsory arbitration mechanism if they failed to reach an agreement during the negotiations, but if they wished, they could also apply for voluntary arbitration. During the parliamentary debates, employers exerted great pressure on Parliament to increase the number and scope of the fields where strikes would be forbidden. In the final Act the areas where strikes were not allowed were kept more limited than employers demanded. [Esin,1974:181; Dereli,1968:148]. On the other hand, in most countries, for example, Sweden, rights disputes -those over the application or interpretation of the terms of the contracts- were to be referred to judicial organs, that is labour courts. In other words, strikes are not permitted within the duration of collective agreements. [Dereli, 1974:295-6, 1968:144-7]. The Turkish legislation allowed strikes in the case of rights disputes as well as interest disputes after the mentioned compulsory conciliation stage. Unlike the situation in most other countries, including the Western Democracies, it explicitly prohibited strike-breaking. In the case of a strike or lockout the rights and obligations originating from labour contracts were to be considered as suspended.

What was more important as far as the restrictions on strike activity concerned was the authorization of the government to postpone a strike for one month if it was liable to endanger national security or health. Following this postponement, the government might then postpone the strike another sixty days at most after it asked the advisory opinion of the Supreme Arbitration Board. At the end of the postponement the strike could be started. This provision was also valid for lockouts. Thus the government could postpone a strike or lockout up to three months. The party concerned had the right to take the postponement decision of the government to the Council of State. The Report of the

Parliamentary Committee stated that similar powers were also held by governments in such countries as Britain and the United States. [Dereli,1968:123]. Dereli says that:

Although the Parliamentary Committee referred to the Taft-Hartley Act in the US to justify this clause, the rationale underlying this provision was not the same that which led to the Taft-Hartley Act. The real motive seemed to be the desire of the government to maintain its third party role particularly with respect to such a weapon in the hand of labour as strike. [Dereli,1968:148].

This provision encountered strong criticism from labour representatives in Parliament and also from Turk-Is. [Isikli,1972:315]. Another article of the Act that was sharply criticized by the labour unions was the article that required labour unions and also employers' associations inform the Ministry of Labour regularly each year of their finances, balance sheets, sources of their revenues, and expenditures and their performance within the preceding year.

Despite the criticism by the labour unions of some provisions of the new labour legislation, as Hale (1976:63) says, it was hardly surprising that the new labour legislation was welcomed by the labour unions as "the Magna Charta of the Turkish labour movement". The new legislation equipped the unions with the arms that they had long demanded. The position of organized labour was considerably strengthened vis-a-vis capital.

C) Organizational Developments in the Field of Labour Unions and Capital Organizations

After 1960 union membership increased significantly. There are widely varying figures on union membership and the items related to union activity. As Talas (1983:194) and

Hale (1976:64) point out, therefore, the related data should be carefully interpreted. To prevent any misjudgement, varying figures for the same years found in the available different sources are given in table 1. Although there are differences between the figures provided by different sources, it is still evident that there was a phenomenal increase in union membership after 1960. Relying on different sources, Hale (1976) calculated the proportion of union membership to the total wage-earning labour force as given in the following table.

Table B Degree of Unionization

| Years | Total Union Membership | Union Membership As % of Wage Earners |
|-------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1950 | 78,000 | 5.9 |
| 1955 | 190,000 | 5.5 |
| 1960 | 283,000 | 15.5 |
| 1965 | 360,000 | 11.8 |
| 1970 | * 2,088 219 | * 53.8 |
| 1970 | ** 1,500 000 | ** 38.6 |

* Total reported by the Ministry of Labour

** Estimate of actual figure

Source: Hale, 1976:65

According to the total membership figure (2,088 219) provided by the Ministry of Labour, in 1970, 53.8 percent of the total wage-earning population (including salary earners) were union members. Even if we use the total membership figure estimated by Hale, which deflated the figure to 1.5 million for 1970, (this was argued to be a more accurate figure than that of the Ministry), the proportion of wage and salary earners who were union members in 1970 appears to be 38.6 percent. To give just a general idea about the Turkish

case compared to some other Western European countries, Hale notes that the proportion of union members to the total working population in Germany in the mid-1960s was about 24 percent, the comparable figure for Britain was 37 percent, for the Netherlands 26 percent and for Belgium 43 percent. He says that although the Turkish figures excluded self-employed persons who were included in the figures for the other countries listed, it can still be safely argued that the degree of unionization in Turkey was comparable to that of the highly developed European countries. It should be noted that among those European countries were included such countries as the Netherlands, which is commonly characterized as highly corporatist, and Belgium and Germany, which are defined as examples of medium-corporatism. According to the calculations made by Mumcuoglu (1980:379), using different sources, the degree of unionization defined as the share of actual union members as percentage of all those who are eligible to become unionized rose to 42.8 percent in 1975 and to 46.0 in 1977. Again it should be pointed out that if the official figures of the Ministry of Labour were used, the degree of unionization would appear much higher.

By 1960, Turk-Is was still the only labour confederation in Turkey. The affiliates of Turk-Is were federations, industry-based national unions, *birliks* and directly affiliated unions. The number of Turk-Is affiliates and their membership are given in the following table.

Table C Number of Turk-Is Affiliates and Their Members

| Type of Organizations | Number of Organizations | Number of Affiliates | Number of Members |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Federations | 11 | 181 | 135,791 |
| Birliks | 11 | 100 | 48,823 |
| Industry-based unions | 2 | 2 | 12,000 |
| Directly affiliated unions | - | 10 | 8,269 |
| Total: | 24 | 293 | 204,883 |

Source: Tuna, 1963:254 and G. Kutal, 1977:26

When we compare the table given above to Table 1 (in Appendix), it appears that in 1961, 119 labour unions with a total of 78,104 members were not affiliated to Turk-Is, in other words, they were independent unions. But as evident in the figures, they were very small local unions. At the time, Turk-Is represented 72 percent of all unionized workers.

As the table above shows, the organizational structure of Turk-Is was rather heterogeneous. It was dominated by local unions. As soon as the 1961 Constitution granted the right to strike and bargain collectively, even before the regulatory legislation was passed, Turk-Is decided to reorganize the structure of the union movement in order that the strike weapon and collective bargaining could be used more effectively. This would be carried out according to an elaborate plan to some extent similar to what was decided in the 1920s and accomplished in the mid-1950s by the Swedish Labour Confederation (LO), that is the merger of separate unions and consolidation of the branches. [for the Swedish case, see Lewin 1980]. "Unity in mind, unity in cash" was accepted as the slogan of this reorganization campaign. Another slogan of the campaign was "fewer unions, more members." [Dereli,1968:158] Turk-Is adopted the principle of

industrial unionism. The national industry-based union was chosen as the model for the new restructuring campaign which aimed at centralizing the union movement on the basis of nation-wide industrial units. In Turkey there were already some national industrial unions with centralized structure the origin of which went back to the early 1950s like the Metal Workers' Union (Maden-Is) and the Oil Industry Workers' Union. These unions had been among the most successful unions. [Tunay,1979:40; Dereli, 1981:565]

In April 1961 a commission was set up within Turk-Is for the purpose of drawing up a reorganization plan. After the organizational structures of union movements of different countries were examined, the organizational structure of the post-war West German union movement was adopted as a model, which was based on a centralized organization (DGB) of sixteen national unions. The goal of Turk-Is was to establish a single national union within each industry. To achieve this goal, the existing federations were to be turned into national industry-based unions, and local unions which had a legally independent status were to become branches of the industry-based unions. Some measures were taken by Turk-Is to realize the reorganization plan. However, this attempt at centralization and consolidation met strong resistance, particularly from the small local unions, because according to the reorganization plan, these local unions were to join national industrial unions and thus become simply branches of them. For those unions, joining a national industrial union would mean giving up their autonomy accorded by their legal status. This was because of the fact that national industrial unions could have only branches which did not have a separate legal status as opposed to federations whose local affiliates retained their separate legal status, hence their independence vis-a-vis the federation to a considerable extent. Some authors point out that national industrial unions are more

powerful due to their centralized structure, yet it is also because of their highly centralized structure that they are internally less democratic. [e.g see Tunay, 1979:45 and B. Dereli, 1977:131-8]

At the beginning, Turk-Is administration avoided coercive measures and generally tried to encourage the existing federations and local unions to adopt this new form of organization through persuasion and education. Nevertheless, when this strategy of persuasion and education failed in breaking the resistance to the reorganization plan, a Committee on Reconciling and Eliminating Conflicts in Reorganization was founded within Turk-Is and started its operation on January 23, 1963. This Committee prepared a report to be submitted to the fifth convention of the General Assembly of the Confederation. The report included the recommendations for the resolution of internal disputes regarding the reorganization as well as the results of its investigation of the case. The Report was adopted by the fifth General Assembly of Turk-Is convened in 1964. According to the Report, Turk-Is was to force its affiliates to comply with the reorganization plan within a specified time period, and expel those which refused to obey.

Turk-Is generally avoided a strict application of this decision. Yet the strategy of a tougher stance towards the dissident unions yielded immediate results. In 1963, there were 21 directly affiliated unions within the structure of Turk-Is. [Tuna, 1964:426]. Between 1964 and 1966 these unions had become either branches of industrial unions or members of Turk-Is affiliated federations, and birliks had been dissolved in accordance with the decisions of the fifth General Assembly of the Confederation. [G. Kural, 1977:34-6]. The number of unions decreased from 543 in 1963 to 400 by the end of 1964, and that of federations from 36 to 10 while the membership of Turk-Is increased

from 420,000 to 500,000 in the same period. In accordance with the new organizational plan based on the principle of industrial unionism, Turk-Is was able to increase the number of national industrial unions from 2 to 24 by 1964. [Tunay,1979:43,45].(13) The total number of organizations affiliated to Turk-Is in 1963 was 55, including federations, national industry-based unions, birliks and directly affiliated unions. By 1970 this number had been reduced to 35 while the number of Turk-Is membership had reached to 1 million. [Hale,1976:67]. The structure of the Confederation had become more homogeneous, including only federations and industrial unions. Though what had been realized was still short of the target set by Turk-Is, it was evident that Turk-Is had achieved a significant degree of centralization and consolidation within its structure. If we take the union movement as a whole it would be apparent that by the end of the 1960s national industrial unions had become the dominant organizational unit and birliks had virtually disappeared from the scene. [see Dereli,1968:202-3 and Tuna,1970:257-65]. And not an unimportant degree of consolidation was achieved as the average size of unions increased sharply during the period as seen in the table given below.

(13) These figures may not comply exactly with the other given related data because, as noted earlier, there are differences among the various sources.

For the details of the reorganization campaign, see Dereli,1965; G. Kutal,1977:26-45; Tunay,1979; B. Dereli,1977:71-5.

Table D Number and Size of Unions 1950-1970

| Years | Number of unions | Average membership per union |
|-------|------------------|------------------------------|
| 1950 | 88 | 886 |
| 1955 | 363 | 550 |
| 1960 | 432 | 655 |
| 1965 | 668 | 539 |
| 1970 | 737 | * 2833 |
| 1970 | - | ** 2035 |

* Calculation based on total reported by the Ministry of Labour

** Estimate of actual figure

Source: Hale,1976:65

As pointed out, the Unions Act and the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act of 1963 favored the principle of industrial unionism. In the Report of the Parliamentary Committee the statements of the policies of the Articles explicitly declared that some provisions were incorporated into the Acts with a view to inducing centralized and consolidated union movement while retaining the principle of plurality of unions or rival unionism. The first Five Year Development Plan which had been prepared before the labour legislation was passed also contained some important principles regarding the union movement and emphasized the unification of fragmented unions as a goal to be achieved by the union movement. [Sonmez,1968:33]. The Unions Act provided that each branch of activity and the sub-branches related to it were to be determined by a regulation by the Ministry of Labour upon receiving the advisory opinion of the Supreme Arbitration Board and employees' and employers' confederations which had the biggest number of members. The purpose of this provision was to provide the determination of the industrial branches that would be the basis of union organization, and thus discourage heterogeneous organization of the union movement. [Talas,1983:22] As noted before,

Turk-Is had been opposed to the power of the Ministry of Labour to determine the industrial categories, and demanded that this provision be removed from the Act. It wanted its autonomy in fixing the industrial branches. [Isikli,1972:313; Dereli,1968:156] But its demand was rejected. Consequently, Turk-Is directed its attempts at pressing the government to restrict the number of industrial branches to what the Confederation considered desirable. [Tunay,1979:42,44]. The first plan adopted by Turk-Is envisaged organization on the basis of 16 industries as in the case of West Germany, but later, this number was raised to 27 on the grounds that although organization according to 16 industries was ideal, 27 was more reasonable and easy to achieve, given the existing conditions. [G. Kutal,1977:33].

The government also supported the reorganization campaign of Turk-Is since it considered the presence of a centralized labour confederation with strong control over its affiliates as desirable for its own purposes. [Dereli,1968:226]. It issued the Regulation on the Branches of Activity. The number was determined as 36, nine more than what Turk-Is demanded. [Kutal,1977:33]

Students of corporatism emphasize that the degree of centralization and concentration within the union movement and employers' associations is crucially important for the development of liberal corporatism, but it is vitally significant in the case of unions. A high degree of rank and file autonomy impairs the capacity of union leaders to cooperate with employers and government in a corporatist scheme. As a result of its reorganization campaign, Turk-Is achieved a significant degree of centralization within its structure and established a considerable degree of control over its affiliates. It remained the only labour confederation until 1967. These structural properties of the union movement made

possible or facilitated the emergence of liberal corporatist arrangements.

Students of corporatism also agree that besides the structural characteristics of the union movement, that is its degree of centralization and concentration, another precondition or facilitative factor for the emergence of liberal corporatism is the ideological orientation of the union movement. Where the union movements have strong class-conflict orientation liberal corporatism fails to develop, as the French case attests. Turk-Is adopted a non-ideological position. It rejected a class-conflict or class struggle orientation. It advocated the idea of cooperation and peace between the social classes. This could partly be explained in terms of the impact of the authoritarian corporatist practices of the DP period. Turk-Is's rejection of class struggle and its support for the idea of cooperation between the classes considerably facilitated the development of liberal corporatist arrangements in Turkey during the period under investigation.

Until the 1960s, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry had acted as the sole representative of capital. Although some employers' associations outside the Chambers had been established in the post-war period, they did not play any significant role during the period. Employers did not show any interest in organizing outside the Chambers mainly because of the fact that deprived of the right to strike and under strict state control, the labour unions did not pose any threat to their interests. They did not have enough incentive to organize employers' associations in the absence of pressure from labour. [Zeytinoglu & Shabon, 1985:206; Esin,1974:171-4].

The recognition of the right to strike by the new Constitution aroused the employers. Throughout the country, particularly in Istanbul, employers entered into an accelerated process of organization. [Kocatopcu,1963:281] In 1961, employers in Istanbul formed

employers' associations in a number of industries. More importantly, in October 15 of that year, that is only three months after the adoption of the new Constitution, the newly established employers' associations and the Metal Employers' Associations founded in 1959 came together to form the Union of Istanbul Employers' Associations. The Istanbul Chambers of Commerce and Industry also actively supported the organization of this new employers' union. [For these associations, see Yazgan,1982:83]. In 1962, two new associations joined the Union. Following the Istanbul employers, in other regions of the country, a number of employers' associations were organized in a very short time. The Union of Istanbul Employers' Associations convened its general meeting on December 1961, and engaged in some activities, especially organizational ones.

OECD had sent the vice-secretary general of the Swedish Confederation of Employers' Associations (SAF) to assist the Turkish employers in their organization. The Swedish expert gave explanations about the structure of the SAF and emphasized the merits of industry-based organization. Following the advice of the Swedish expert and also relying on the results of their own investigation, the Turkish employers adopted the principle of industry-based organization. [Kocatopcu,1963:281] As will be recalled, during the same time, Turk-Is had accepted industrial unionism and launched its reorganization campaign. The existing employers' associations began to emphasize the necessity for a centralized employers' confederation. In line with the adoption of the principle of industrial organization, the employers' associations affiliated to the Union of Istanbul Employers' Associations transformed themselves legally into national level organizations from regional level by changing their statutes in their general conventions held in December 1962. And at its second convention on December 20, 1962, the Union

of Istanbul Employers' Associations, which had now become an organization whose affiliates were nation-wide employers' associations, was transformed into a national confederation, and its title was changed to the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Associations (TISK). [Kocatopcu,1963:281; Esin,1974:17].

The adoption of the labour legislation provided further impetus for the formation of employers' associations. The immediate impact of the new legislation on the employers was to bring them together. In various parts of the country the employers began to join or organize national industry-based associations. As a result, new employers' associations participated in TISK from all over the country. [see Esin,1974:183-4]. To facilitate nation-wide organization of the employers, TISK divided the country into seven regions and established representative bureaus in these regions. [Esin,1974:184].

According to its statutes, TISK accepts as affiliates only those employers' associations that are organized on industry-basis and at the national level. Only one employers' association from each industry can become a member of TISK. But TISK can decide to accept the membership of two or more associations from the same industry if they agree to unite into one organization after they join the Confederation. [Zeytinoglu & Shabon, 1985:207-8]. Thus TISK had a centralized structure at birth. Public-sector employers can also affiliate with TISK as well as private-sector employers. As a result of this policy, as Bianchi (1984:264) points out, TISK was very successful in establishing a centralized nation-wide organizational structure that brought the employers together. The figures for the number and membership of employers' associations are given in Table 2 in Appendix.

Until the 1960s, the Union of Chambers was the sole representative of Turkish capital at the national level. By the early 1960s, capital had two representative central

organizations, TISK and the Union of Chambers. TISK was established by the backing of the Union of Chambers, and the founders of TISK were at the same time influential members of the Union. Most members of TISK were members of the Union as well. From the very beginning close contacts were established between the two organizations, and continued into the subsequent periods. In the following years of the establishment of TISK, these two organizations acted together in most cases. [see Esin,1974:180-96]. The Union of Chambers is a corporate law body with compulsory membership, while TISK is based on voluntary membership. The Chambers can not enter into collective agreements; it is only employers' associations that are authorized to conclude collective agreements in the name of their members. After the establishment of TISK, the Union of Chambers was not involved in workers-employers relations. In accordance with the division of labour between them, industrial relations fell within the domain of TISK. As will be explained later, TISK has been entitled to sit in various tripartite commissions to represent employers as being the biggest employers' confederation. In short, with their centralized and non-competitive character, the employers' organizations also met the structural pre-conditions for liberal corporatism.

D) Corporatist Cooperation Between the Central Organizations of Capital and Labour and the State

The First Five Year Development Plan was adopted in 1963 and implemented during 1963-1967. The plan gave special importance to labour-employer relations in line with the requirements of the new planned development strategy. It emphasized the importance of "harmonious relations" and "close cooperation" in economic development between

labour and capital. It also stressed the significance of the realization of social justice and "equilibrium" among the social classes if close cooperation between labour and capital was to be achieved. It stated that:

In order to establish an equilibrium among the social classes, it is necessary that the workers who have an important role to play in the realization and continuation of development should enjoy the same economic and social rights as other social categories. The rights of the worker must be recognized and he must be conscious of the important part he plays in the economy as a member of the community and not just as an important factor in production. This is indispensable for obtaining the harmonious relations and close cooperation between capital and labour on which planned development depends in a democracy...[cited in Jackson 1971:72]

To summarize briefly the objectives set by the plan, the first and primary goal was the realization of a high and sustained economic growth. It set 7 percent GNP growth per year as the target. Secondly, the solution of the unemployment problem and creation of additional employment were stated as among the main objectives of the plan. Thirdly, taking into account the severe balance of payment difficulties that afflicted Turkey during the late 1950s, the elimination of this problem was made another important objective of the plan. Significantly, the first plan stated that these objectives were to be achieved in accordance with the principle of social justice as also provided in the 1961 Constitution. Reducing inequalities in income distribution, the extension of social services and social security to all sections of the society were accepted by the plan as an important goal. For this purpose, the Plan proposed tax reform so as to shift the higher proportion of the tax burden onto the shoulders of the higher income groups. [Kepenck,1984:156; Hale,1981:143-9]

From the very beginning Turk-Is supported the idea of planned development.

[Kutal,1977:285-6]. It immediately showed its interest in participation in the making of the development plans. Nevertheless, at first the government consulted only the employers' representatives during the preparation of the plan. Turk-Is protested this situation, and demanded participation in the preparation process of the plan. It criticized the government for ignoring workers who would bear the main burden in the realization of the plans and stated that "the right to say the first word on the plans belongs to the workers. The government should feel obligated to ask the opinions of the labour unions which are the real representatives of the Turkish workers, and give primary notice to their opinions in the preparation of the plans." [G. Kutal,1977:286]. Faced with the strong reaction of Turk-Is, the government invited the representatives of Turk-Is to the State Planning Organization to participate in the preparation of the plan. [G. Kutal 1977:286; Dilik et al.,1965:69]. The First Five-Year Development Plan, with its emphasis on economic development within the framework of social justice and creation of additional employment, was welcomed by Turk-Is. It stated that "the Turkish workers will support the planning activities of the government and see to it that the plan reaches its objectives". [cited in Tuna,1964:416-7]. The government indeed immediately sought the cooperation of organized labour in the implementation of the plans. For this purpose periodic summit meetings began to be held between the government and Turk-Is leaders. The first meeting was held in August 1962. The initiative actually came from Turk-Is rather than the government, but the latter also welcomed this offer from Turk-Is. [Tuna,1963:270, 1964:416]. Henceforth, periodic summit meetings between the cabinet ministers and the leaders of Turk-Is became common. [Tuna,1974:264; Ecevit,1973:161]. Bulent Ecevit, the Minister of Labour at that time, noted that in those meetings, in addition to the

questions of direct interest to labour, general economic, social and political policies were discussed. [Ecevit,1973:161]. Beginning in 1962, similar summit meetings were also arranged between the government and the representatives of capital organizations (TISK and the Union of Chambers) about major economic issues. [Saybasili,1976b:87-8] Although the government generally preferred to hold such summit meetings with Turk-Is and the employers' representatives separately, sometimes they were held together, thus assuming a tripartite character. [G. Kutal,1977:280]

As pointed out, the government sought the cooperation of organized labour, which was vitally significant for the successful implementation of the plans. First of all, the realization of the plans was dependent on the preservation of social peace. The prevention of work stoppages or strike action, which endanger the production process, seemed necessary if the plan targets which were binding for the public sector and indicative for the private sector were to be achieved. The prevention of large scale wage increases was also important. Wage increases higher than the rise in productivity would very likely cause inflation. Inflation, in turn, might divert the resources from industrial investment to non-productive areas or easy money-making fields, thus endangering the achievement of rapid and sustained economic development as provided by the Development Plans. Therefore, without resorting to authoritarian measures characteristic of the previous decades, it was essential to secure moderation of wage claims from organized labour, and to see to it that wage increases would not exceed the gains in productivity. The wage policy formulated by the plans emphasized that "the increase in the wage level would be in proportion to the increase in productivity so that wages would not impede economic progress and upset economic stability". [Saver,1975:3]. It was

realized that the labour unions now armed with the strike weapon were in a position to press the employers to increase wages. Yet the cooperation of Turk-Is, the only labour confederation at the time with a membership of 72 percent of all unionized workers, could play a significant role in controlling strike action and moderating wage claims. During the same time, Turk-Is had achieved a considerable centralized control over its affiliates as a result of its reorganization campaign. Turk-Is, with its centralized authority, could prevent locally called strike actions and secure moderation of wage demands.

Turk-Is had showed its interest in cooperating with the government in the implementation of the plans if it was given the opportunity to participate in the policy-making process, particularly in the formulation of the development plans. It was with such a view that the summit meetings between Turk-Is leaders and the government were initiated. As noted, Turk-Is leaders were also consulted by the government during the preparation of the first development plan. In those summit meetings held between the government and the peak associations of labour and capital, generally separately but sometimes together, the government tried to reach a series of agreements about their likely behaviour in accordance with the requirements of the plans, and induced them to take responsibilities in their implementation. For this purpose, it promoted collaborative relations between the peak associations of capital and labour.

In distinguishing the two main types of corporatism, namely liberal and authoritarian corporatism, authors such as Schmitter emphasize that liberal corporatism emerges within the framework of democratic rights and freedoms and that interest organizations voluntarily enter into corporatist arrangements without coercion from the state, or as Panitch says, state coercion plays, at least, a secondary or sporadic role. In Turkey, the

freedom of association, more specifically union freedom, had now been constitutionally guaranteed. The necessary mechanisms and institutions had been established, which could be applied against any violation by the government of democratic rights and freedoms in order to prevent the emergence of any situation similar to the previous period. Thus with democratic rights and freedoms, particularly the freedom of association guaranteed, state coercion played a secondary role in inducing the labour confederation to cooperate under corporatist arrangements which involved sharing responsibility for the economic policies. Turk-Is agreed voluntarily to cooperate in the implementation of the development plans rather than being coerced. For the realization of the plan targets, it undertook to control strike activity of its affiliates and secure moderation of wage demands. In exchange for its cooperation it was promised an institutionalized participation in the making of the plans and representation in some other governmental bodies. Such arrangements between the peak organizations of labour and capital and the state during the period under investigation came to represent a case which is much closer to the liberal type of corporatism than to the authoritarian. Thus there occurred a significant shift from the authoritarian corporatism of the DP period towards some kind of liberal corporatist arrangement.

As explained in the first chapter on corporatist theory, students of corporatism agree that the emergence of liberal corporatism is linked to the problems associated with the advanced or monopoly stage of capitalism. In other words, they argue that it is the concomitant of advanced capitalism, though they use different perspectives and differ in their specific explanations. It is true that liberal corporatism developed in the advanced capitalist democratic societies of Europe. Yet the absence of the advanced capitalist

development in Turkey or its relative economic backwardness did not prevent its politicians and the leaders of capital and labour organizations from fashioning some sort of liberal corporatism. It was advocated as a mechanism for reconciling rapid economic development with democracy. Turk-Is and the employers' confederation undertook to cooperate with each other and the state authorities in the implementation of the five year development plans and yearly programmes. The crucial aspect of this cooperation was to prevent work stoppages and keep wage increases in proportion to productivity gains.

Upon the enactment of the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act in 1963, the labour unions began to press the employers to negotiate collective agreements. Within the first seven months after the passage of this legislation, 824 collective agreements covering 391,838 workers were signed. [Ecevit,1973:158]. As seen in Table 3 (in Appendix), through collective agreements workers secured 8.88 percent increase in money wages, given the rate of inflation, this amounted to a 6.03 percent increase in real wages for 1964. Not accustomed to the collective bargaining system, the employers were alarmed by the wage increases. TISK immediately began to demand the establishment of a tripartite wages commission composed of labour and employers' representatives and the government authorities which would control wage increases. During the same time, at the third General Assembly of TISK held in June 1964, the Minister of Labour emphasized the need for the formation of such a tripartite body. [Esin,1974:226]. Consequently, in February 1965, the government proposed to establish a permanent tripartite committee for the purpose of controlling wages, which was similar to those in the liberal corporatist countries of Europe. Ecevit, the Labour Minister at that time, says:

Encouraged with the positive results stemming from cooperation

and consultation with labour, the government proposed in February 1965 to set up a permanent committee composed of government, labour and employers' representatives. The aim of the committee was to harmonize collective agreements with actual economic conditions prevailing in the country and with the social and economic principles of the development plan. [Ecevit,1973:161]

Nevertheless, the committee failed to be formally established. This was partly due to the crisis in the coalition government. The third coalition government which had been formed under the premiership of the RPP leader, Inonu, resigned upon the defeat of the budget of 1965-66 in Parliament.

The fourth coalition government was formed on 26 February, 1965 by the participation of four right-wing parties, this time with the RPP in opposition. The coalition was dominated by the Justice Party. In the general elections of October 1965, the Justice Party won an overwhelming victory under its newly elected leader, Suleyman Demirel. The Justice Party, which again succeeded in winning an overall majority of the seats in Parliament in the 1969 elections, ruled the country until March 1971. In the meantime an important development took place in regard to the RPP. The RPP had failed to win an overall majority in any of the five elections held since 1950. This failure made it clear that the party urgently needed to reform its policies. Shortly before the 1965 elections, Inonu, the leader of the RPP, announced the party's commitment to what is known as a "left of center" policy which was based on the basic principles of social democracy. Ecevit, the newly rising star of the party, played an active role in the adoption of the new left of center policy, and later became secretary general in 1966. The RPP fought the election campaign of 1965 with its new social democratic platform. [see Ahmad,1977:232-61].

As emphasized by neocorporatist writers, liberal corporatism is most developed where a social democratic party has been in office or the dominant partner in the government. Union movements will be more prepared to enter into corporatist arrangements where they have ideological as well as organizational ties with the ruling party. In almost all the corporatist cases of Europe, there exist close ties between the labour unions and the social democratic parties. In Turkey, however, when the liberal corporatist arrangements were initiated there was no social democratic party worth mentioning. It was only in 1965 that the RPP announced its commitment to the left of center or democratic left policy. Yet it was not until the early 1970s that the supporters of this policy managed to take full control of the party. Besides, unlike most other liberal corporatist cases, the main labour confederation in Turkey, Turk-Is, adopted an above-party policy according to which it was to maintain its independence vis-a-vis political parties. It refused to cooperate with the only labour party at the time, the Turkish Workers' Party. The above-party policy, however, allowed Turk-Is to cooperate within a corporatist framework even after the conservative JP assumed office in 1965.

An important public body that brought together labour and capital representatives and government authorities was the so-called Labour Council. The Labour Council was an advisory body which convened according to the Act on Establishment and Functions of the Ministry of Labour that was passed in 1946. The Labour Council was called by the government only just a few times in the pre-coup period. The Labour Council convened under the leadership of the Ministry of Labour on the date determined by the Ministry. Each Ministry was authorized to send a representative with full authority. According to the Establishment Act, the Chambers were entitled to send the employers' representatives

to the Labour Council. But since 1965, TISK, as the biggest employers' confederation, has represented employers in the Labour Council. Labour has been represented by Turk-Is, which under the law has been entitled to send workers' representatives to the Council as the labour confederation with the biggest membership. The Labour Council was formed to investigate and discuss the questions in the field of industrial relations that were to be determined by the Ministry, and give its advisory opinion to the government.

The first Labour Council had been held in 1947 and the second convened during the early years of the DP rule. But after that, the DP government did not call the meeting of the Council. The Labour Council gained important dynamism after 1960. The third and fourth Labour Councils were held in late 1962. It should be noted that because at that time TISK had not been organized yet, employers were represented by the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The fundamentals of the new labour legislation were laid down in those tripartite meetings. The fifth Labour Council was convened in January 1965.

The experience with the 1963 labour legislation had turned attention to some of its faults on different matters from the perspectives of workers and employers. Turk-Is and TISK had begun to demand some amendments to certain parts of it. At the fifth Labour Council which brought together the representatives of Turk-Is and TISK and the government authorities, proposed legislative changes were discussed. Nevertheless, in the commission where the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act was discussed, the employers' representatives exerted continued pressure to extend the numbers and scope of industries where strike was forbidden, and compulsory arbitration was the rule. The delegate of the Ministry of Transportation also joined the employers by

demanding prohibition of strikes in the transportation services by State Railways and the Marine Bank in the province of Istanbul. Turk-Is representatives in this commission showed strong reactions against such demands and left the meeting. Turk-Is had wanted to restrict the amendment proposals to the allegedly practical deficiencies of the Acts. [Esin,1974:188; Dereli,1968:171]. However, in general, such tripartite meetings at the national level fostered the cooperation between the leaders of TISK and Turk-Is and the government in the field of industrial relations. [G.Kutal,1977:262]. They also provided an important platform for reaching decisions on economic matters as well.

During the early years of its formation, TISK followed a conciliatory attitude towards Turk-Is. At every opportunity TISK leaders offered Turk-Is cooperation and emphasized the significance of reaching some principal decisions as the confederations of employers and labour on issues that were of common concern to the employers and workers. Esin (1974:247) says that in the immediate years of its establishment, TISK was not in a position to challenge Turk-Is, which was more experienced and relatively stronger than the former as an organization at the time. With regard to the cooperation between the two organizations an important development took place in 1964. During the peak of the Cyprus crisis in that year, Turk-Is and TISK agreed to suspend all strike and lockout activities for a certain period of time, Turk-Is disregarding all the allegations of the "betrayal of the workers' interests" by the Turkish Workers' Party and some leftist circles. [Sulker, 1976:84; Esin,1974:247; Ecevit,1973:164]. In the same year after this agreement between the two confederations, TISK, "with the encouragement provided by the good relations" between the two confederations, invited Turk-Is leaders to sign a "Principal Agreement" between "the communities" of capital and labour. The proposed Agreement

had already been prepared by TISK, but Turk-Is decided to leave it for a later time after its General Congress that was to be held in 1965. This agreement was never signed, although TISK repeated its proposal for such a central agreement to Turk-Is in the subsequent years. [Esin,1974:247-9].

The Second Development Plan (1968-72) was prepared and implemented during the rule of the conservative JP government. During 1965-1967, Turk-Is, TISK and the Union of Chambers participated in the making of the plan in various commissions of the State Planning Organization. Some meetings were held separately but they were mostly tripartite. [Saybasili,1976b:92; G. Kutal,1977:287; Esin,1974:188]. Nevertheless, there was a shift of emphasis in favour of private capital in the second plan which was adopted and implemented under a conservative government. The representatives of capital had subjected the first plan to detailed criticism on different matters. They had argued that the plan totally ignored their demands. But this time they welcomed the second plan. Not only did they not criticize the plan, they praised it. The Union of Chambers declared that:

The government finally recognized the importance of our view that the private sector should be given priority in the development of the national economy, and decided to create all the conditions for the growth of private sector. [quoted in Saybasili,1976b:93]

Although it had been generally recognized that the plan targets could not be imperative for the private sector, it had not been explicitly stated in the first plan (1963-67). It had also provided that the state must act as the leader of progress in the industrial sphere by establishing enterprises in new branches of production. In his introduction to the Second Development Plan, Prime Minister Demirel specifically stated that the plan would be imperative for the public sector and indicative for the private sector. The second plan envisaged numerous incentives for the private capital in order to

encourage its growth. The Plan document provided that the policies to be adopted in the Second Plan would enable the private sector to take over the development of manufacturing industry in the long-run. [Hale,1981:142-3; Saybasili,1976b:93].

This time, it was Turk-Is that criticized the plan on different matters. It expressed the view that the plan should be more binding in order for either the private sector or the public sector to carry out the duties that they were assigned by the plan. [G. Kutal 1977:244]. Turk-Is leaders claimed that since the plan was not binding for the private sector, it did not make its investment decisions with a view to achieving the goals set by the plan. The scarce resources, therefore, were wasted. Private capital tended to invest in areas which would bring huge profits in a short time, but without creating any additional employment. Turk-Is suggested that the plan should be more binding for the private sector in order to realize economic development within the framework of social justice. The private sector should be compelled to invest according to the objectives of the plan through the denial of credits and other facilities to those investments which were not in conformity with the plan. Turk-Is also insisted on the employment aspect of the plan and criticized it for not taking employment as an independent objective itself. In both the first and second plans employment was stated among the main goals. But even the first plan had viewed employment as a linear function of the economic growth, though this approach had been taken in a disguised way. However, the Second Plan explicitly adopted this approach to the question of employment. [Kepenek,1984:372; Hale,1981:149]. Turk-Is demanded that employment should be the main objective of the plans, and claimed that the main aim of the second plan was to protect the private sector by transferring resources from the people who were already under an excessive tax burden, and enrich a certain

segment of the society at the expense of the masses. It denounced the second plan as lacking in social justice. [see G. Kutal, 1977:244-8]. Despite such criticisms by Turk-Is from time to time, throughout the 1960s it agreed to take responsibility in the implementation of the planned development strategy.

In the liberal corporatist cases of Europe, the state committed itself to the maintenance of full employment. In fact, full employment constituted the *raison d'être* of the corporatist arrangements. In the Turkish case, however, employment was never considered by the government as an independent or primary goal. Though the development plans incorporated employment as one of the main objectives, they dealt with it as a variable dependent on economic growth. Indeed in a developing country like Turkey the achievement of near-full employment may be only utopia.

Turk-Is agreed on the principle stated in both the first and the second development plans that wage increases should be linked to increases in productivity. The Administrative and Financial Reports that were submitted to the fifth General Congress of Turk-Is in 1964 conceded that the labour unions should keep their wage demands commensurate with the general productivity increases in industries. [in Dereli,1968:169]. Ecevit says that:

The Confederation subscribed to the principle stated in the first Five Year Development Plan that wage increases except in the case of minimum wages, should depend on increases in productivity... Where certain unions either within or outside Turk-Is insisted on *unreasonable* wage increases...Turk-Is intervened promptly and effectively. [Ecevit,1973:158-9] (14)

To show "the sense of responsibility" displayed by Turk-Is, Ecevit quotes the following

passage from a Turk-Is publication.

Turk-Is is convinced that the time of heroic unionism is over. Unionism has now become a science. The new order of [industrial democracy] established in Turkey charges as much responsibility as gives new rights to Turkish workers and union leaders. The Turkish trade union movement, while committed to protect these rights, will never forget its responsibilities. Only such a mentality would assure that the rights now being obtained are long-lasting and worthy. Turk-Is will handle with utmost care the right to strike and free unionism [both of] which are considered among the basic rights and freedoms and will resist every attempt to degenerate them...It is the basic principle of all our activities that every project to be launched and every step to be taken should be in the interests of the Turkish nation as well as of the Turkish workers. [from Turkish publication No.23, 1964, p.8 ,quoted in Ecevit,1973:159-60].

Collaborating with the government and employers in the implementation of the plans, Turk-Is exercised strict control over its affiliates to secure moderation of their wage demands. A statement made by the then president of Turk-Is at the fifth General Congress illustrates the point:

My friend, the General Secretary of Turk-Is, participates in the collective bargaining negotiations of our affiliates as though he is one of their officers. [Olaylar (Events), Turk-Is vol.1 no.12, Feb. 1964,p.7, quoted in Dereli,1968:170].

If we look at the wages given in Table 3 (in Appendix) it will be seen that between 1963 and 1970 real wages continued to increase each year except 1970. Nevertheless, increases in the level of real wages remained very limited. The highest increase which was obtained in 1969 was only 7.74 percent and in the following year, real wages recorded 1.61 percent decrease. Despite the emphasis by the first plan on the achievement

(14) Italics are mine.

of a greater degree of social justice, according to some studies, at the end of its implementation the degree of inequality in income distribution had actually increased. It should be noted that there is formidable difficulty in finding enough and reliable data to evaluate the changes in income distribution. The results of the studies conducted by the State Planning Organization in 1963 and the University of Hacettepe in 1968 are given below.

Table E Income Distribution

| Household Percentage Shares of Total | 1963 | 1968 |
|---|------|------|
| Lowest 20 % | 4.5 | 3.0 |
| 2nd 20 % | 8.5 | 7.0 |
| 3rd 20 % | 11.5 | 10.0 |
| 4th 20 % | 18.5 | 20.0 |
| Highest 20 % | 57.0 | 60.0 |
| Gini coefficient | 0.55 | 0.56 |

Source: Gevgilili, 1974:83 and Kepenek, 1984:426

The first thing that strikes one's attention is the highly inequitable distribution of income as is true for many developing countries. These figures show that the share of national income by the poorest 20 percent of households decreased from 4.5 percent in 1963 to 3.0 percent in 1968 while the share of the richest 20 percent of households increased from 57 percent to 60 percent in the same period. Gini coefficient of income inequality increased from 0.55 in 1963 to 0.56 in 1968.

In the period of 1963 and 1969, a high and continuous growth was realized. GNP

grew by an average of 6.4 percent per year, coming very close to 7 percent target of the first and second plans. [Hale,1981:132]. During the first plan (1963-67), the growth of industry was realized at an average of 10.9 percent per year. [Kepenek,1984:268]. Capital accumulation accelerated during the planned period. Acceleration of capital accumulation went hand in hand with the growth of surplus value extracted from the working class. While the ratio of surplus value (surplus value / wages) showed a 21.3 percent increase during 1950-59, it recorded a 43.3 percent increase during 1963-68 period. The ratio of surplus value to total wages was 2.63 in 1963 and increased to 3.77 in 1968.(15)

In practice this meant that while a worker had to work 2.53 hours for himself and 5.07 hours for the employer a workday of 8 hours in 1950, in 1968 he came to work 1.41 hours for himself and 6.19 hours for his employers. [Gevgilili,1974:71]. During the 1960s a significant degree of capital concentration in industry took place. In 1963, 278 establishments with more than 200 workers accounted for 64.2 percent of total industrial production. In 1967, those large enterprises whose number had reached to 387 were responsible for 71.5 percent of total industrial production. [Gevgilili, 1974:77]

The inclusion of employment into the plan as an important goal had also induced Turk-Is to cooperate in its implementation with the government and employers. However, in contrast to the proposals of the plan, unemployment increased from 11 percent in 1962 to 12.1 percent in 1967. [Kepenek,1984:374] This was partly due to the fact that despite

(15)
 (surplus value) 4,001,893 thousand 14,219,800 thousand
 (1963) ----- = 2.63 ----- = 3.77 (1968)
 (total wages) 1,519,229 thousand 3,771,751 thousand
 source: Gevgilili, 1974:71

the low level of wages, employers tended to invest in capital intensive rather than in labour intensive production. [Hale,1981:215].(16)

Cooperating with the government and employers within a corporatist framework, Turk-Is showed considerable restraint in strike action. There are differences between strike statistics provided by different institutions. We will use the data provided by the State Institute of Statistics, which are assumed to be more reliable. The strike statistics of the Ministry of Labour are also given separately in Table 4a in Appendix. However, as Koc (1981:304) points out, the statistics by the Ministry involve various deficiencies. The first thing that strikes one's attention when looking at the strike figures in Table 4 (in Appendix) between 1963 and 1970 is the very low level of strike frequency. According to a study, Turkey was among the countries with the lowest strike rates during this period. In the comparison of the workdays lost as a result of strikes, Turkey tended to record among the lowest. [Turk-Is Dergisi, No.78 1968, p.20]. The main reason for the low level of strike action was the centralization of authority in the hand of Turk-Is. Jackson (1971:76) says:

Strikes tend to be infrequent because of the central control exercised over stoppages: the individual workplace union or branch has to have the permission of the national union, which controls the strike funds, and the national union in turn has (informally) to have the backing of Turk-Is before it may proceed to sanction a strike.

Turk-Is generally tended not to give its permission for strikes. It exercised strict control

(16) As in most other cases, there are differences between figures on unemployment in various sources. For example, Hale (1981:215) gives unemployment figure for 1962 as 10.5 percent and 10.6 percent for 1973. According to the data used by Hale there was no increase in unemployment during the 1960s and early 70s, but neither was there a decrease.

over its affiliates to avert any strike decision in collaboration with the government and employers. At this point, it is important to note that during this period , thanks to the check-off system and the solidarity contribution introduced by the 1963 legislation, the financial strength of the labour unions increased considerably. Therefore, the availability of strike funds was not a problem or an impediment to calling for a strike. As Jackson notes, strike pay was nearly always available. He says that "this controlled and well-financed system was very different from the usual situation in an underdeveloped country". [Jackson,1971:76]. To give an idea of the reasons for the strikes in this period, according to the results of a study which analyzed the strikes called during 1963-67, 24.72 percent of the strikes were called as a result of wage disputes, constituting the highest percentage among other given reasons. [Tuna, 1969:106]

There were cases in which Turk-Is openly condemned a strike decision of the workers and directly intervened, siding entirely with the government or the employers. On March 9, 1965, workers in the Kozlu coal mine, near Zonguldak, staged a protest movement against a new method of remuneration. Shortly after this, more than five thousand workers went on an allegedly illegal strike. The conservative JP government resorted to severe measures against the strikers, claiming that the strike was initiated as a result of communist provocation. An armed clash occurred between the strikers and the security forces, with the result being that two workers were shot dead. Instead of protesting this event, Turk-Is joined the government and the employers in condemning the strike as an illegal act led by communist forces. This caused reaction among the workers against Turk-Is and the government, and antagonized more radical unionists against the Confederation. [Sulker,1976:85-6; Hale,1976:64; Dereli,1968:216]. Another similar

event took place in 1966 when the workers at the Pasabahce glass factory in Istanbul went on strike. An industry-wide agreement covering the mentioned workplace was in force when a local union (Kristal-Is) representing the majority of the workers at this workplace demanded that the employer negotiate itself on the grounds that the industry-wide agreement with a two-year duration did not bring any benefits to the Pasabahce workers. The employer refused to negotiate, and upon this the union called a strike on January 31, 1966. The government and TISK argued that the strike was illegal. At first, Turk-Is seemed to support the strike. When the strike appeared to drag on, Turk-Is preferred to sign a protocol with TISK to end the strike despite the protests of the workers. In accordance with the agreement signed with TISK Turk-Is declared that it withdrew its support from the striking union for the reason that there was already an industry-wide agreement and that such a strike within the duration of a collective agreement would threaten industrial peace. [Sulker, 1976:86-7]. Despite the decision of Turk-Is, several of its affiliates together with some independent unions decided to support both financially and morally the 2400 striking workers. Of these unions, the Petroleum Workers' Union, the Press Workers' Union, the Metal Workers' Union and the Bureau Workers' Union formed a committee on April 6 to support the strike [Sulker, 1976:87-88; Dereli, 1968:187-8]. During the same time Court of Cassation ruled that the strike was legal, thus overriding the claims of the Confederations of labour and employers and the government. However, this time the government took a decision on April 19 to postpone the strike for a month, and the dispute was submitted to the High Conciliation Council. Upon the acceptance by the union of the decision of the Council, the dispute was ended in favour of the Pasabahce workers with the union authorized to negotiate. Nevertheless,

four of the affiliated unions which had supported the strike against the decision of Turk-Is were suspended from the Confederation for varying degrees for having strayed away from its policy. These unions were the Petroleum Workers' Union, the Metal Workers' Union, the Rubber Workers' Union and the Press Workers' Union. [Sulker,1976:89-1]. All these events antagonized the workers and gave rise to a splinter group of more radical leaders within Turk-Is, eventually leading to the formation of the Confederation of the Revolutionary Labour Unions in February 1967, which was soon to become an important force in the Turkish labour movement and political life.

During 1963-1967, the government used its authority to postpone a total of 28 strikes for one month, and of these strikes, 18 were postponed for another two months on the allegation that they were liable to threaten national security or health.

Table F Postponed Strikes

| Year | 30 days | 60 more days |
|------|---------|--------------|
| 1963 | - | - |
| 1964 | 5 | 2 |
| 1965 | 4 | 2 |
| 1966 | 5 | 3 |
| 1967 | 2 | 1 |
| 1968 | - | - |
| 1969 | 5 | 3 |
| 1969 | 5 | 3 |
| 1970 | 7 | 1 |

Source: Tayanc,1980:70

During the period several new Acts were passed in Parliament providing social

benefits to labour. In 1964, a new Social Insurance Act (Law No:506) was passed for the purpose of improving the existing workers' insurance scheme established in 1946. A Social Security Institution was set up in 1965 as the successor to the earlier Workers' Insurance Institution. More importantly, a new Labour Code (No:931) was enacted, which replaced the 1936 Labour Code. During its preparation, employers showed a strong opposition to the draft labour code, alleging that it would impose excessive burdens on employers, and demanded that it be changed. The final bill was shaped by Parliament under strong pressure from the employers. [Esin,1974:189-192]. Unlike the 1936 Labour Code, the new Labour Code applied to white-collar workers as well as blue-collar workers, and its scope was extended to cover all enterprises regardless of their size. Yet there were some exclusions particularly in the case of agricultural workers and household servants. The 1967 Labour Code abolished the local minimum wage commissions and provided for the determination of minimum wages by a central minimum wage commission at least every two years. According to the Labour Code, the Minimum Wage Commission was to be composed of five labour representatives, five employers' representatives and five government representatives. The workers' representatives were to be selected by the biggest labour confederation, similarly the employers' representatives by the biggest employers' confederation. Thus, on the side of labour, Turk-Is, and, on the side of employers, TISK, were entitled to sit on the Minimum Wages Commission. We should note that the 1967 Labour Code was repealed by the Constitutional Court in terms of procedure on May 14, 1970, and the verdict of the Court went into effect on November 12, 1970. However, without important amendments, the 1967 Labour Code went into force in 1971 as the new Labour Code with Law No 1475. [see Celik, 1988]. Parallel to

the 1967 Labour Code, the Acts on white-collar press workers and maritime labourers were amended in many respects and put into effect as Acts No 212 and 854 respectively. The new Acts brought important benefits to those who fell under their coverage. [Celik,1988:14].

An important development for the workers and labour unions in this period that is worth mentioning was the adoption of a limited type of codetermination modelled after the German Model. Act 440 passed in 1964 provided for the participation of workers in the management of certain public enterprises and corporations. In 1966 a government decree organized and put into effect this codetermination system. According to the government decree, "a workers' representative who is to participate in the board of directors of state enterprises and certain government corporations which employ considerable number of workers is to be nominated among the workers themselves and elected to the board of directors by the administrative committee of the labour union concerned". However, by Act 440 the government was empowered to determine which state enterprises and government corporations qualified as employing "a considerable number of workers". The government decided that codetermination was to be applied only to those state enterprises and corporations which employed ten thousand or more workers. Consequently, workers' representatives selected according to the Act began to participate in management of the determined enterprises and corporations. Although this was a progressive step at the time, its scope remained very limited. [see Dereli,1968:219-20; Talas,1983:444-6].

These benefits provided to labour in the field of social policy and industrial legislation were in accordance with the development plans. They can be considered as compensation

for the compromises made by organized labour under corporatist arrangements. Nevertheless, Turk-Is's cooperation with the government and TISK in restricting wage increases and preventing strikes led to unrest among the rank and file and split at the leadership level. Cooperating with the government and employers, Turk-Is sometimes totally ignored workers' demands. Just after the Pasabahce Strike, four of the unions that had supported the strike despite the decision of Turk-Is had signed an Inter-Union Solidarity Agreement in July 1966. This was not a confederation but formed the nucleus of the Confederation of the Revolutionary Labour Unions (DISK). DISK was formed on February 13, 1967 by the four unions mentioned above and another Turk-Is affiliate. These unions were namely the Metal Workers' Union, the Rubber Workers' Union, the Press Workers' Union, the Food Workers' Union and the Turk-Is Metal Workers' Union. Two other attempts had been made earlier by some unionists to break away from Turk-Is and found their own confederations. As a result, the Confederation of Free Labour Unions and Council of Solidarity had been established. [see G. Kutal, 1977:67-9]. These organizations, however, failed to achieve any success and soon disappeared. Dereli (1974:305-6, 1968:196) says that "the real reason for the break away of these union leaders from Turk-Is to form their own organization seemed to be rivalries for leadership rather than disagreements on the goals and strategies to be followed by the Turkish union movement, therefore, they failed to gain any significance".

Unlike the former secessions from Turk-Is, the main reason for the establishment of DISK was significant disagreements over the goals and means of the union movement rather than rivalries for leadership. In its first public statement, DISK declared that "the reason for its establishment is to see to it that the principles of the 1961 Constitution were

enforced...for the total interest of the Turkish working class, for the total rights and freedoms and the dignity of the workers". It also stated that "we have taken oath to struggle against imperialism that desires to destroy us and capitalism that desires to swallow us". [quoted in Zeytinoglu & Shabon,1985:198].(17) While DISK founders declared their loyalty to the democratic framework laid down by the 1961 Constitution, they explained the purpose of their movement as to fight against imperialism and capitalism. DISK advocated political unionism for advancing the interests of the working class. It considered political unionism not as a limited means to establish a welfare state, but as an indispensable weapon for class struggle on the way to socialism.

In contrast to DISK, Turk-Is recognized the existing socio-economic system as its starting point as made explicit in Article 3 of the Turk-Is Statute entitled "Purposes". It provided that "Turk-Is considers it to be its basic purpose, while adhering to the conception of national, democratic, secular, social rule of law, based on human rights, Ataturk's principles and the 1961 Constitution, to fight against communism, fascism, conservatism, poverty, illiteracy and misery, and to strive for the protection of the contemporary level of civilization". [quoted in Mumcuoglu,1980:387] Turk-Is advocated the idea of peace and harmony among social classes as stated in Article 5 of the so-called *Twenty-Four Principles Document*, twenty three principles of which were approved by the Seventh Turk-Is General Congress held in 1968 and the remaining one by the Eighth Congress convened in 1970. Article 5 declared that "Turk-Is opposes the deepening of social class inequalities as well as class struggles. It favours the pursuance of policies

(17) For the DISK Establishment Declaration, see Isikli,1972:377-85.

designed to achieve balance, peace and harmony among social classes". [for the Document see Isikli,1972:367-70]

DISK, on the other hand, expressed its opposition to the existing socio-economic order and adopted class struggle against capitalism and imperialism. [for DISK's policies see Sulker,1976; Mumcuoglu,1980; G.Kutal,1977]. In that regard, there was a close resemblance between the ideas of DISK and the socialist program of the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP). Indeed some unionists who founded DISK were the same persons who had played an active role in the establishment of the TWP. Of them, Kemal Turkler became president of DISK. Turkler, while denying that DISK had been established directly by the TWP, admitted that "DISK may have the same general outlook, the same political ideas, as the Turkish Workers' Party". [cited in Hale,1976:64]. DISK established close informal links with the Workers' Party from the very beginning of its formation. At the first general elections (1969) following its establishment, DISK actively supported the TWP, and most DISK executives ran for the Parliament on the TWP list. [Mumcuoglu,1980:396].

DISK, in cooperation with the TWP, immediately launched a propaganda campaign against Turk-Is. DISK accused Turk-Is of collaborating with any political party that came to power and employers while ignoring the interests of the workers.

There have even been times when the leaders of Turk-Is have sided entirely with the government and/or supported the employers, thus leaving workers alone in their struggle. These so-called leaders have accused even the most innocent forms of strike activity (as in the case of Zonguldak mineworkers' riots, the strikes of Social Insurance employees and Singer workers) of being communist infiltrated. [Report on Activities of DISK, 2nd General Convention, February 24-25, 1968, cited in Dereli 1968:221]

DISK also denounced "the above-party policy" of Turk-Is, and claimed that "the above-party policy" in fact served as a mask for collaborating with any political party in power in attempting to suppress class struggle. Turk-Is had become rather susceptible to such accusations especially from the leftist circles, particularly after the conservative Justice Party took office in 1965. Thus DISK criticized the above-party policy of Turk-Is, and instead proposed the principle of political unionism.(18) DISK maintained that economic struggle alone is not an adequate means to advance working class interests. In a DISK publication it was stated that:

Notwithstanding the truth that labour movements and politics are intermingled all over the world, the Turk-Is executives, by launching the highly imaginary slogan of above party policy, have beguiled the Turkish labour. Being fully aware of this situation, the DISK community has defended the view that the unionists of the backward Turkey, by invoking the principles of our advanced Constitution, should assume responsibilities in their own party, and struggle for its coming to power. [quoted in Mumcuoglu,1980:396-7]

In accordance with this view, DISK established close links with the Turkish Workers' Party and extended its full support in the 1969 elections. However, soon two factions emerged within the ranks of DISK as well as the TWP. One group began to defend the idea of achieving socialism through gradual and democratic processes while the other group supported the use of more revolutionary weapons on the way to socialism. [Dereli,1968:221; Mumcuoglu,1980:396].

(18) Article 3 of the Basic Principles Section of the DISK statute stated that "it is not possible to gain the rights of labour through economic struggle only. To achieve this, by using its democratic rights provided for in the Constitution it should also engage in political battle. This battle by rendering the labour fully conscious of its existence will put an end to the exploitation of men by men". [quoted in Mumcuoglu,1980:395].

In response to the accusations from DISK, Turk-Is also launched a counter-propaganda campaign against DISK. According to Turk-Is, the foundation of DISK represented a setback for the Turkish unionism, which divided the movement. [Hale,1976:64]. In Turk-Is propaganda, it was argued that "DISK was a mere appendage of the Turkish Workers' Party" or "an elitist collection of armchair socialists". [Bianchi,1984:219]. Turk-Is indeed continuously accused DISK of being "a doctrinaire communist organization subversive to the democratic order". [see G. Kutsal,1977:213-20].

By the end of the 1966 the total membership of those unions which split from Turk-Is and founded DISK was 85,349. Thus Turk-Is had lost some of its members. But later some of these members, for various reasons, returned to Turk-Is thus offsetting, to some extent, the decline in its membership. [B.Dereli,1977:62; T. Dereli,1968:205] Very soon DISK started a successful membership campaign. As a result of this membership campaign DISK rapidly succeeded in registering the workers in such advanced private industries as automotive, metal hardware and consumer durable industries. [Mumcuoglu,1980:394]. By 1970 the membership of DISK affiliated unions had reached between 120,000 and 133,000. At that time the number of Turk-Is members was around 1 million. [B.Dereli,1977:62, Hale,1976:66]. Although the membership of DISK was still very small compared to Turk-Is, at some large industrial establishments, DISK affiliates began to challenge and defeat Turk-Is affiliates in authorization contests to be entitled to conclude collective agreements. [Bianchi,1984:219; Hale,1976:64]. Indeed the impact of DISK with its radical and militant attitude far exceeded its membership strength. It presented a real alternative to the corporatist position of Turk-Is.

In the 1967-71 period DISK effectively used all sorts of militant tactics such as boycotts, factory occupations, sit-down strikes and various protest demonstrations. [Bianchi, 1984:219; Mumcuoglu, 1980:396]. The following table gives the findings of a study on the Turkish working class movement. The figures show the total number of all sorts of labour action, legal or illegal, such as legal or illegal strikes, factory occupations, protest marches, mass demonstrations, slow-downs etc. in the period 1960-70.

Table G Labour Actions 1960-1970

| Year | Number of Labour Actions |
|------|--------------------------|
| 1960 | - |
| 1961 | 4 |
| 1962 | 15 |
| 1963 | 25 |
| 1964 | 92 |
| 1965 | 57 |
| 1966 | 74 |
| 1967 | 129 |
| 1968 | 88 |
| 1969 | 123 |
| 1970 | 150 |

Source: Koc,1981:301

When we look at the table it appears that there was a considerable increase in labour actions between 1967 and 1970. Although these labour actions were mostly induced by DISK, they also had great impact on the members of Turk-Is and some leaders within the ranks of Turk-Is. The workers' militancy also found echoes in public opinion.

Cooperation of organized labour in the implementation of the economic policies in exchange for its inclusion in the decision-making process seemed essential if rapid economic development was to be realized within the framework of democracy. In other words, liberal corporatism was advocated as a mechanism for reconciling rapid economic development with democracy. The supporters of corporatism, nevertheless, failed to recognize its internal contradictions. As Panitch (1981:34-5) pointed out, corporatism is designed to legitimate and mediate state policy. But because the unions' legitimation or mediation of state economic policy takes the form of their promulgation of wage restraint in the national interest and their enforcement of it on their members, these same corporatist structures that are designed to legitimate state policy eventually lead to the delegitimation of the union leadership in the eyes of the rank and file. The outbreak of rank and file militancy in Turkey in the late 1960s and early 1970s can be explained in terms of this main contradiction of corporatism. The cooperation of Turk-Is with the government and employers, at the leadership level, in the implementation of the economic policies which required moderation of wage demands and control over strike activity, led to the delegitimation of Turk-Is leadership in the eyes of the rank and file and discontent among more radical leaders within the ranks of Turk-Is itself.

DISK explained the outbreak of workers' militancy in terms of rallying the awakening working class around its organization by breaking away from "the class reconciling yellow dog unionism" represented by Turk-Is. The conservative JP government and Turk-Is, in return, denounced these actions as communist provocation. [Mumcuoglu,1980:396]. As Bianchi (1984:126) points out, as the rivalry between Turk-Is and DISK intensified, the relations between Turk-Is and the conservative JP government

improved substantially. The right-wing and capital circles exerted great pressure on the government to find a solution to the situation. But the JP government generally avoided using authoritarian repressive measures against the workers' militancy and radical unionists, which were very common before 1960. [Bianchi,1984:115]. As Miller also points out, the government was not indeed in a position to resort to a policy of suppression against organized labour whose power had considerably increased compared to the previous period. As he put it:

The government's reluctance to act is in part a tribute to the actual or potential power of the trade union movement... One other reason for the government's inaction may be that union organization and the growth of organized labour's power have outstripped the capacity of bureaucracy to deal with it. [Miller,1969:33].

Nevertheless, all these events led the government to pass an obviously discriminatory piece of legislation on August 12, 1970, which amended twenty articles of the 1963 Unions Act.

The foundation of this legislation was laid at a series of meetings held between Turk-Is and TISK. The Unions Act and Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act of 1963 had been criticized by Turk-Is and TISK on various points, and some attempts had been made to change certain parts of it. Consequently, in 1967 it was decided that the two confederations, Turk-Is and TISK, should jointly prepare a draft bill to be submitted to the Ministry of Labour. Turk-Is and TISK started the first of a series of meetings on the matter in October 1967. At these meetings, which continued for about a year, the two confederations reached some principal decisions. It is important to note that when Turk-Is and TISK started their meetings, DISK had already been established. Among the principles that were agreed on by TISK and Turk-Is with regard to the Unions Act was the

decision which suggested that only those unions and employers' associations which had the majority of the union membership and represented 30 percent of the insured workers in a branch of industry were to be entitled to enter collective agreements, and that only those unions which were authorized to conclude collective agreements in a branch of industry were to be entitled to conclude collective agreements at the workplaces covered by this industry. [see Esin,1974:192] Obviously, if these decisions were to be put into effect, they would very likely have the effect of preventing the emergence of rival unions and dismembering the existing small unions and DISK, thus providing Turk-Is with an exclusive monopoly over the union movement. However, because of the general elections in 1969, this amendment proposal prepared jointly by TISK and Turk-Is failed to be discussed in Parliament. The JP government probably did not want to take a risk on the eve of the elections. Upon the spread of workers' militancy in the last years of the 1960s TISK began to press the government to pass the proposed amendments to the Unions Act, which was held responsible by the employers for the ills of the day. According to TISK, 95 percent of the "illegal actions" were started and administered by DISK affiliates. Turk-Is's views on the suggested amendments were to a surprising extent in conformity with the views of TISK. [see Esin,1974:197-198 and 251-55]. During the same time TISK, while openly condemning DISK for illegal activities, brought onto the agenda the issue of the previously mentioned "Central Agreement" with Turk-Is, and offered Turk-Is cooperation to deal with the existing situation. [Esin,1974:254]. Eventually, the JP government, which won the 1969 elections and was thus guaranteed office for another four years, passed a series of amendments to the 1963 Unions Act in the direction of the demands of TISK and Turk-Is. The amendment proposal that had been drafted by Turk-Is

in cooperation with TISK constituted the main source of this new legislation (Law No:1317) (19) The draft bill was submitted to the Parliament by some Turk-Is unionist deputies.(20)

While some of the amendments made by Act 1317 to the Unions Act were not significant, a few of them were quite controversial. Article 9 of Act 1317 stated that:

a) For a labour union to be competent at the industry level, it should represent at least one-third of the all workers covered by the Social Insurance Scheme in the industry.

Similarly b) A labour federation was to be formed by at least two existing unions in the industry, and should represent at least one-third of the insured workers in the industry.

c) A labour confederation was to be formed by the affiliation of at least one-third of the existing unions and federations established in accordance with the above provisions, and should represent at least one-third of all unionized workers in Turkey.

Accompanying these provisions, a proposed amendment to the Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Act of 1963 stipulated that "only a federation or national industrial union which represent workers in a particular industry was entitled to conclude collective agreements". This meant that when there existed such a union in a particular industry, local unions in the industry would lose their authority to enter into collective agreements at the plant level even though they represented the majority of the workers at the workplace. In other words, the federation or national union could conclude collective agreements in the name of all workers in the industry even though a particular establishment did not have any affiliate of the bargaining federation or national union, or

(19) For the main provisions of the draft bill prepared by Turk-Is, see Okay,1974:240.

(20) For the Parliamentary proceeding on the draft bills, see Isikli,1972:319-33.

a local union that was not affiliate of the bargaining union represented the majority of the workers in that particular establishment. In this way, those national industrial unions which failed to meet the one-third requirement imposed by Act 1317, thus lost their national industrial union status, and fell to the local level would not be entitled to enter into collective agreements even at the workplace level. [B.Dereli,1977:57; Bianchi,1984:127]

The stated objective of these provisions was to encourage the formation of bigger and stronger unions. Obviously, such provisions, once put into effect, would force the existing small unions to unite or join those existing unions which had already organized one-third of the workers in the same industry otherwise they would be wiped out. In that respect, imposing such a restrictive numerical requirement, the amendment would allegedly induce the formation of bigger and stronger unions. This provision directly infringed on union freedom by granting monopoly of representation to the existing large unions which were mostly Turk-Is affiliates. These amendments would render the labour unions outside Turk-Is completely powerless. The amendment concerning labour confederations would deprive DISK of its confederation status. It was argued by some intellectuals as well as by DISK and the TWP that the main purpose of the amendments was to undermine the power of or dismember the socialist DISK and DISK affiliates.(21) [B. Dereli,1977:104-5; Dereli,1974:311] The Minister of Labour, Seyfi Ozturk, in explaining the purpose of the proposed amendments, had explicitly stated that "as soon as this Act is

(21) For the criticisms directed by different circles against the Act that amended the Union Act, see Okay, 1974:239-43.

passed, those unions which became an instrument for ideological movements will be wiped out". This statement of the Minister had clearly targeted DISK. [Isikli,1972:324]. Thus it would not be wrong to argue that the amendments specifically aimed to render DISK and its affiliates powerless, as also later confirmed by the spokesman Secretary-General of the Justice Party.(22) As Bianchi (1984:126-27) points out, the conservative JP government, rather than dealing with a socialist Confederation, preferred to pass legislation which aimed to grant Turk-Is an effective monopoly of representation at the national level and weaken its rivals. As noted before, the foundation of this new legislation had been laid jointly by TISK and Turk-Is, and the government also opted for sponsoring it in accordance with its own interests. In other words, the new legislation was a product of the cooperation between Turk-Is, TISK and the government.

During the parliamentary debate, the proposed amendments had been subjected to severe criticism by intellectual circles, university professors, DISK and the TWP and also independent unions for violating union freedom. [see Okay,1974:240-3]. Four days after the legislation was passed in the National Assembly (the Lower House) on June 11, 1970, massive workers' protests and uprisings broke out in the Istanbul-Izmit area, commonly known as the June 15-16 events. On June 16, armed clashes took place between the police and the demonstrators, causing three deaths. Immediately following these events, martial law was declared in Istanbul and Izmit provinces at 9 pm of the same day. On June 17, 22 people, mostly DISK executives, were arrested on the allegation that they had encouraged

(22) See the press for the declaration made by JP spokesman Secretary General, Nizamettin Erkmen, dating April 18,1974.

the disturbances. They were soon released by the Civil Court. Martial Law remained in force for three months. When martial law was declared, a ban had also been imposed on strike activity in these two provinces. The ban on strikes was lifted on August 13. [Isikli,1972:329; Hale,1976:67-8].

Despite the massive reactions, the proposed amendments to the Union Act were passed in the Senate without any changes, and enacted in the National Assembly as law no. 1317 on July 29, 1970. [Isikli,1972:329]. But as a result of such reactions the government was forced to withdraw the proposed amendments to the Collective Agreement, Strikes and Lockouts Act. On August 13, 1970, the Turkish Workers' Party applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of certain provisions of Act 1317 on the grounds that they violated the provisions of the Constitution that guaranteed union freedom. The Constitutional Court issued its verdict in February 1972, which repealed the controversial provisions of Act 1317, ruling them unconstitutional. Among the provisions repealed by the Constitutional Court was the most controversial one that we tried to explain. [For details see Okay,1974:246-55i; Tuncomag,1975:14-6]. The verdict of the Constitutional Court stated that:

Although the wording of the amendment did not specifically forbid the founding of new unions, the one third representation requirement would weaken the freedom to organize unions and multi-union organizations guaranteed by Article 46 of the Constitution, and restrict their role to such an extent that it would make their foundation pointless. [quoted in Okay, 1974:259]

Nevertheless, though the Court's decisions, in principle, become effective on the day of its publication in the Official Gazette, the Court ruled that its decision would be effective a year after its publication in the Official Gazette, that is October 19,1973. Although the

verdict of the Constitutional Court abolishing the controversial provisions of Act 1317 entered into effect about three years after it was enacted, in practice they remained inoperative even during the period when they were under the review of the Court. [B. Dereli,1977:107]. As Hale (1976:68) says "the amendments had in practice died almost at birth".

Bianchi (1984:127) points out that some other amendments to the Unions Act aimed at strengthening the position of the established union leaders against new rivals and insulating the leadership from the rank and file. The Unions Act required unions to convene their general meetings and hold elections every two years at the maximum. But the amendment to the Unions Act lengthened this period to 3 years. B. Dereli says that "although this provision showed the maximum period, it was without doubt that most union leaders would attempt to get this maximum period included in the union statutes in order to maintain their leadership posts for a longer time". [B.Dereli,1977: 126-7]. It was also stressed that from the standpoint of union democracy, this was certainly an undesirable situation. [Dereli,1978:105; B. Dereli,1977:127]. Another amendment to the Unions Act stipulated that in order to be competent to found a union a worker must have worked for at least three years in the same branch of industry. This amendment was also overruled by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the three years requirement infringed the right to organize unions freely. [Okay,1974:252]. Article 6 of Act 1317 made it a somewhat difficult process to resign from a union. While maintaining the freedom to resign from a union by stating that "any member, if so desires, can resign from a union" it required that "a notice of resignation also be given in person in the presence of a notary public who has to verify the identity and authenticate the signature of the

member wishing to resign". [Dereli,1981:560-1]. The Turkish Workers' Party, in its application to the Constitutional Court, had also demanded the annulment of this provision. But the Court refused to repeal it. [Okay,1974:248]. Act 1317 subjected application for membership to the approval of "the competent body" of the union. Such a provision could easily be manipulated by the union leaders in order to prevent the membership of potential rival leaders. The Constitutional Court overruled this provision as well on the grounds that it violated the constitutional freedom to join unions by equipping the competent body of the unions with unlimited authority as such.

When the corporatist structures were endangered due to the rank and file militant actions led by a rival socialist labour confederation, DISK, the government did not hesitate to enact authoritarian legislation. It aimed at granting Turk-Is a monopoly of representation and weakening its rivals in order to save the existing corporatist structures. Turk-Is also openly collaborated with the government and the employer's confederation in the preparation and enactment of this authoritarian corporatist legislation. Thus it sacrificed union freedom and democracy for its own short-sighted organizational interests in spite of the massive reactions of the workers. This event well illustrated how distant Turk-Is leaders were from the rank and file, and how ignorant they were of the interests of labour. Nevertheless, Turk-Is continued to be recognized by the government as the exclusive representative of organized labour in various tripartite boards and commissions such as the regulatory commissions in the State Planning Organization, the Labour Council, the Minimum Wage Commission, the Supreme Arbitration Board, the Social Insurance Institution, the Employment Service Organization, the National Productivity Council and some ad hoc committees. In those councils or commissions, the employers

were represented by TISK. [see Yazgan,1982; Esin,1974:217-20; G.Kutal,1977:262-88].

VI. The Period of 1971 - 1980

1. The Military Pronunciamento and New Developments in the Relations Between the State and Capital and Labour

The widespread students' and workers' movements in the late 1960s and early 70s led to outraged cries from the bourgeoisie and right-wing circles. They propagated the view that Turkish society was not yet ready for the political freedoms that were granted by the 1961 Constitution. According to them, the 1961 Constitution was a luxury, it allowed political freedoms far in excess of those that were warranted by the existing socio-economic conditions. The Constitution, therefore, should be changed to restrict those "excessive freedoms" enjoyed by those who caused the existing anarchic situation. [Keyder,1979:30; Tachau & Heper,1983:23]. Keyder (1979:30) says that "the Martial Law, which was declared upon the massive workers' demonstrations in June 1970, created the opportunity for the bourgeoisie to experience at first hand the benefits of a suspended democracy, accordingly they began to demand some changes in the Constitution with a view to limiting the allegedly excessive freedoms". The Justice Party was not in a position to meet such demands. Consequently, on March 12, 1971 the military intervened in order to do what the JP government had been unable to do. The chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of the Land, Sea and Air Forces issued a memorandum, which was sent to the President and the Chairmen of the National Assembly and the Senate. The memorandum called for the formation of "a strong and credible government, which would

put an end to the present anarchic situation" and it was stated that "unless this was done immediately, the armed forces would be ready to take over the administration of the State.. in order to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic". The memorandum justified this intervention on grounds that "the Parliament and the government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest". [see Ahmad,1977:ch.X1]. Accordingly the JP government promptly resigned. Parliament was not dissolved, but a technocratic supra-party government was formed, replacing the elected JP government. For the following thirty months the country was ruled by supra-party governments under the control of the military until the general elections of October 1973.

The 1971 military intervention caught the Turkish Left in confusion. [Keyder, 1979:31-2] After the 1960 military takeover, extensive democratic freedoms and rights had been recognized, and some social policies had been implemented. Thus most of the left-wing movements, at first, welcomed the 1971 military intervention, assuming that it would resemble the military regime of 1961. Indeed, some statements made by the military commanders seemed to justify their optimism. [see Ahmad,1977:289]. Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that the military intervention had been carried out not against the conservative Justice Party government, but the increasingly powerful working-class movement and the leftist forces. The first concern of the military was "law, order and stability". The intervention aimed at preserving the existing order against the challenges from the radical left and the working class movement.

On 27 April, Martial Law was proclaimed in 11 of Turkey's 67 provinces. This enabled the government to take severe measures against those who allegedly involved in

revolutionary activities. During the first few days of Martial Law, political meetings and seminars of professional groups and labour unions were banned. Strikes were also forbidden by the Martial Law authorities in their respective regions. Political youth organizations were also closed. Many student activists, left-wing journalists, academics and the members of the Turkish Workers' Party were taken into custody. On July 20, the Turkish Workers' Party was dissolved. [Ahmad,1977:294]. Although the armed forces did not take over state administration directly, and the government remained in the hands of civilians, it was obvious that the military was in full control. A repressive regime was established under the control of the military commanders. But despite the establishment of a repressive regime, as Keyder (1979:32) notes, "unlike the pattern in Latin America, the Turkish military preferred to preserve Parliament and other Constitutional institutions intact in order to create a semblance of legitimacy. It sought to gain the support for the supra-party governments and the proposed constitutional amendments from among the deputies and exerted pressure on Parliament to pass a series of constitutional amendments". The proposed constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening the hand of the government in dealing with the challenges to the existing socio-economic order.

The Republican People's Party led a democratic opposition to the military regime and the proposed constitutional amendments. On the other hand, the Justice Party, while criticizing the military intervention, extended its support to the policies of the supra-party governments, which were dominated by the Right, and to the changes in the Constitution as in conformity with the interests which it represented. Other Parties of the Right were also enthusiastic about the amendment of the Constitution. Consequently, a series of constitutional amendments were passed in the National Assembly on September 6, and in

the Senate on September 20. The amendments, while maintaining the general character of the Constitution, basically aimed at imposing some restrictions on the exercise of some of the democratic freedoms recognized in the Constitution. Keyder says that:

In retrospect this insistence on constitutional modification seems purely symbolic. Only few of the changes that were implemented made any difference in practice. The general character of the Constitution remained, upholding democratic freedoms and social rights, but some restrictions were imposed on the exercise of those freedoms; for example allowing for the establishment of Security Courts in emergencies and providing for state supervision of the universities. [Keyder,1979:32].

Regarding union freedom, an amendment to Article 46 of the Constitution, replacing the word "employees" by "workers", abolished public civil servants' right to form or join unions. Following this amendment, the Civil Servants' Unions Act of 1965 was repealed. Article 46, besides this mentioned change, was maintained, which stated that "workers and employers are entitled to establish unions and federations without having to obtain prior permission, to enroll them as members and to resign from such membership freely". Yet a provision was added to this Article, which stated that "the law may impose restrictions for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the state with its territory and people, national security, public order and public morality". No change was made in Article 47, which guaranteed the right to strike and collective bargaining.

The changes in the Constitution were welcomed by the bourgeoisie, while they were denounced by the Left and organized labour. Turk-Is also raised its voice against the repressive measures and the proposals for constitutional change. Upon the declaration of Martial Law, Halil Tunc, the Secretary-General of Turk-Is, declared that "if workers' rights were narrowed, the reaction would be harsh". [quoted in Ahmad,1977:294]. He condemned the ban on strikes and the proposed constitutional changes as "threats to

pluralist democracy and to a just balance among classes". Bianchi (1984:221) says that "these were remarkable statements from a unionist who so recently had advocated corporatist monism". The massive workers' demonstrations of June 1970 against the amendments in the Unions Act had showed Turk-Is leaders that they had totally lost touch with the rank and file. As a result of such strong pressure from workers, some changes had already begun to take place in the position of Turk-Is. While Turk-Is had collaborated with the JP government in passing authoritarian corporatist legislation to wipe out DISK from the scene, in a letter written to the Prime Minister of the supra-party government in May 1971, the General Secretary of Turk-Is said:

Turk-Is had heard rumors DISK would be closed down in the near future. As you are well aware Turk-Is has had a continual battle with DISK, since DISK and Turk-Is have conflicting ideas and objectives. Despite this fact, we must cite our observation that if efforts are to be made to close down DISK the impression would be given of an overall attempt which aims at doing away with union rights and union freedom. [quoted in Hale,1976:68].

In the summer of 1972, the General Secretary of Turk-Is also raised his voice against the pro-capital bias of the supra-party government of Melen, and emphasized the need for transition to a new era of union political activity. Accordingly, Tunc, together with the Izmir regional representative of Turk-Is, called for a campaign to replace the Melen government and to defeat employers' attempts to freeze wages. In December of the same year, in his capacity as a presidentially appointed senator, Tunc delivered a dramatic speech to the Senate, openly challenging the right-wing Melen government and the military authorities. He warned that "the workers had sworn to resist every form of dictatorship whatever its source", and he threatened that "if necessary Turk-Is would be able to stop the flow of the foreign exchange remittances from the Turkish workers

abroad and to organize a general strike that would turn Turkey into a vast arena of protest meetings". [quoted in Bianchi, 1984:221-2]. The military intervention and the subsequent martial law created the most unfavourable conditions for politically active, militant DISK by banning strikes, demonstrations, any resistance activities in the martial law regions where about 90 percent of the industrial labour force was concentrated. Its closest ally, the Turkish Workers' Party, was outlawed soon after the Military Pronunciamento of March 12, 1971. DISK was not touched, but it lived under the continuous danger of being banned by the martial law authorities.

During the 1960s, a continuous and high rate of economic growth had been realized under the strategy of planned economic development. The industrial sector had registered a very high rate of growth thanks to the import-substitution industrialization policy with its highly protectionist measures and various incentives which constituted the essence of the pattern of planned capitalist development. It was also in this process that the big industrial bourgeoisie became an increasingly powerful element in the class configuration of society. [Gulalp, 1985:340; Gevgilili, 1974:85] Capital concentration in industry reached a considerable level. According to the 1971 statistics, those large establishments with more than 200 employees which constituted only 11 percent of the total industrial establishments produced 71.5 percent of the total industrial output. Those large enterprises with more than 500 employees were responsible for 49.1 percent of this large production potential. [Gevgilili, 1974:86] Having gained sufficient strength, the big industrial bourgeoisie began to claim its hegemony over other factions of the bourgeoisie. In the late 1960s, this led to an exacerbation of intra-bourgeois conflict which centered around the allocation of such scarce resources as bank credits, foreign currency and their

price. [Gevgili,1974:85; Keyder,1979:31]. The intra-bourgeois struggle for hegemony also caused turmoils within the Union of Chambers, which was dominated by commercial and small manufacturing capital. Eventually, dissatisfaction with the Union of Chambers led the big industrialists to establish their own organization, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) soon after the March 1971 military intervention. [For details, see Oncu,1980:470-75 and Bianchi,1984:252-9].(23) Oncu argues that "political considerations also played an important role in the establishment of TUSIAD. In the politically explosive atmosphere of the early 1970s, big industrialists and businessmen felt the need for an organization which would be active against the upsurge of the Left in Turkey". [Oncu,1980:474]. According to some left circles, "the formation of TUSIAD represented the willingness of Turkish monopoly capital to come out of the closet under the protection of the military rule". [quoted in Bianchi, 1984:268]

The economic policies of the March 12 regime aimed at strengthening the position of capital vis-a-vis labour. But more specifically these policies had a differential impact favoring big industrial capital. [Keyder,1979:33] If we look at Table 3 (in Appendix) for wages, we see that there was a marked decline in real wages during 1970-1973 period. The ban on strikes in several provinces accommodating the bulk of the industrial workforce certainly contributed to this fall in real wages. The Third Five-Year Development Plan, which was to be implemented during 1973-1977, was prepared under the 1971 regime. During the preparation of the Plan a series of conferences was held

(23) The membership of TUSIAD had reached 110 firms by the end of 1973, which were the biggest establishments in the country. [Oncu,1980:474].

between the organizations of capital, that is TISK, TUSIAD and the Union of Chambers, and the government in 1972 and 1973. [Esin,1974:208; Bianchi,1984:269]. But there is no record for any such meetings between the government and the representatives of organized labour during the same period. Unlike the previous period, obviously Turk-Is was not included in the making of the Plan. The Third Plan differed in some important respects from the previous two plans. It designed a new long-term development perspective, leaving aside the 15 year long-term development perspective of the First Plan before it completed its period. The new long-term strategy as provided by the Third Plan took the achievement of customs union with the EEC by 1995 as the main independent target, and the whole policy of the Plan was built on the basis of this goal. The overall strategy of the Plan to hasten the entry into the Common Market was well in the direction of the demands of big industrial capital. As in the previous plans, the industrial sector was to be given priority in the economic development. Import-substitution industrialization still continued to constitute the essence of the planned development. The Third Plan envisaged the extension of import-substitution to intermediate and capital goods. Yet it differed significantly from the former two plans in that it put the emphasis on the necessity for making disciplined and serious sacrifices on economic and social rights in order for the planned goals to be achieved. [Kepenek,1984:163-7] Such complaints from capital that the right to strike and collective bargaining endangered capital accumulation found their expression even in such an important document as the Development Plan. Kepenek (1984:165) says that "the the dilemma of reconciling rapid economic development with democracy remained unresolved in the Plan, more rightly a step was taken in the direction of sacrificing democracy for the sake of rapid industrialization".

The state and capital saw the source of the dilemma in the democratic rights and freedoms rather than in the nature of the structure of Turkish capitalism.

The 1971 Yearly Development Program, as a response to the demands of the employers, provided for the establishment of a tripartite Wages and Incomes Council to control wage increases and to see that wage increases did not exceed gains in productivity. As we pointed out earlier, whenever labour unions secured relatively high wage increases, the employers' Confederation brought onto the agenda the issue of forming a tripartite wages commission to replace autonomous collective bargaining, and pressed the government to take steps in this direction. This issue had immediately occupied the agenda of TISK in the first year of collective bargaining system when relatively high wage increases, compared to the previous years, had been secured by the unions. In line with the corporatist cooperation with the government and TISK, throughout the 1960s, Turk-Is had acted in conformity with the principle of linking wage increases to productivity increases, and pressed its affiliates to moderate their wage demands. Accordingly, wage increases remained very moderate. But with the outbreak of workers' militancy in the last years of the 1960s, the workers obtained relatively high wage increases in 1969. Immediately after this, TISK again began to force the government to form a wages and incomes council above the collective bargaining system on the allegation that the existing system gave a free hand to "irresponsible unionists" to press for "unreasonable wage increases". [Esin,1974:232-4]. Although wage increases fell in the following year, and real wages registered a considerable decline during the 1971 regime, still the 1971 Development Program made the formation of a tripartite Wages and Incomes Council under the State Planning Organization an official policy of the State. In

October 1972, the Minister of State, in his response to the criticisms of the Third Plan, stated that "during the period the government would follow a policy aimed at encouraging the private sector". He also said that "to determine wages and price policy and to prevent inflationist pressure, a permanent Wages and Price Commission would be established". [quoted in Esin, 1974:235]. This commission did not materialize, but in 1978, as will be explained, a Social Contract was signed between the government and Turk-Is.

The increasing popular discontent with the 1971 military regime and the clear position of the labour movement and the Republican People's Party against the military-backed supra-party governments, combined with increasing pressure from the European Community, left the military with two alternatives: either it could directly take power or it could withdraw to its barracks. It was evident that the first alternative would involve serious challenges. Eventually, the military decided on the second alternative and elections were held in October 1973. Thus after two years of interruption, normal functioning of parliamentary democracy was resumed.

2. Changes in the Policies of Turk-Is, DISK and the Employers'

Confederation; The Rise of A Conflictual Industrial Relations System

In the early 1970s, important developments took place in Turk-Is. The outbreak of rank and file militancy in 1969 and 1970 had well illustrated that corporatist arrangements were no longer acceptable to the workers and that Turk-Is was far from representing labour interests. Turk-Is increasingly came under attack from within its own ranks. The leaders of some Turk-Is affiliated unions began to charge the Confederation of political passivity, and forced it to abandon its above-party policy, which had proved to be a

failure. The transformations in ideology and leadership that took place in the Republican People's Party during the latter part of the 1960s significantly affected the leaders of some Turk-Is affiliates. By the early 1970s, those leaders within the RPP who espoused the so-called left of center policy had managed to take full control of the party organization. Ecevit, who was the main promoter of the left of center policy, was elected leader of the RPP in May 1972. In the early 1970s, the RPP began to issue calls for cooperation to Turk-Is. Ecevit, as the leader of the Party, stated that the above-party policy could only undermine the strength of labour. In a speech delivered at the Eighth Congress of Turk-Is held in 1970, he emphasized the importance of cooperation between Turk-Is and the RPP. [see Mumcuoglu,1980:390-1; Isikli,1972:344].

The leaders of four Turk-Is unions submitted a report entitled *The Labour Movement and Our Unions in the Turkey of 1971, Research and Analysis of Joint Means of Reform* to the meeting of Turk-Is Administrative Board held on January 14-18, 1971. This Report is commonly referred to as the Report of the Four. In this Report, the Four severely criticized the overall policy of Turk-Is but particularly its "above party policy". The Report proposed that the Confederation should abandon the above party policy and be linked to a definite political ideology. The Four, stressing the need for an ideological approach outside capitalism and also Marxism, called for a social democratic movement within Turk-Is. The Report pointed to the necessity for close cooperation with a political party of social democratic character. They rejected alliance with the Turkish Workers' Party and proposed cooperation with the RPP. [see Isikli,1972:342-46; Tuna,1974:265-7; Mumcuoglu,1980:391]. The Report of the Four created widespread echoes in public opinion. Nevertheless, it failed to be endorsed by the Administrative Board of the

Confederation. Despite the rejection by the Administrative Board of the Report, the social democratic movement initiated by the Four quickly gained ground in Turk-Is. Eight other affiliates of the Confederation decided to support the movement. About two months after the presentation of the Report of the Four to the Confederation, this time "the Twelve" produced a 380 page document entitled *A Social Democratic Order for the Turkish Labour Movement*. (24) According to the Report of the Twelve, the proposed social democratic order was neither simply a reformist movement nor the acceptance of the hegemony of the capitalist order which had failed to produce a sound industrialization or a fair distribution of income in Turkey. The Twelve also expressed their opposition to Marxism as well as capitalism. While the economic development model formulated by the Twelve was based on mixed economy, it was emphasized that the weight would be given to the public sector within this mixed economy framework. The state, "social enterprises" (kitle tesebbusleri) or people's cooperatives and the private sector would constitute "tripartite production". The Report also elaborated on proposed reforms in such fields as education, social services, foreign investment and trade, land ownership, agriculture, etc. The following strategy for achieving the social democratic order was proposed:

Like all other social forces, the Turkish labour movement is also entitled to become, or take a share in, political power. To make use of this opportunity, from now on we must aim at widening the horizon of our endeavours to become, in cooperation with other working people of our society, a major political force.
[*Social Democratic Order*, 1971:7]

Thus the Twelve were proposing the abandonment of the above-party policy. There was a

(24) *Türk İsci Hareketi İçin Sosyal Demokrat Düzen*, Ayyıldız Matbaası, Ankara, 1971.

close resemblance between the social democratic policies of the Twelve and the left of center or democratic left policy adopted by the RPP. Some of those unionists who came to be known as the Twelve were also affiliated with the RPP either as members of Parliament or party executives. In spite of the increasing support for the social democratic movement from within Turk-Is and increasing pressure on the Confederation to cooperate with the RPP, both from within its own ranks and also from the RPP, the Administrative Board of Turk-Is again refused to endorse the Report and give up the above-party policy.⁽²⁵⁾ In the Tenth General Congress of Turk-Is held in 1976, Ecevit, as the leader of the RPP, again found the opportunity to express his views on the RPP - Turk-Is cooperation. He made the following proposals to the Confederation:

- 1) To take part effectively in the Party organization, starting from such initial stages of democratic process as delegate nominations and primary elections
- 2) To advise the government once the Party takes office on all important social, economic and political issues and decisions in a mutual spirit of solidarity
- 3) To ensure a growing participation of workers in government.
[cited in Mumcuoglu 1980:391]

At the same Congress of Turk-Is, Tunc, who assumed the Presidency of the Confederation in 1974, for the first time, openly endorsed Ecevit's proposal of cooperation. [Bianchi,1984:223]. The Congress adopted a resolution to abandon the above-party policy, but without making clear-cut commitment to any political party. It authorized the Administrative Board to decide by two-thirds majority whether to support or not a

(25) For the Social Democratic Movement in Turk-Is see Tuna,1974; Isikli,1972:342-52; Bianchi,1984:237-45; Mumcuoglu,1980:390-93, Yici,1974; for counter arguments see Balci,1974]

particular political party in the coming elections. [Dereli,1981:582]. During the 1977 election campaign, Tunc made a recommendation that Turk-Is formally support the RPP. However, because of the very rigid 2/3 requirement, his recommendation was narrowly defeated in the Administrative Board of Turk-Is. Though no formal endorsement of the RPP was issued by Turk-Is in the 1977 general elections, Turk-Is took a stand favorable to the RPP. [Bianchi,1984:223-24].

Turk-Is, under the leadership of Tunc, tended to adopt a more militant and politically active role. This move on the part of Turk-Is from a collaborationist position to a relatively more militant role had some important causes. In the face of the rank and file's growing discontent with the corporatist arrangements and serious challenges from the rapidly growing DISK, Turk-Is could not afford to continue its collaboration with the government and employers under corporatist arrangements the way it used to be. Its class collaborationist strategy had led to the loss of much of its reputation among the rank and file. Turk-Is now wanted to regain its lost reputation. The workers' discontent with Turk-Is was evident in the increasing defections of Turk-Is members to DISK. After 1973, there was a rapid and considerable increase in the membership of DISK. The rapid expansion of DISK after the normal parliamentary regime was resumed was due to either the defections of workers from Turk-Is-affiliated unions to DISK-affiliated unions or the split of many local unions and some entire federations from Turk-Is to join DISK.(26) [Koc,1981:303; Bianchi,1984:224]. DISK's membership increased from about 100,000 to over 300,000

(26) In 1975 three federations broke away from Turk-Is to join DISK. The leaders of those federations were the main proponents of the social democratic movement in Turk-Is. [Bianchi,1984:225].

by 1976. Bianchi (1984:224) says that "Turk-Is's adoption of a more militant and politically active policies were largely a response to the rapid resurgence and expansion of DISK after 1973".

Another factor that pushed Turk-Is to assume a more militant role was the coming to power in 1975 of a right wing coalition government, known as the National Front. When the general elections were held in October 1973, no party emerged with a clear majority, though the social democrat RPP succeeded in coming the first, thus pushing the major conservative party, the JP, into a second place. An important number of seats were distributed among the small parties. As a result, in early 1974 the RPP was forced to form an ill-matched coalition with the National Salvation Party which was an Islamist reactionary party. This unstable government collapsed in September of that year. In return, the National Front was formed by an alliance of four right-wing parties under the premiership of Demirel, the leader of the JP. The National Front remained in power until the elections in June 1977. The 1977 elections too left the two major political parties without a clear majority. A second National Front Government came to power following the 1977 elections. It survived only until the end of the year. One of the coalition partners in the National Front was the National Action Party which was an ultra-nationalist fascist party. The National Front Government took an anti-labour stance and aimed to appease the bourgeoisie with short-term policies. The anti-labour attitude of the National Front government can also be cited as one of the factors that forced Turk-Is to follow a more militant and active strategy. In 1975, the president of the Confederation called for a partial general strike against the National Front Government, involving about 80,000 workers in Izmir. [Bianchi,1984:223].

At the same time that Turk-Is was forced towards a relatively more militant and politically more active position, DISK was forced to moderate its early political radicalism after 1973. [Mumcuoglu,1984:396-7; Bianchi,1984:224]. The Martial Law of the 1971 regime had created least desirable conditions for the politically radical DISK. Its best ally, the Turkish Workers' Party, had been banned, while DISK had faced the danger of being outlawed. This period inevitably affected DISK's general orientation, leading to a strategic change in its policy. It should be noted, however, that DISK never abandoned the principle of political unionism, nor did it give up its socialist ideology. Yet the conditions of the 1971 regime forced it to moderate its radical, hard-line policy. In this period of moderation, DISK sought to establish close ties with the RPP, which was considered to be now the closest party to the position of DISK among its counterparts after the closure of the Turkish Workers' Party. It declared its formal endorsement of the RPP in the 1973 and 1977 elections, which was in sharp contrast to its earlier accusations of the party in the 1969 elections. Although this alliance between DISK and the RPP was not free of conflicts mainly due to the ideological differences, still close cooperation between the two organizations continued. [Mumcuoglu,1980:397-8, Bianchi,1984:225:6].

To summarize, in the 1970s both union confederations were forced to modify their policies. Turk-Is adopted a relatively more militant and politically active role. DISK, on the other hand, moderated its radical position. They both tended to cooperate with the social democratic RPP in coordinating a greater political mobilization of the working class. The leader of the RPP, Ecevit, also expended great efforts to integrate organized labour into a social democratic coalition. [see Bianchi, 1984:245-8]

During the 1970s, the employers' Confederation also modified its policy towards organized labour. It abandoned its cooperative strategy and adopted an increasingly hostile and aggressive stance against organized labour. It also increased its calls for more state intervention in disciplining the working class. During the 1971 regime, the unions' power was severely restricted because of the ban imposed by the martial law authorities on union activities in their respective regions. Exploiting the existing condition of the unions, employers in such industries as leather, textile, rubber and food processing refused to negotiate the expired agreements. At the same time, employers more often resorted to lockouts to hasten the issue of back-to-work order by the martial law commanders. [Bianchi,1984:260]. If we look at the lockout figures given in Table 5 (in Appendix), we see that there was an immediate increase in lockouts about one year after the 1971 regime was instituted. During the 1971 regime, it was reported that TISK raised a supporting fund of around TL 25 million, and increased by as much as ten times the dues of the members who did not participate in the lockouts. In 1975, TISK organized an industry-wide lockout covering the entire textile industry as a show of force against Teksif, one of Turk-Is's largest and best financed affiliates. One year later, employers in the metal goods industry called for a national lockout. This lockout dragged on for nearly two years, involving forty thousand workers in more than sixty locations. This time the target of the lockout was Maden-Is, one of DISK's largest affiliates. [see Bianchi,1984:266-7]. In that year the number of lockouts had reached as high as 30. TISK showed the lockout carried out by the Metal Goods Federation as a model for employers' collective action, and using this opportunity, it proposed that in order that such a successful collective action could be repeated in other industries, it should be given direct control over a larger and permanent

lockout fund. TISK's proposal was endorsed by its members in 1977, thus it was authorized to administer a lockout fund that was to be supported by membership contributions exceeding TL 40 million. [Bianchi,1984:267].

It is worth noting that in the mid-1970s an important attempt was made by Turkish capital to solve its internal disputes and constitute a common front against politically mobilized organized labour. In 1976 TISK, the Union of Chambers and TUSIAD, together with the Confederation of Artisans' Associations and the Union of Chambers of Agriculture, formed the Free Enterprise Council (Hur Tesebbus Konseyi) to be a general spokesman for Turkish capital. But no move was made to form its constituent organizations into a more structured unit. [see Bianchi, 1984]

At a time when the labour movement was gradually overcoming its internal divisions and trying to form a left of center coalition in coordinating a greater political mobilization of labour, the Employers' Confederation abandoned its early conciliatory attitude and adopted a more militant position against organized labour. It promoted the greater use of large scale lockouts as a show of force against the unions. All these developments resulted in increasingly conflictual industrial relations. By the mid-1970s there was a sharp rise in strike activity. Not only did the frequency of strikes increase, but also their duration and the number of workers involved increased rapidly. [see Table 4 in Appendix]. There were also more politically motivated strikes in this period. While during the previous period, strikes were in general limited to the private sector, after 1974 strikes became widespread in the public sector as well. The workers resorted to mass political action more often in the latter half of the 1970s. [Koc,1981:305]. The employers also used lockouts more often and these lockouts were of larger scale and longer duration.

While the workers increasingly resorted to the strike weapon the government also used its own weapon of postponement of strikes up to three months in the case that they were liable to endanger national security or national health as provided by the Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Act. The government used this excuse sometimes unjustifiably to deter strike action. [Kutal,1980:199]

Table H Postponed Strikes 1970-1980

| Year | 30 days | 60 more days |
|------|---------|--------------|
| 1970 | 7 | 1 |
| 1971 | 8 | 6 |
| 1972 | 3 | 1 |
| 1973 | 5 | 3 |
| 1974 | 2 | 1 |
| 1975 | 4 | 2 |
| 1976 | 15 | 7 |
| 1977 | 18 | 12 |
| 1978 | 11 | 7 |
| 1979 | 20 | 8 |
| 1980 | 44 | 27 |

Source: Tayanc,1980:70

It is worthwhile mentioning an attempt by the right-wing National Front government to pass a statutory wages and incomes policy in response to the demands of the employers. In late 1976, two draft bills were prepared by the government to this end. This attempt by the government to adopt statutory wage controls encountered strong opposition from labor. The government was forced to withdraw any such proposals, and declare its disapproval of "any restrictive labour policies for the time being".

[Dereli,1978:108].

To sum up, the relations between organized labour and employers became increasingly hostile in the latter half of the 1970s. There was a sharp rise in strike activity and lockouts. Under these conditions the employers exerted great pressure on the government to replace autonomous collective bargaining by a system of national wage controls and take measures against workers' militant actions. In the face of strong opposition of labour to such restrictive policies, the government preferred not to take the risk.

3. Economic Crisis and A Corporatist Agreement (Social Contract)

By 1977 the Turkish economy had entered a severe economic crisis which showed itself in the form of a high rate of inflation, increasing unemployment and intensified external balance of payment difficulties. [Kepenek,1984:436]. During the first three Five-Year Development Plans (1963-1977), high and continuous economic growth had been realized at a moderate level of inflation. The GNP growth in the 1963-69 period was 6.4 percent per year, which rose to 7.4 percent during 1970-76 period. Thus for the fourteen year period, the Turkish economy grew by annual average of 6.9 percent. Nevertheless, the annual average rate of GNP growth was only 3.7 percent for 1977-78. Similarly, whereas the per capita GNP had registered an unprecedentedly high growth rate of 4.3 percent per year during 1963-76 period, the growth of per capita GNP fell to an average of just under 1.2 percent per year for 1977-78. This was the lowest level registered since 1960-62. [Hale,1981:132-3]. The first three plans' targets had been nearly achieved. Yet the signs of a coming crisis had already been evident during the first half of the 1970s. Since 1974

the Turkish economy had been growing by relying more and more on short-term foreign borrowing, which simply helped to postpone the inevitable crisis. [Bulutay,1981:495; Hale,1981:133]. Turkish export earnings fell far short of paying the enlarged import bill, thus forcing the government to seek more and more foreign credits. About half of the foreign trade deficit was paid through short-term loans from outside sources. In the 1975-77 period, Turkey's imports exceeded its exports by \$ 10.5 billion, an annual average of 3.2 billion. [see Keyder,1979:39; Kepenek,1984:349; Berberoglu,1982:110]. By 1977 Turkey had simply run out of foreign exchange, and the government was not able to find fresh credits. Turkey was not in a position to afford even the most essential imports for production. This had drastic effects on the economy. The rate of economic growth, as a result, declined sharply. In the late 1970s, inflation reached an unprecedented level. It was running at around 50-60 percent in 1978 and 60-70 percent in 1979, exceeding 100 percent by 1980. [see Kepenek,1984:437; Hale,1981:162]. Unemployment also tended to increase, reaching 14.1 percent in 1979 and 15.4 percent in 1980. [Kepenek,1984:374].

In the situation of deepening economic crisis, internally divided, unstable coalition governments could do nothing but resort to short-term policies to prevent a total collapse. The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983) could only be put into effect with a one-year delay. In fact, after the mid-1970s a wide discrepancy between the plan targets and actual economic performance had occurred. Kepenek (1984:435) says that "the economic conditions of the latter half of the 1970s rendered the plans meaningless and ineffective. It was not the plans any more that gave a direction to the economy, rather it was the economy that directed the plans". It was clear that the pattern of economic

development based on import-substitution industrialization had exhausted itself.

Amidst the economic crisis, conflict within the right-wing National Front coalition government intensified, eventually forcing the Prime Minister to resign at the end of December 1977. The leader of the RPP, Ecevit, was asked to form a new government. In January 1978, he formed a new RPP government with the support of recently resigned ex-JP deputies, and thus shouldered the formidable duty of putting the economy in order. Under the conditions of severe economic crisis, the RPP government was forced to implement unpopular economic policies. In March 1978, the urgent need for fresh credits led the government to sign a letter of intent to the IMF providing for new loans. In return, it was to implement standard IMF-engineered measures: devaluation and strict monetary and fiscal measures. Accordingly, beginning in April 1978, the RPP undertook a series of stabilization measures, including wage restraint.

The social democratic RPP government sought the help of the labour Confederations in restricting wage increases. Their cooperation was essential if this policy was to be successfully implemented. Turk-Is and DISK responded to the government's call for cooperation in administering wage restraints in different ways. Although DISK had actively supported the RPP in the 1973 and 1977 elections and continued to be its close ally since 1973, it approached this proposal of the RPP government with suspicion and resentment. DISK leaders in fact hinted that they could perhaps negotiate a social contract with the government only if it was ready to implement a series of social reforms which had long been on the agenda of DISK, including nationalization of a good portion of the economy and abolishing the right of lockout. [Dereli,1981:588]. Under the existing conditions, the government, which was itself standing on very unstable foundations, was

not in a position to commit itself to such far-reaching policies as nationalization of a considerable part of the economy. DISK, which was indeed not willing to take part in the implementation of wage controls, seems to have wanted to drive a very hard bargain with the government.

Turk-Is, on the other hand, was more easily persuaded to negotiate a corporatist contract with the government. After long negotiations, a "Social Contract" was signed between the RPP government and Turk-Is on July 20, 1978. The Social Contract signed between Turk-Is and the government was in essence very similar to its counterparts in those Western European countries that are commonly characterized as liberal corporatist, like the Social Contract reached between the British Labour Confederation (TUC) and the Labour Government of 1974-78. However, the Turkish Social Contract did not cover the private sector, only the public sector. But because it has generally been the public sector that set precedents for wage increases, it also aimed to lay guidelines for collective bargains in the private sector.

Under the Social Contract Turk-Is undertook to cooperate with the government in restraining wages. In the Social Contract, it was stated that:

In the face of the existing economic conditions the total wage increase made in the public sector was to be kept at the income level that was to be determined by taking into account the 1976 income level of workers, price increases during the duration of the collective agreements and the increase of employment in the establishment. In collective bargains, wages, social benefits and similar issues were to be determined according to this principle. [for the text of the Social Contract see Talas,1982:43-56].

This meant that real wages would be frozen at the 1976 level. It was this provision that constituted the essence of the Social Contract.

The Social Contract also dealt with a variety of issues directly concerning the whole economy, such as reducing the external dependence of national industry, solving the external balance of payment difficulties, social justice, tax reform and agricultural labour force. The Social Contract set down the basic principles agreed on by the government and Turk-Is on these various issues. However, the inclusion of these broad issues in a document like the Social Contract did not make much sense because it could not go beyond simply expressing the common view of the government and Turk-Is on such issues.

Some proposals incorporated into the Social Contract, such as workers' participation in management of the State Economic Enterprises, tax reform with a view to reducing the tax burden of the low income groups and amendment of certain parts of the labour legislation in favour of workers, can be considered as the price for Turk-Is's cooperation in restraining wages and preserving "social peace".⁽²⁷⁾ The Social Contract also stated that "in the conditions of current economic and social crisis, some circles, in seeking for a solution to the crisis situation, tended to promote such faulty and dangerous views as restricting or suspending workers' rights while ignoring the defects in the economic structure itself." It was declared that "with the Social Contract the Government and Turk-Is undertook to cooperate in safeguarding and improving democracy and workers' rights". [Talas,1982:43-4].

The Social Contract provided for the formation of a technical committee composed of

(27) These provisions were also subjected to criticism by some authors, for example, see Minibas,1979.

experts from the government and the peak associations of labour, which would draw up a co-determination model, determine the minimum norms of economic and social benefits and prepare proposals for labour law reforms. Besides this technical committee, the Social Contract provided that:

For the purpose of improving the cooperation between the government and the principal labor organizations in realizing economic development and democratic principles, a permanent commission was agreed to be established which would be composed of representatives to be selected by the parties concerned. The Commission would work together with the Minister of State to be determined by the Prime Minister. [Talas,1982:55]

While Turk-Is agreed to cooperate with the government in implementing wage controls, in the Social Contract there was no reference to profit controls despite the acknowledgement by the Social Contract of the fact "that the private sector had a great desire to make excessive profits". [Talas,1982:43] The Social Contract came at a time when there was a considerable increase in strike activity in both public and private sectors. As Talas (1982:11) points out, the Social Contract also aimed at controlling workers' militancy through their own confederation. DISK denounced the Social Contract for "making the working class pay for the crisis of capitalism" and it pointed out that while the Social Contract aimed at freezing wages, it imposed no controls whatsoever on profits. [Talas,1982:17; Bianchi,1984:248].

Although according to the Social Contract real wages would be maintained at the 1976 level, since no measures were taken to control price increases, real wages indeed declined below the 1976 level. Wages registered a real loss of 7.44 percent in 1978 and as high as 20.05 percent in 1979 as price increases reached an unprecedented level. This fact clearly showed that the real causes of the rising inflation should have been sought in other

fields rather than in wage increases. It is important to note that the decline in real wages in the late 1970s far exceeded the decline in the growth rate of national income. While the growth rate of GNP fell to around 2-3 percent during the late 1970s from an average growth rate of 6.9 percent for the 1963-76 period, and the growth of per capita GNP declined from 4.3 percent per year for 1963-76 to 1-1.5 percent per year after 1976, the increase in real wages was below zero. In other words the decline in wages far surpassed the decline in the growth rate of national income, with real wages deteriorating below the previous levels. This meant that the real burden of the economic crisis fell on the shoulders of labour.

The RPP failed to win enough seats in the parliamentary by-elections of 1979, thus losing its parliamentary majority. The RPP government promptly resigned. The leader of the Justice Party, Demirel, was assigned the task of forming a new cabinet. By October 1979, a JP-led government had been formed. With the coming to power of a conservative party, neither of the parties seemed to be willing to renegotiate the Social Contract. [Talas, 1982:Onsoz; Dereli, 1981:588] Besides, DISK and the Employers' Confederation had been left outside of this corporatist agreement. As a result, after a short period of implementation, the Social Contract was repealed.

To sum up, in the period after the 1971 regime, corporatist cooperation of the 1960s gave way to an increasingly conflictual industrial relations system. The union movement tended to follow a strategy of political unionism. The employers' associations also adopted a more militant policy towards organized labour. In the latter half of the 1970s there was a considerable increase in strike and lockout activities. During the same time, economic conditions deteriorated. By the late 1970s the economy entered into a severe

crisis. Under such conditions, the social democratic RPP came to office and shouldered the burden of putting the economy in order. It was forced to implement unpopular economic measures, including wage controls. It sought the cooperation of organized labour in implementing these economic policies and controlling labour disturbances. Turk-Is agreed to enter into a corporatist agreement with the RPP government, the essence of which was to implement wage restraints and control the use of strike weapon and other militant actions. This corporatist agreement, however, did not last long. Thus another experiment with liberal corporatism came to an end.

4. Prelude to Military Takeover

The economic conditions further deteriorated in 1979 and 1980. The deepening economic crisis was accompanied by political and social crises. The late 1970s were characterized by an increasing mass mobilization and polarization of Turkish society. In 1979 and early 1980 workers' militancy reached its peak. According to research by the TUBA Agency, in 1979 there were 267 strikes involving 39,901 workers. In 1980 the number of strikes increased to 424 and that of workers on strike rose to 84,432. The workdays lost as a result of strikes amounted to 7 million 709 thousand the same year. It should be noted that these figures refer only to legal strikes, excluding illegal strikes and other sorts of labour action. A total of 44 strikes were also postponed by the government. Of these strikes, 17 were postponed for a month and 27 for three months. [cited in Koc, 1981:307] In addition to this upsurge in strike action, workers' mass demonstrations, rallies, factory occupations, in some cases leading to open confrontation with the security forces, had become widespread. While the workers' movement had become more militant and

politicized, a left-wing guerrilla movement was gaining momentum throughout the country, but without direct links to the working class movement.

The latter half of the 1970s also witnessed the rise of a fascist movement. Its main social base was characteristically the petty bourgeoisie, which felt a growing threat from the accelerating monopolization process. Unorganized workers, shanty-town dwellers and small town workers also constituted a wide base of support for the fascist movement. The legal political organization of the fascist movement was the National Action Party, which was the coalition partner of the National Front Governments of 1975-1978. Being a partner in the coalition government enabled the fascist National Action Party (NAP) to infiltrate its minions into the state apparatus. The death squads, an underground paramilitary fascist organization with direct links to the NAP, were used to spread terrorist activities and street violence with a scenario that violence would be intolerable to the large passive segment of the population, and the NAP would emerge as victorious to establish order and law. The fascist movement was also used by the right-wing JP led governments against the increasingly powerful working class movement and the leftist guerrilla movement. At the same time a reactionary religious movement was also on rise.

Thus by the late 1970s, society was polarized between left and right extremes. Amidst this mass mobilization and polarization of society, the state apparatus was parcellized between the warring groups, leading to its paralysis. The unstable and rapidly alternating coalition governments were not in a position to lead the system out of the crisis. However, neither the left movement nor the fascist movement was able to assume power. In other words, Turkish politics was in a condition of stalemate. Eventually, the military once again stepped in with surprising ease. Unlike the 1971 intervention, this time the

armed forces directly took over the administration of the state.

VII. The 1980 Military Intervention and Suppression of the Working Class Movement

1. General Developments

On September 1980 Kenan Evren, the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, announced that "through the National Security Council the Turkish Armed Forces had taken over the administration of the State. The Parliament and government were dissolved, and martial law was declared countrywide. Political activity at all levels of society was disbanded until the adoption of a new constitution", thus marking the beginning of a new phase in the economic and social development of Turkish society.

Two major themes enunciated by the leaders of the coup were "authority of the state" and "national unity". The first communique issued by the generals stated that:

The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to reestablish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order. [quoted in Tachau & Heper, 1983:26].

"The solidarity nation" formula of Kemalism was dominant in the statements of the generals, but this time in an authoritarian fashion. [Gulalp, 1985:346]. The military junta propagated the view that the political, economic and legal arrangements that existed prior to the military intervention of September 12 had been responsible for the crisis, which inevitably compelled the armed forces to take power. It was specifically emphasized that

the democratic structure established by the 1961 Constitution led to a disaster. In the public statements of the military junta, the democratic practices of the 1970s were often condemned. From the very beginning, it was clear that the military would not be content with an immediate social peace or simply a restoration. It called for a thorough restructuring of society. In its self-proclaimed mission to establish "law and order", to restore "state authority" and to maintain "the integrity of the nation", the military junta immediately moved to suppress radical politics with a heavy hand. The martial law commanders started rounding up thousands of people claimed to be extremists of the left or right, secessionist terrorists or political offenders. During the first year of the military regime, 43,140 people suspected of illegal political activities were arrested and about 30 thousand of them were still in custody a year after the military coup. During the second year, 13,346 more were arrested, and in 1983 the reported number was 7000. Thus between September 1980 and February 1983 a total of 60,841 were reported to be arrested. Among those arrested and tried were also members of legal associations who were alleged to have engaged in political offences, former parliamentarians, lawyers and journalists. The crackdown on leftist groups was particularly harsh. According to the official figures, of the 60 thousand arrested, 54 percent were leftist, 14 percent rightist, 7 percent separatist and 25 percent unknown. [Pevsner,1984:88-9]. The demobilization and depoliticization of society were successfully carried out by the military.

On July 1, 1981 the National Security Council (NSC) announced the formation of a Consultative Assembly which would be assigned the task of drafting a new constitution, a new political parties law and a new election law. The nominated Consultative Assembly convened on 15 October, 1981. On this occasion of the convening of the Consultative

Assembly, all political parties then in existence were formally disbanded and their property confiscated. The new Constitution adopted by the Consultative Assembly and approved by the NSC was submitted to a public referendum on 7 November 1982. The new Constitution was approved by 95 percent who voted or 87 percent of the whole electorate. Under Provisional Article 1 of the new Constitution, approval of the Constitution entailed the automatic election of General Evren, the leader of the coup, as the President of the Republic for a seven-year term. By Provisional Article 4 of the Constitution the leaders and chief officers of the JP and the RPP and those party leaders, party executives and members of the Parliament against whom legal proceedings had been instituted were banned from participating in politics for ten years. The parliamentary members of the two major parties (the RPP and the JP) and those of the political parties against which legal proceedings had been instituted were barred from politics for five years.

What is envisaged in the 1982 Constitution is a strong state and depoliticized society. The emphasis is on the limits of the rights and freedoms that it recognized. The 1982 Constitution imposed extensive restrictions on the freedom of association. Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution, like the 1961 Constitution, recognized the right to form associations without prior permission, and emphasized the voluntary character of associations. But in contrast to the 1961 Constitution, the new Constitution stipulated that "associations can not carry out activities against Article 13, can not pursue political goals, engage in political activities, receive support from political parties and extend support to political parties". Article 13 states that

Basic rights and liberties can be limited by law in conformity

with the spirit and letter of the Constitution for the purpose of defending the indivisible integrity of the state with its country and nation, of defending the Republic, national security, public order, general tranquillity, public good, public morals and public health, and also special reasons specified in the relevant articles of the Constitution.

These special reasons referred to in the Article are those specified in the articles of the Constitution that deal with the right to form political parties, labour unions and freedom of the press. The imposition of such extensive restrictions, particularly on the freedom of association, was indeed foreseen in a number of public statements made by General Evren. In his opening speech before the Consultative Assembly whose principal task was to draft a new constitution, Evren, acting as the Head of the State, said:

While trying to enhance and protect human rights and liberties, the State itself also has certain rights and obligations as far as its continuity and future is concerned. We do not have the right to put the State into a powerless and inactive position. *The State can not be turned into a helpless institution to be governed by private associations.*

We can not reduce the State to a petty entity subservient to the Law of Associations. [quoted in Tachau & Heper, 1983:29](28)

After about three years of direct military rule the resumption of political activity and the formation of new political parties were authorized by the National Security Council on 25 April 1983. November 6, 1983 had already been set as the date for the general elections. Between April 25 and the general elections of November 6, the emerging political parties and politicians went through a close screening by the NSC, which exercised veto power both for the founding members of new parties and the candidates that could enter the coming elections. Two parties widely recognized as the successors to

(28) Italics are mine.

the dissolved JP and RPP were prevented from entering the general elections. After all these vetoes exercised by the military only three parties were allowed to fight the Elections of November 6: the Nationalist Democracy Party on the right, which was led by a retired general, and obviously favored by the military; the Populist Party, which claimed to represent the left of center; and the Motherland Party on the center-right, which was led by a technocrat, Turgut Ozal, who had been in charge of economic policy during the last civilian government before the coup of September 12, and retained his post during the first two years of military rule. The General Elections of November 6 brought a landslide victory for the Motherland Party, while the Populist Party came second and became the main opposition party in Parliament. The Nationalist Democracy Party which had the backing of the military, however, suffered a major defeat. While the military had expected the Nationalist Democracy Party to win office, it came in a humiliating third in the election. The outcome of the elections was generally interpreted as showing the people's discontent with the military regime. Following the elections, the Motherland Party under the leadership of Ozal assumed office. On December 6, 1983 the National Security Council, after ruling the country three years, was dissolved, and civilian rule was again assumed. Thus a process of cautious democratization began. [see Ahmad,1985; Pevsner,1984:ch.4; McFadden,1985].

2. The Military Regime and Organized Labour: Establishment of Authoritarian Corporatism

The three years of military rule imposed a restructuring on the union movement. In line with its aim of suppressing the working class movement, the military junta dealt harshly with working-class organizations. On the day of the military coup, all union activities were suspended, their accounts blocked and their documents confiscated. While on the same day all other interest associations throughout the country were also abolished, the organizations of capital, namely TISK, the Union of Chambers and TUSIAD were not touched at all. But ten days after the military takeover, Turk-Is and its affiliates were formally allowed to resume their activities while DISK and its affiliates remained under suspension. [Zeytinoglu & Shabon,1985:210] DISK officials were arrested and subsequently brought to trial. Fifty-two of its leaders were charged with violating Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, which in summary stipulate that "creating or attempting to create the domination of one class over another class is punishable with eight to fifteen years of hard labour or the death penalty". The military prosecutor demanded the death penalty for the 52 DISK officials. The leaders of some DISK affiliates were also brought to trial separately. In December 1981, 2 thousand other DISK members were also accused of engaging in conspiratorial activities to overthrow the constitutional order. They were later released. [Ketenci,1983:16-7]. Meanwhile some DISK lawyers and experts were also brought to trial. [for DISK trials see Zeytinoglu & Shabon,1985]. DISK was accused of organizing disruptive demonstrations, destabilizing general strikes and leading the workers to industrial violence. On September 27, 1980, the military government declared:

Labour unions (affiliated to Turk-Is) will continue to carry out their activities in accordance with democratic principles. However, those who exploit the workers, who wish to direct the workers along their own ways and misuse labour union rights will not be given any chance. [quoted in Zeytinoglu & Shabon, 1985:210]

While DISK was effectively suppressed, the more docile Turk-Is was allowed to survive but as a means of control over labour. It was put under the close control of the military government. When the military announced that Turk-Is and its affiliates could resume their activities, Turk-Is issued a circular to its affiliates warning them to carry their activities in conformity with directives from the government. [Zeytinoglu & Shabon, 1985:210]. The labour unions had to get the approval of the martial law authorities before they could hold any meetings, including executive board meetings, and the martial law commanders were to supervise these meetings. Thus although Turk-Is was formally permitted to carry out its activities, as Ketenci (1981:14) says, "it was impossible to mention any union activity in the real sense". With the majority of workers organized under closely controlled Turk-Is and DISK, the main representative of political unionism, banned, independent union movement was effectively suppressed. An authoritarian corporatist structure was imposed on the working class, which was very similar to the case in the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America. To guarantee the continuity of this authoritarian corporatist structure beyond the period of military rule, stringent regulations were imposed by the 1982 Constitution on unionization and union activities. Shortly before civil rule was assumed, a rather restrictive Unions Act (Law No:2821) and Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Act (Law No:2822) were adopted in May 1983.

The 1982 Constitution confirmed that workers and employers are entitled to establish

unions and federations of unions without having to obtain prior permission. But it denied the civil servants the right to unionize. Thus it adopted the 1971 amendment in the 1961 Constitution. It also emphasized the voluntary nature of union membership. Yet it stated that "the worker must have worked at least ten years in the industry in order to become an executive officer of a union". This is an obviously very restrictive requirement. Zeytinoglu and Shabon (1985:136) point out that the aim of this provision was to keep young and more radical leaders out of important posts in the unions. As a result of this provision, most of the young and more radical unionist were forced to leave their posts to the older and generally more conservative unionists. [Zeytinoglu & Shabon,1985:160]. An article was incorporated into the Constitution which explicitly stated that "unions can not carry activities against the limitations set by Article 13, and they are banned from pursuing political goals, engaging in political activities, receiving support from political parties and extending support to political parties." In addition it stipulated that "unions and confederations can not unite their efforts in any way with other associations or occupational organizations for these purposes". Such a provision had been clearly rejected by the makers of the 1961 Constitution on the grounds that it violated union freedom by forbidding them from any sort of political activity. Although the 1963 Unions Act had imposed some restrictions on unions' political activities, they had been restricted to extending or receiving material aid from political parties. Apart from material aid, unions were free to support political parties in different ways. Article 52 of the 1982 Constitution also stated that "administrative and financial supervision by the state over unions, their revenues and expenditures and the way of collecting their revenues shall be regulated by law". It also added that "unions can not use their revenues outside their stated goals, and

they are obligated to deposit their revenues in state-owned banks". These provisions clearly violated union freedom, and aimed to put unions under direct state control. The 1982 Constitution abolished the advanced rights and freedoms of unions gained through struggle. It imposed strict regulations on union activities, particularly their political activities, which are very similar to the authoritarian provisions of the 1947 Unions Act. It was such provisions of the 1947 Unions Act that had been utilized to suppress the independent union movement during DP rule in the 1950s. The aim of these restrictive provisions has been to prevent the re-emergence of political unionism or DISK-like unions.

Unusually for such a basic law as the constitution, the right to strike was dealt with in detail. Article 54 prohibited political and solidarity strikes, general strikes, any slow-downs, sit-ins or intentional decreases of productivity. It stipulated that "in cases where strikes are not allowed or postponed by the government, if the parties can not come to an agreement within the postponement period, the dispute shall be appealed to the Supreme Arbitration Board. The decision of the Board is final and has the effect of a collective agreement". By this provision, unlike the former Act which allowed strikes after the postponement period ended, unions are forbidden to call a strike even after the postponement period. The dispute has to be solved by the Supreme Arbitration Board. In this way, the government has been given an important opportunity to deprive the unions of the strike weapon. In the 1961 Constitution, the lockout had not been recognized as a constitutional right. By adopting the view that strikes and lockouts are of equal nature, the 1982 Constitution recognized the lockout as a constitutional right along with the right to strike. Thus Turkey became one of those few countries in which the lockout is a

constitutional right. The 1982 Constitution held unions and workers liable for any damages done to the workplace during a strike. It does not, however, propose any compensation for losses experienced by the workers as a result of a lockout.

When the Consultative Assembly began to debate on the draft Constitution on 4 August 1982, the National Security Council, by a decree, allowed public discussion of the document by all citizens except the banned politicians. [Mango,1983:31]. During the public discussion, the anti-labour provisions of the draft Constitution sparked a great outcry from the unions, workers and some intellectuals. Turk-Is, the only functioning labour confederation, publicly criticized the anti-labour provisions as well as the generally restrictive character of the Constitution. Turk-Is called it "the Constitution of capital". Some objections of Turk-Is convinced the National Security Council to make some changes in the final draft, but obviously without much success. [Pevsner,1984:101]. While different circles were dissatisfied by the Constitution, and severely criticized it on different matters, businessmen and employers extended their full support to the Constitution in general and its anti-labour provisions in particular. The President of TISK, Halit Narin, said that "it (the Constitution) is a commendable work which brought justice and balance between the employers and the workers". [Zeytinoglu & Shabon,1985:140].

In line with the 1982 Constitution, the new Unions Act (Law No.2821) and the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act (2822) passed in May 1983 also imposed strict regulations and extensive restrictions on unions and union activities. In MERI Report it is said:

The military government was ruthless in suppressing independent union activity as an attempt both to curb a potential focus for opposition and to re-order society in a fashion the junta

regarded as compatible with its concept of economic justice and with Turkey's best interests. In practice the latter objective has meant the imposition of stringent regulations on unionization and strikes mainly in the form of Law 2821 on Trade Unions, Collective Bargain, Strikes and Lockouts... The law makes it difficult for unions (other than the docile Turk-Is) to be constituted... and imposes strict limitations on strikes. [MERIP, 1985:92-3]

The new labour legislation perfectly met the demands of the employers. It was evident that the proposals of the employers were fully taken into account while the suggestions of Turk-Is were simply ignored. [see Ketenci,1983:12, Cumhuriyet, February 20,p.1 and 22,p.1,1983]. The new labour legislation was enacted by the military government and implemented by the conservative Motherland Party government. The Motherland Party government, in line with the interests of its social base, has totally approved the restrictions imposed on union activities, particularly the right to strike.

Immediately after the military coup of September 12, strikes were banned and about 50 thousand workers on strike were ordered back to work. [Pevsner,1984:101]. The National Security Council also forbade the dismissal of workers for any reason, and ordered the employers negotiating collective agreements to give the workers a 70 percent wage increase. This 70 percent wage increase was later extended to all workers. In the absence of any effective controls over employers' dismissal of workers, employers still continued to fire workers despite the decision of the National Security Council. As of February the annual rate of inflation was as high as 133 percent. Moreover, because of the very high taxes on wages, a gross wage increase of 70 percent amounted to a net increase of only 35 percent after taxes. This policy caused great discontent among the workers while the prohibition of strikes and 70 percent wage increase were welcomed by the employers. [Zeytinoglu & Shabon, 1985:226].


Since strikes were banned and union activities frozen, the military-appointed Supreme Arbitration Board was authorized to handle wage disputes and set wages, fringe benefits and other remunerations of workers. To renew the expired collective agreements, the workers themselves, the employers or the employers' association had to apply to the Ministry of Labour. And then the Supreme Arbitration Board was to make necessary changes in the collective agreements and put them into effect. Fixed wage and fringe benefit increases were decided by the Board on a yearly basis. It was authorized to repeal those provisions of the collective agreements that run counter to national health and security. Ketenci (1981:16) argues that the Supreme Arbitration Board abolished most of the rights of the workers provided for in collective agreements, particularly those regarding job security and the workers' participation in management. In accordance with the anti-labour policies of the military government, the wage increases set by the Board were consistently below the inflation rate. [see Zeytinoglu & Shabon, 1985:228]

During the first half of the 1980s, the workers incurred real losses in their income. This situation led to considerable discontent among the workers, but satisfaction for the employers. Keyder (1987:225) notes that the share of national income by labour (wages and salaries) declined from around 35 percent in 1976-78 to around 25 percent in 1983-86. He also points out that the change in income distribution against labour does not explain the whole story, for at the same time social expenditures of the state declined considerably, thus further contributing to the deterioration in the living standards of labour. Under strict state control, and considerably weakened under the military rule, organized labour was not in a position to change the conditions in its favour.

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As provided by the provisional article of the new Unions Act, union activity was formally resumed in January 1984. Accordingly, the Supreme Arbitration Board was transformed from a body fixing wage increases to an organization dealing with disputes in cases that strikes are not allowed or postponed by the government as stated in the Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act. However, in late 1983, the Supreme Arbitration Board had renewed for a three-year period the expired agreements in many industries. This meant that in practice collective bargaining in many industries was prevented until the end of 1985. [Cumhuriyet,1984:1 and Dogan,1984:1,11]

The new Unions Act states that unions can be formed on a plant basis or on an industry basis. With respect to the multi-union organizations it outlawed federations and birliks. The number of industrial branches was set by the Ministry of Labour at 28 (previously 34). The new Collective Agreements and Strikes and Lockouts Act (2822) requires that for a union to be eligible to negotiate it should represent at least 10 percent of the workers in a particular industry. (29) It was obvious that this 10 percent requirement would have the effect of granting Turk-Is and its affiliates monopoly of representation in their respective fields. It would make it very difficult to form rival unions.

The immediate effect of the 10 percent requirement was a decline in the number of unions from around 800 in 1980 to 100 in 1985. [Sen,1985:48]. This was mainly because

(29) In order to initiate negotiations the unions must be recognized by the Ministry of Labour or the regional representatives of the Ministry as the bargaining agent. Authorization of the unions as the bargaining agent is based on the membership cards submitted by the unions to the Ministry of Labour and the lists of union membership compiled by the employers by summing up the check-off lists.

of the disappearance of local independent unions or their merging with Turk-Is-affiliated unions in order to survive. According to the 1985 work branches statistics published by the Ministry of Labour, in each of eight industrial branches, there was a single union organization and all of these unions were affiliated to Turk-Is. They all met the 10 percent requirement. In 23 industrial branches out of a total of 28, only Turk-Is-affiliated unions succeeded in meeting the 10 percent condition. In other words, in only five industries some unions outside of Turk-Is qualified to conclude collective agreements. Indeed in one of these five work branches (agriculture and forestry), the 10 percent is not sought because of the peculiarities of this particular work branch. In the other four industrial branches those unions which were not affiliated to Turk-Is were weak compared to the Turk-Is affiliates. [see Sen,1985:8 and Isveren,1985]. This means that Turk-Is has been left as the sole representative of labour due to the strict legal requirements.

With the unions effectively controlled by the state and their activities severely restricted, Turk-Is leaders were forced to cooperate first by the military government and then the pro-capital Motherland Party government in the implementation of their anti-labour economic policies. Indeed it would not be wrong to argue that having been granted exclusive monopoly of representation by law, Turk-Is leaders have not been greatly dissatisfied with the existing system. [Sen,1985:48]. They avoided mounting a true opposition to the pro-capital economic policies of the Motherland Party. By the mid-1980s, however, a social democratic opposition had begun to re-emerge within the ranks of the Confederation. [Basaran,1985:23]. The workers' discontent with the existing authoritarian-corporatist setting

has also greatly increased. As the MERI Report (1985:93) put it:

The resulting shift of balance against the working class has greatly reduced the incidence of labour unrest and caused average net wages to grow so slowly relative to inflation that they declined in real terms in the immediate aftermath of the coup. While this has helped to restore business confidence, the cost in terms of alienation of workers should not be underestimated.. The fact that labour dissatisfaction has indeed intensified rather than abated points to a potentially explosive situation.

Writing in 1979, just one year before the military coup of September 12, Keyder was saying that "alone in the third world, its (Turkey's) political regime has been a genuine multi-party democracy since 1946 with the exception of two "extraordinary" periods together lasting about four years". He also argued that "so far Turkey's political traditions and social structure have enabled it to avoid the Latin American model of authoritarian-technocratic regime". [Keyder,1979:3] The same author, in his book published in 1987, came to point to "the similarity of the Turkish military regime of September 12 to the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America". He stated that "this similarity continued into the subsequent cautious democratization period". [Keyder,1987:228]. We can say that most of the conditions that preceded the emergence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the Latin American countries also existed in Turkey prior to the military coup of September 12, 1980. There was a massive political mobilization of the subordinate classes, particularly the working class. Its strength had considerably increased and begun to pose a real threat to the interests of the ruling class and to undermine the process of capital accumulation. Society was characterized by an ideological polarization, which was ultimately reflected in the parcellization of the state apparatus among the contending groups. This resulted in the loss of state authority. The State lost its capacity to

control the situation. But neither of the warring groups was able to defeat its rival and assume power itself. The existing situation can best be characterized as a social impasse. As in the Latin American cases, the economy had entered into a deep crisis which showed itself in the form of declining growth rates, very high level of inflation, decreasing investment and rising unemployment. After the mid-1970s it was evident that the strategy of import-substitution industrialization which had been followed successfully for the past two decades had been exhausted. The coming together of all these conditions resulted in a structural crisis. This was very similar to the situation that preceded the rise of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America.

While there were important similarities between the political and economic conditions that led to the military regime of September 12 in Turkey and those that preceded the establishment of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America, there were also some significant differences between the two cases. Unlike in the Latin American countries where foreign capital always played an important role, in the development of Turkish economy, however, the role of foreign capital has still remained limited [For comparative figures, see Keyder, 1987:182-83]. Keyder (1987:182) says that "Turkish capitalism was the most national in terms of the presence of multinationals of all cases (except India) of successful import-substituting industrialization". International capital played a very important role in the transition to the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in Latin America, and has continued to play a determinant role with respect to the characteristics of the state and of the national bourgeoisie. The latter, though it has survived, remains subordinated to the state and international capital. O'Donnell says that the national bourgeoisie in the authoritarian-bureaucratic countries of Latin America lost

all possibility of leading the new pattern of economic development while international capital emerged as the main dynamic economic force to lead the system out of the crisis. [see O'Donnell 1977]. In the Turkish case, however, the military coup of 1980 and the subsequent restructuring of society and the economy are to be understood in relation to the search of the national bourgeoisie, particularly the big industrial bourgeoisie, for a solution to the structural crisis of Turkish capitalism through extraordinary means. [Gulalp,1985] The big industrial bourgeoisie had by the late 1970s unquestionably emerged as the hegemonic element from the intra-bourgeois conflict. Its clear solution to the crisis was the abandonment of the pattern of import-substitution in favour of export-led development in which the industrial sector would assume the leading role. This was also the solution that was strongly urged by the IMF, OECD and the World Bank. The adoption of export-led development strategy implies a thorough restructuring of the economy or reconstituting the mechanism of capital accumulation. It also points to a new configuration of class relations. The shift from import-substitution to export-led strategy involves the reduction of the domestic level of consumption and increasing the resources available to the big industrial bourgeoisie. Thus an end should be put to the excessive demands of the subordinate classes, more specifically the working class. This involves the lowering of the wages if the economy is to be competitive in the world market. The labour force should be disciplined. This implies the dismantling of the organizational structure which transmitted these demands. The principal aspect of this is to effectively subordinate the working class organizations, particularly labour unions, to the state. Obviously this transformation could not be achieved within the constitutional framework and organizational structure of the previous period.

The new export-led development strategy had already been launched under the conservative JP government in January 1980 through the adoption of a set of economic policies, commonly known as "the Economic Decisions of January 24". This set of economic decisions was well in conformity with the explicit demands of the big industrial bourgeoisie and the newly signed stand-by agreement with the IMF. When the military took power, it declared its commitment to this new pattern of capitalist development. The effective suppression of the working class movement, subordination of labour unions and the considerable lowering of the wages were all in line with the requirements of the new strategy of export-led development. As we have explained, the policies of the military government that aimed at weakening labour vis-a-vis capital were successfully carried out. Independent union activity was suppressed, the more radical DISK was closed. The more moderate Turk-Is, now officially controlled and circumscribed, was left as a means of control over the working class. The military intervention did not only involve the immediate social peace, but the imposition of an authoritarian corporatist structure on labor, which was institutionalized in the form of the new labour legislation passed by the military government. The authoritarian corporatist setting imposed by the military also continued into the subsequent period of civil rule. Under the existing labour legislation Turk-Is has remained the sole representative of labour. The scope of union activities has been severely restricted. The labour unions have also been forced to cooperate with the government in implementing wage controls and preventing labour disturbances.

By the mid-1980s the increasing discontent of the workers with the existing system had already begun to surface, pointing to a potentially explosive situation. In a country like Turkey, which has a sizeable working class with significant experience in political

struggle, the experiment with authoritarian corporatism within the framework of a parliamentary regime (even though it is based on restricted democracy) does not seem likely to last long. If an explosive situation is to be prevented the ruling class should seek another compromise with the working class.

CONCLUSION

Turkey showed the characteristics of both liberal and authoritarian corporatism during different periods. There were transitions from one to the other at certain times. To be able account for the emergence of both the main types of corporatism, and transitions from one type to the other, one needs to analyze both socio-economic conditions and political context.

In Turkey, from the very beginning state policy towards labour had been motivated by a constant fear that economic development would produce heightened class antagonism, leading to the formation of radical labour organizations that would launch class struggle. [Bianchi, 1984:119]. State labour policy, therefore, sought to prevent or contain class conflict and class struggle. The techniques used to achieve this goal varied according to the configuration of power relations and the degree of ruling-class concern with winning the support of the working class. In a traditional society where the divisions in social and political life characteristic of capitalism had not yet emerged control over labour could be achieved through traditional authoritarian policies and some paternalistic measures as was the case in Turkish society of the 1920s and 30s under the authoritarian single-party rule of the RPP. The ruling bureaucratic elite had no interest in mobilizing the subordinate classes either. But by the end of the Second World War class divisions were fully in existence. The working class had become at least a potential force to reckon with. The traditional authoritarian policies towards labour could not have the same effect in the post-war period as in the previous period.

By the end of the Second World War significant changes in the power relations of

society took place. The bourgeoisie had gained sufficient strength to break its alliance with the bureaucratic elite and capture political power itself. This led to a struggle between the traditional ruling elite (the military-civil bureaucracy) and the emerging bourgeoisie. Both tried to win the political support of the subordinate classes, the working class and the peasantry. They attempted to mobilize the working class towards the goals of their respective parties. Under such conditions the 1947 Unions Act was passed. It signified the desire of the RPP government to establish an institutionalized control over the working class as well as to gain its political support. The Unions Act, therefore, contained both democratic pluralist provisions and authoritarian provisions. Accordingly, the RPP government established authoritarian corporatist relations with organized labour. Yet it also allowed the existence of some pluralist elements. During the election period, seeking electoral support from labour, it allowed the system to become more competitive. Indeed in the face of the growing popularity and strength of the DP it could not do much about it.

In the immediate post-election period, the system still contained some pluralist elements, but only until the DP firmly consolidated its position. Within just a few years pluralist elements were eliminated, and the DP government firmly established its grip on the union movement through corporatist structures. Thus a system emerged, which was very close to the authoritarian type of corporatism in terms of both structural and interactional dimensions. It is important to note that authoritarian corporatist practices remained limited to labour unions. The DP government followed a rather liberal policy towards ordinary interest associations. During the DP period interest association formation reached its peak. [see Bianchi, 1984:155]

We characterized the corporatism of the DP period as authoritarian on the grounds that the labour unions were coerced to enter into such arrangements. They were put under effective state control, largely losing their independence. The state did not avoid using authoritarian measures or violating union freedom whenever necessary in order to force them to cooperate in controlling and mobilizing the working class towards the state policies. Yet this system differed from the Latin American cases in some important respects. These authoritarian corporatist arrangements in Turkey emerged during the period of liberalization of the economy and democratization. They developed under the rule of a bourgeois party which came to power after democratic elections and by great popular support. It advocated the principle of liberalism, opposing the interventionist state. The main link established with the working class through authoritarian corporatist arrangements was one of control. Yet within the framework of a parliamentary system based on elections, the government also wanted to get the electoral support of the working class and mobilize it against opposition parties. Therefore the economic and social policies of the government were not specifically anti-labour. In these respects the Turkish case differs from the bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism of Latin America.

The corporatism of the populist regimes of Latin America also involved those aspects of control and subordination of the labour unions to the state. Yet it also entailed a considerable increase in the strength of organized labour vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. The corporatist arrangements in Turkey during the DP period, however, specifically aimed to prevent the strengthening of labour vis-a-vis capital and the state. Thus they also differed from the corporatism of the populist regimes. As a result, the corporatism of the DP period can be characterized as an unusual case of authoritarian corporatism from the

perspective of corporatist theory developed for Latin American countries. It does not exactly fit into the corporatist framework developed for Latin America.

After the military takeover of May 1960 which ended DP rule, an institutional and legal framework for democratic regime was firmly established. A planned development strategy was adopted. The authors of the new regime also aimed at the social and political incorporation of the subordinate classes. The principle of the social state was adopted under which generous promises of economic and social welfare were made. As a response to the demands of the working class, freedom of unions was put under constitutional guarantee, and the right to strike and bargain collectively was recognized, for the first time. This considerably strengthened the position of labour with respect to the state and capital. Organized labour was equipped with the arms which it had long demanded. The state and business realized, however, that if the strategy of planned development was to be successfully implemented, industrial peace must be maintained and moderation of labour demands must be secured. The crucial question was how to obtain the cooperation of organized labour in realizing these objectives. Authoritarian corporatist arrangements similar to those of the previous period did not seem a likely answer under the new regime. If rapid economic development was to be realized within the framework of democracy laid down by the 1961 Constitution, voluntary cooperation of organized labour in the implementation of the economic policies was to be secured. As a result, some kind of liberal corporatist arrangements developed during the period.

Compared to the Western European countries, in Turkey, perhaps, the state played a more active role in the establishment of these corporatist arrangements. Yet they emerged within a democratic framework. Democratic rights and freedoms, particularly freedom of

association, were constitutionally guaranteed, and the necessary institutional mechanisms were established to safeguard them against any abuse by the political authorities. In contrast to the previous period, the Labour Confederation, Turk-Is, voluntarily agreed rather than was coerced to enter into such corporatist arrangements, and to a great extent, at least in principle, it remained free to terminate them. On these grounds, we characterized the corporatist arrangements in the 1960s as a case of liberal corporatism. They resemble more the corporatist arrangements in Western Europe than the authoritarian corporatist arrangements in Latin America. Thus there was a transition from the authoritarian corporatist practices to a liberal type of corporatism.

The relative economic backwardness of Turkey did not prevent its politicians and leaders of capital and labour organizations to fashion some sort of liberal corporatism. Liberal corporatism emerged in Turkey despite the absence of advanced capitalist development which is considered by students of corporatism as providing the most favourable context or even the necessary condition for the rise of liberal corporatism. This shows us that the necessary political and organizational conditions for liberal corporatism can exist even in a developing country. Thus students of corporatism should reconsider the hypothesis of direct link between advanced capitalism and liberal corporatism.

We tried to find an answer to the question of who benefited under the liberal corporatist arrangements within the framework of the Turkish case. Turk-Is agreed to cooperate with the government and employers in restraining wage increases and preserving industrial peace. In return, it was granted participation in economic-policy making, and recognized as the principal representative of labour. In order to induce organized labour to cooperate under corporatist arrangements, the government also

promised to solve the unemployment problem, to extend social services and to achieve a greater degree of social justice. In conformity with the corporatist arrangements, wage increases remained limited, and the labour unions showed a considerable degree of restraint in strike action. But although this was the case, there was no improvement in employment. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s there was an increase in unemployment. This stands in contrast to the corporatist cases of Western Europe, in which the maintenance of near-full employment is argued to be the main benefit accruing to the working class. In a developing country like Turkey, however, near-full employment did not seem to be attainable. It is true that the government provided some social benefits to labour. Yet despite the government's promise of greater degree of social justice, inequality in income distribution actually increased. On the other hand, capital accumulation accelerated during the period. A significant degree of capital concentration took place. This went hand in hand with the growth of surplus value extracted from labour. Thus capital derived significant benefits from the corporatist arrangements in terms of capital accumulation and stability of industrial relations. The preservation of industrial peace was also in state interest. Turk-Is leaders and Turk-Is as an organization also obtained benefits in the form of organizational or positional gains. They were recognized as the most authoritative spokesmen for labour interests. Workers, on the other hand, did not obtain any significant benefits from the corporatist arrangements. Thus we can say that these corporatist arrangements were less "liberal" in terms of their consequences.

The asymmetrical nature of the corporatist arrangements caused increasing discontent among the workers. Like the situation in the liberal corporatist cases of Europe, liberal

corporatist structures in Turkey also encountered a threat from the rank and file and a more radical labour confederation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Under these circumstances the government passed an authoritarian Act to save the existing corporatist structures. This Act was repealed by the Constitutional Court. But the military intervened in March 1971, putting an end to the labour disturbances. After two years of quasi-military rule, normal functioning of parliamentary democracy resumed.

In the face of rejection by the rank and file of the corporatist arrangements and the threat from rapidly growing DISK, Turk-Is avoided corporatist deals and adopted a more militant position. Also, the right-wing National Front government and the employers' confederation did not seem willing to make corporatist deals with organized labour. The liberal corporatist arrangements of the 1960s gave way to an increasingly conflictual industrial relations system after the 1971 Regime.

By the latter half of the 1970s the economy also entered into a crisis situation. Under these conditions the social democratic RPP government came to office. It was forced to take restrictive economic measures, including wage controls. Cooperation of organized labour seemed essential if these economic measures were to be successfully implemented. The RPP government, therefore, sought the help of the labour confederations in restricting wage increases and preventing labour disturbance. Turk-Is agreed to enter into a corporatist agreement with the government. This corporatist agreement, known as the Social Contract, was very similar to its counterparts in the liberal corporatist countries of Europe. The Social Contract did not last long. With the coming to office of a conservative party neither of the parties to the agreement seemed willing to renegotiate it.

Under the conditions of deep economic and political crisis, the military again stepped in and directly took power in September 1980. The political and economic conditions that led to the military coup were very similar to those that preceded the establishment of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America. It was only a repressive authoritarian regime that could effectively curb the increased power of the working class, depoliticize society and carry out a thorough restructuring of society. This seemed necessary if the material conditions of capital accumulation were to be guaranteed and the new strategy of export-led development successfully implemented. A repressive regime was established by the military. The working class movement was suppressed. Radical labour unions were banned. More docile ones were allowed to exist, but put under direct state control. They were forced to cooperate in the administration of anti-labour policies of the military government. This system was very similar to the corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America. These authoritarian corporatist arrangements continued into the subsequent civilian rule.

The corporatist arrangements under DP rule and those established under the 1980 military regime can both be characterized as instances of authoritarian corporatism at a more general level. However, they differ in terms of the socio-economic and political context in which they emerged and the degree of coercion used. While the DP government aimed to control labour through authoritarian corporatist arrangements it also sought political support from labour against opposition parties. The authors of the 1980 regime, nevertheless, were primarily concerned with controlling organized labour rather than winning its support. A more repressive form of authoritarian corporatism was established. Besides the degree of ruling class concern with winning the support of

organized labour, the strength and autonomy of the labour movement played a significant role with respect to the degree of coercion used. The DP government did not confront a strong independent labour movement. Organized labour was still very weak. At least in the first half of its rule some co-optative techniques worked very well in keeping the labour unions under governmental control without a need for a high level of repressive measures. The 1980 military regime, however, was established as a response to a politically mobilized and considerably strengthened working class movement. It required a high degree of coercion to curb the strength of organized labour and put it under direct state control through corporatist structures. In brief, while both cases represent examples of authoritarian corporatism there are also important differences between them. In explaining these differences one needs to take into account political and organizational factors. In a comparative perspective the corporatism of the DP period represents an unusual case of authoritarian corporatism with respect to the political and economic context in which it was established. The corporatism of the 1980 regime, on the other hand, resembles the bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism of Latin America.

This study suggests that both main types of corporatism can emerge in a single country like that of Turkey. There can be shifts from one type to the other, depending on the existing configuration of power relations and socio-economic conditions. It also suggests that liberal corporatism is not confined to the advanced capitalist societies of Europe. Neither the corporatist framework developed for advanced capitalist societies nor the one formulated for Latin America can adequately explain the emergence of both liberal and authoritarian corporatism in a single country. There is, therefore, a need for

analyzing corporatist cases outside Western Europe and Latin America. We believe that such studies can make significant contributions to the theory.

Appendix

Table 1
Number of Labour Unions and Members 1948-1980

| Year | Number of Unions | Number of Members |
|----------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1948 | 73 | 52,000 |
| 1949 | 77 | 72,000 |
| 1950 | 88 | 76,000 |
| 1951 | 137 | 110,000 |
| 1952 | 248 | 130,000 |
| 1953 | 275 | 140,000 |
| 1954 | 323 | 180,000 |
| 1955 | 363 | 189,595 |
| 1956 | 376 | 209,155 |
| 1957 | 385 | 244,853 |
| 1958 | 394 | 262,591 |
| 1959 | 417 | 280,786 |
| 1960 | 432 | 282,967 |
| 1961 | 511 | 298,679 |
| 1962 | 543 | 307,839 |
| 1963 (1) | 565 | 295,710 |
| 1964 | 595 | 338,769 |
| 1965 | 668 | 360,285 |
| 1966 | 704 | 374,058 |
| 1967 | 798 | 834,680 |
| 1968 | 755 (2) | 1,057,928 |
| 1969 | 797 | 1,193,908 |
| 1970 | 737 | 2,088,215 |
| 1971 | 631 | 2,362,787 |
| 1972 | 642 | 2,672,857 |
| 1973 | 637 | 2,658,393 |
| 1974 | 675 | 2,878,624 |
| 1975 | 781 | 3,328,633 |
| 1976 | 800 | 3,269,356 |
| 1977 | 863 | 3,807,577 |
| 1978 | 912 | 3,900,079 |
| 1980 | 735 | 5,695,285 |

(1) According to Tuna (1964:425), the number of unions and membership in 1963 was 400 and 420,000 respectively.

(2) Talas (1972:255) and Ecevit (1973:178) give the number of unions as 658 for 1965, 724 for 1966, and membership for 1966 as 363,654.

Source: Ministry of Labour 1977:104, 1978:167; Zeytinoglu and Shabon, 1985:182.

Table 2
Number of Employers' Associations and Members

| Year | Number | Membership |
|------|--------|------------|
| 1948 | 4 | - |
| 1949 | 2 | - |
| 1950 | 2 | - |
| 1951 | 5 | - |
| 1952 | 10 | - |
| 1953 | 12 | - |
| 1954 | 17 | 576 |
| 1955 | 25 | 1059 |
| 1956 | 28 | 1092 |
| 1957 | 27 | 1244 |
| 1958 | 29 | 1364 |
| 1959 | 32 | 1434 |
| 1960 | 33 | 1150 |
| 1961 | 35 | 1076 |
| 1962 | 47 | 1820 |
| 1963 | 78 | 1605 |
| 1970 | 120 | 10,760 |
| 1975 | 107 | 8,943 |
| 1978 | 119 | 10,112 |
| 1980 | 106 | 9,183 |

Source: 1950-1963, Tuna (1963:252); 1970-1980, Zeytinoglu and Shabon (1985:182).

Table 3

Wages (TL / Day) 1963-1983

| Year | Nominal Wages | Ankara Price Index | Real Wages | Increase of Real Wages (1963:100) | Index of Real Increases | Annual Increases % |
|------|------------------|--------------------------|---------------|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1963 | 17.91 | 100.0 | 17.91 | 100.0 | 100.0 | - |
| 1964 | 19.50 | 102.7 | 18.99 | 106.03 | 106.03 | 6.03 |
| 1965 | 21.64 | 109.5 | 19.77 | 110.44 | 104.11 | 4.11 |
| 1966 | 23.28 | 115.5 | 20.16 | 112.56 | 101.97 | 1.97 |
| 1967 | 25.83 | 120.6 | 21.42 | 119.60 | 106.25 | 6.25 |
| 1968 | 28.22 | 125.6 | 24.47 | 125.46 | 104.86 | 4.86 |
| 1969 | 32.13 | 132.7 | 24.21 | 135.19 | 107.74 | 7.74 |
| 1970 | 35.32 | 148.3 | 23.82 | 133.00 | 98.39 | -1.61 |
| 1971 | 39.32 | 180.7 | 21.76 | 121.50 | 91.35 | -8.65 |
| 1972 | 43.88 | 208.3 | 21.09 | 117.77 | 96.92 | -3.08 |
| 1973 | 54.41 | 241.2 | 22.56 | 125.90 | 106.97 | 6.97 |
| 1974 | 68.26 | 278.4 | 24.52 | 136.90 | 108.69 | 8.69 |
| 1975 | 85.60 | 331.4 | 25.83 | 144.22 | 105.34 | 5.34 |
| 1976 | 115.30 | 385.9 | 32.13 | 166.82 | 124.39 | 24.39 |
| 1977 | 146.50 | 472.8 | 30.98 | 173.01 | 103.30 | -3.68 |
| 1978 | 207.90 | 724.8 | 28.68 | 160.13 | 92.56 | -7.47 |
| 1979 | 269.2 | 1174.2 | 26.87 | 150.03 | 79.95 | -20.05 |
| 1980 | 427.0 | 2365.1 | 18.05 | 100.78 | 78.71 | -21.29 |
| 1981 | 534.8 | 3168.2 | 16.86 | 94.14 | 93.41 | -6.5 |
| 1982 | 668.3 | 4066.7 | 16.43 | 91.74 | 97.45 | -2.6 |
| 1983 | 821.0 | 5039.9 | 16.29 | 90.95 | 99.15 | -0.9 |

Source: Kepenek, 1984:384, 441

Table 4
Strikes By Year 1963-1980

| Year | Strikes | Workers Involved | Total Workdays Lost (Thousand) |
|------|---------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1963 | 7 | 1,374 | 12.2 |
| 1964 | 81 | 6,603 | 192.8 |
| 1965 | 43 | 5,573 | 40.5 |
| 1966 | 39 | 10,401 | 409.8 |
| 1967 | 91 | 8,162 | 203.8 |
| 1968 | 59 | 8,098 | 192.2 |
| 1969 | 82 | 23,190 | 357.8 |
| 1970 | 111 | 25,963 | 260.3 |
| 1971 | 97 | 20,016 | 296.0 |
| 1972 | 14 | 7,158 | 147.6 |
| 1973 | 22 | 12,284 | 479.9 |
| 1974 | 45 | 21,046 | 470.1 |
| 1975 | 90 | 25,498 | 1102.7 |
| 1976 | 105 | 32,899 | 1768.2 |
| 1977 | 167 | 59,899 | 5778.2 |
| 1978 | 175 | 27,208 | 1568.9 |
| 1979 | 190 | 39,901 | 2217.3 |
| 1980 | 227 | 46,216 | 5408.6 |

Source: The State Institute of Statistics, *The Turkish Yearbook of Statistics* 1974: 178-9; 1978:158; 1981:170.

Table 4a

Strikes According to the Ministry of Labour 1963-1980

| Year | Strikes | Workers Involved | Total Workdays Lost (Thousand) |
|----------|---------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1963 | 8 | 1,514 | 20 |
| 1964 | 83 | 6,640 | 238 |
| 1965 | 46 | 6,593 | 337 |
| 1966 | 42 | 11,414 | 430 |
| 1967 | 100 | 9,463 | 344 |
| 1968 | 54 | 5,179 | 175 |
| 1969 | 86 | 20,162 | 323 |
| 1970 | 72 | 21,156 | 220 |
| 1971 | 78 | 10,916 | 476 |
| 1972 | 48 | 14,879 | 660 |
| 1973 | 55 | 12,286 | 667 |
| 1974 | 110 | 24,546 | 1109.4 |
| 1975 | 116 | 13,708 | 669 |
| 1976 | 30 | 6,264 | 338 |
| 1977 | 59 | 15,682 | 1397.1 |
| 1978 | 151 | 27,208 | 1624.1 |
| 1979 | 176 | 24,902 | 1432.1 |
| 1980 (1) | 111 | 42,483 | 4178.9 |

(1) Up to September 1st only.

Source: The Ministry of Labour, in Koc, 1981:304 and Zeytinoglu and Shabon, 1985:224.

Table 5
Lockouts By Year 1963-1980

| Year | Lockouts | Workers Involved | Total Workdays Lost |
|----------|----------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1963 | - | - | - |
| 1964 | 2 | 608 | 13,188 |
| 1965 | 52 | 1,051 | 22,071 |
| 1966 | - | - | - |
| 1967 | - | - | - |
| 1968 | 71 | 1,317 | 14,397 |
| 1969 | 1 | 10 | 180 |
| 1970 | 4 | 1,389 | 98,229 |
| 1971 | 3 | 2,064 | 95,730 |
| 1972 | 10 | 3,239 | 145,385 |
| 1973 | 10 | 3,278 | 90,578 |
| 1974 | 17 | 1,941 | 170,935 |
| 1975 | 7 | 1,776 | 67,949 |
| 1976 | 30 | 1,448 | 245,369 |
| 1977 | 4 | 596 | 126,467 |
| 1978 | 33 | 7,591 | 521,454 |
| 1979 | 15 | 968 | 141,848 |
| 1980 (1) | 19 | 824 | 95,383 |

(1) Up to September 1st only.

Source: Koc, 1981:336; Kepenek, 1984:394; Zeytinoglu and Shabon, 1985:224.

GLOSSARY

DISK The Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions (Devrimci Isci Sendikolari Konfederasyonu), founded in 1967 by a splinter group of more radical union leaders from Turk-Is. It adopted a socialist program, and followed a strategy of political unionism. It was outlawed after the 1980 military coup.

DP Democrat Party (Demokrat Party), founded in 1946. It came to power after Turkey's first honestly contested elections in 1950, remained in office until the military coup of 27 May 1960, after which it was disbanned by court order.

JP Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), founded in February 1961 as the successor to the Democrat Party. It soon became the major conservative party. It was disbanded after the 1980 military coup.

NSC The National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Konseyi), the committee of military officers created after the 1980 military coup. It acted as the principal instrument of military rule, and enjoyed extraordinary powers. It was dissolved on 6 December 1983 shortly after political power was restored to civilians after the General Elections of November 1983.

NUC The National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi), the committee of 38 military officers formed after the 1960 coup to rule the country. Fourteen radical members were expelled in November 1960. The NUC continued to function until civilian rule was resumed after the General Elections of October 1961.

RPP Republican Peoples' Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), founded in 1923, and ruled Turkey until 1950. It was dominated by the civil-military bureaucrats at the national level and notables at the local level. In 1965, it declared its commitment to "the left of center" or "democratic left" policy, but it was not until the early 1970s that the supporters of this new policy took control of the party. The RPP was disbanded after the 1980 military coup.

TISK The Confederation of Turkish Employers Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu), founded in 1961, and soon became a major representative of employers. It established close contacts with the Union of Chambers. During the years following its foundation, it followed a cooperative policy towards organized labour. In the 1970s, it adopted a more militant position.

Türk-İs The Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu), founded in 1952. It remained under effective state control in the 1950s. After the 1960 military regime, it gained sufficient independence of the state. It adopted the principle of "above-party" policy, and followed moderate policies.

TUSIAD The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Türkiye Sanayiciler ve İş Adamları Derneği), founded by a group of businessmen representing the country's biggest establishments soon after the 12 March 1971 military intervention.

TWP The Turkish Workers' Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi), founded by unionist leaders in 1961. It adopted a socialist programme. There was a close cooperation between the TWP and DISK. It was dissolved by court order in July 1971.

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